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The revised learned helplessness model postulates a critical role for self-
blaming biases in the development and perpetuation of clinical symptoms of 
major depressive disorder (MDD). Causing persistent and excessive feelings of 
guilt and other self-blaming emotions, a maladaptive attributional style is thought 
to contribute to depressive symptoms. Current therapeutic approaches are limited 
in addressing self-blame in MDD, and often patients do not achieve symptom 
remission or the prevention of recurrent episodes. This is particularly true for 
MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype.  
The work presented in this thesis tested the clinical benefits of a novel 
self-blame-targeting treatment protocol, employing a self-guided psychological 
intervention with and without additional real-time functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (rtfMRI) neurofeedback in early treatment-resistant MDD. Based on the 
recent finding of guilt-specific hyper-connectivity between the right superior 
anterior temporal lobe (rSATL) and the posterior subgenual cortex (SC) as a 
neural signature of recurrence risk in MDD, the single-blind randomised trial 
presented in this thesis aimed at rebalancing rSATL-SC functional connectivity in 
MDD, while investigating neurocognitive underpinnings of self-blame. For this 
purpose, a novel experimental task was developed and tested in anxious and non-
anxious MDD patients and healthy control participants. 
 Both interventions, rtfMRI neurofeedback training and the solely 
psychological intervention, were found to be safe and therapeutically effective 
approaches, with response rates of more than 55% in both treatment groups. MDD 





neurofeedback training and did not present with self-blaming emotional biases 
compared with non-anxious MDD. Further, despite resulting in a reduction in 
functional connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC, this change was 
not associated with a reduction in depressive symptoms.  
Ultimately, the findings presented in this thesis are only in partial support 
of the revised learned helplessness model with clearer evidence for its 
applicability in non-anxious MDD, whereas there was experimental evidence 
contrary to its predictions in MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype by 
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Chapter I: General introduction  
I.1) Background and rationale 
I.1.1) Major depressive disorder: the leading cause of ill health worldwide 
Depression can affect anyone at any point in life (Friedrich, 2017). Major 
depressive disorder (MDD) has been recognised to be a serious mental health 
condition, describing an affective syndrome distinct from normal sadness or 
occasional low mood (Holtzheimer & Mayberg, 2011; Schulz & Arora, 2015). 
Depression is declared to be the leading cause of ill health and disability 
worldwide and is proposed to become the primary contributor to the global burden 
of disease by 2030 (World Health Organization, 2008, 2017). Highly debilitating 
in nature, depression has a profound negative impact on the quality of life of those 
affected.  
In MDD, a complex cluster of clinical symptoms constrains the 
individual’s everyday well-being and is displayed to different extents and in 
various severities among patients. Nevertheless, core symptom features of MDD 
are a state of severe despondency and anergia (Holtzheimer & Mayberg, 2011). 
According to the diagnostic criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (5
th
 ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013) at least five of the following symptoms need to be present nearly every day 
over a duration of a two-week period in order to fulfil clinical criteria for MDD: 
1) depressed mood and/or anhedonia (loss of interest or pleasure), 2) >5% weight 
loss or weight gain or a decrease or increase in appetite, 3) psychomotor agitation 
or retardation, 4) insomnia or hypersomnia, 5) fatigue or loss of energy, 6) 
feelings of worthlessness or excessive, inappropriate guilt (not merely self-




reproach or guilt for being sick), 7) diminished concentration, and 8) recurrent 
thoughts of death (not just fear of dying) or suicidal ideation. Only if the 
symptoms result in the significant impairment of one's psychosocial functioning, 
and are not evoked by substance use or a physical health condition (e.g. 
hypothyroidism), a diagnosis of MDD is given. 
To this date, a plethora of research has been conducted in an attempt to 
decipher the complexity of this mood disorder and unveil the causal basis of its 
clinical presentation. Nevertheless, despite the development of a variety of 
pharmacological and psychological treatment options, a majority of MDD patients 
experience the current standard of available interventions as only partially 
effective in the long run (Bockting et al., 2009; Viguera, Baldessarini, & 
Friedberg, 1998) or never entirely remit from their major depressive episode 
(MDE) despite receiving standard treatment (Nierenberg & Amsterdam, 1990; 
Rush et al., 2006). Also, patients who experience at least two MDEs are found at 
increased risk of developing further episodes in the future (Eaton et al., 2008). 
However, all research efforts so far have failed to conclude irrefutably on the 
causal origin of MDD and to establish interventional approaches that not only 
temporarily stabilise the patients' condition but prevent a lifelong recurrence. 
Novel interventions are needed, effectively addressing depressive 
symptomatology and the vulnerability for developing MDD. 
 
I.1.2) The role of self-blaming biases in psychological models of MDD 
In his work on ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, Freud (1917, 1924) posits the 
theory that it is the presence of self-blaming emotions that distinguish the 
pathological state of depression from adaptive sadness and healthy mourning. He 




claims that ambivalence with the departed can turn unconscious anger towards 
others inwards, ultimately resulting in self-directed anger. Thus, opposed to the 
experience of grieving, depression is thought to be associated with a critical 
judgement of the ego due to the perception of having failed to live up to ideals 
(Freud, 1917, 1924). Freud further suggests that in a depressive state, the ego is 
being attacked by repressed emotions towards the deceased individual (Freud, 
1917, 1924). The depressed individual reproaches himself and expects to be 
punished (Freud, 1917). This causes the ego to divide into two parts that rage 
against each other, whereby one part comprises an inexorably critical component 
within the ego (Carhart-Harris, Mayberg, Malizia, & Nutt, 2008; Freud, 1917). 
 
Similar to Freud, Beck (1967) regards self-blame as a primary feature of 
depression, occurring in 80% of severely depressed patients opposed to 43% of 
non-depressed individuals. Contrary to Freud, however, Beck posits that self-
blaming emotions arise due to a tendency to take responsibility for negative 
outcomes of events (Beck, 1963). Specifically, Beck (1963) suggests that 
depressive affect may develop secondary to the presence of distorted cognitive 
conceptualisations, although reciprocal interactions between cognition and affect 
are possible. He acknowledges the presence of self-criticism (i.e. self-
condemnation) as a prominent clinical feature amongst patients with depression 
compared to a non-depressed cohort and explains self-criticism as a self-directed 
reproach for perceived weaknesses (Beck, 1963). Whelton & Greenberg (2005) 
link pathogenic self-criticism to self-directed anger, self-disgust and self-
contempt. 




Self-criticism is considered a personality disposition and vulnerability 
factor for feelings of guilt and self-blame, predictive of depression (Manfredi et 
al., 2016; Werner et al., 2019) and different models attempt to explain its origin. 
Self-criticism is posited to be the result of a deviation in personality development 
(Blatt, D’Afflitti & Quinlan, 1976; Blatt & Zuroff, 1992) or to be triggered by 
negative experiences within the motivational system for competition and social 
rank, provoked by a lack of self-defence mechanisms (e.g. self-reassurance) 
(Gilbert et al., 2006). Other approaches suggest parental criticism during 
childhood expressed verbally and through critical emotions to be a causal factor of 
depressogenic self-criticism (Shahar, 2015) and associated with self-blaming 
tendencies in children (Jaenicke et al., 1987; Rubenstein et al., 2016). 
Beck (1963) proposes that self-blaming emotions might be arising due to a 
dysfunctional (overgeneralised) self-critical attitude, separate from low self-
evaluation. The author further stresses the observation that no logical basis 
underpins self-blaming tendencies in MDD, as they may be caused by an 
erroneous interpretation of reality (Beck, 1963). Beck concludes that depression is 
characterised by the presence of the ‘cognitive triad’ of automatic negative 
thinking, comprised of 1) a negative, i.e. critical view of the self, missing 
attributes necessary for success, 2) a negative interpretation of current 
experiences, anticipating negative outcomes from any undertaking and thirdly, 3) 
a negative view of the future. According to Beck’s theory, such automatised self-
directed negative thought processes and interpretations result from depressogenic 
self-schemata grounded in negative experiences during childhood that led to 
biases in the perception of the self and self-related information (Beck et al., 1967). 
 




 Analogous to Beck (1963), Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale (1978) 
postulate that a distinct cognitive attributional style predisposes individuals to 
depression. The authors introduce the revised learned helplessness model and 
suggest that attributions are principal in determining affect (Abramson et al., 
1978). According to this appraisal theory, the individual’s causal attribution of a 
negative event determines how they feel about the situation and its consequences. 
Causal attributions to a negative event can occur on three dimensions: 1) either 
internal or external, involving the individual personally or the event itself, 2) may 
be perceived as persistent or transient in regard to time, and 3) may be viewed as 
global or specific, i.e. impacting negatively on manifold outcomes or being 
limited to that one negative event (Abramson et al., 1978). Internal attribution of 
causality for a negative event may result in low self-esteem; stable causal 
attribution is thought to be associated with persistence of chronicity of depression, 
as is a persistent attribution of cause (Abramson et al., 1978). Thus, individuals 
who display internal, stable and global attributions of negative causation are 
thought to be highly vulnerable to developing depression when confronted with 
negative events beyond their control (Hoffman & Al’Absi, 1998).  
Ultimately, in this model, depression vulnerability is thought to arise as a 
consequence of the presence of motivational, cognitive and affective deficits as 
well as deficits in self-esteem. Whereas motivation, cognition and self-esteem are 
understood as being based on uncontrollability, i.e. the thought to arise as a 
consequence of learning that the outcome is uncontrollable, affective deficits are 
assumed to arise due to the general belief that negative outcomes will occur 
(Abramson et al., 1978). To summarise, the revised learned helplessness model 
states that overgeneralised self-blame leads to increased feelings of guilt and in 




turn to low self-worth, which corresponds to a high-level vulnerability for 
depression. 
 
 Teasdale (1983) points to a bi-directional reciprocal relationship between 
emotions and cognition in depression, stressing the possibility that not only 
negative thinking may lead to or maintain depressed mood, but that depressed 
mood may also be the cause of negative thinking biases. Contrary to Beck, 
however, Teasdale claims that dysfunctional attitudes are not always observed in 
individuals remitted from depression (Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004). Teasdale, 
therefore, contradicts Beck’s postulation that dysfunctional attitudes are 
necessarily a vulnerability factor for depression. He proposes the differential 
activation hypothesis to explain cognitive vulnerability to depression and declares 
cognitive reactivity to be crucial in determining depression severity and 
persistence (Teasdale, 1983, 1988). Further, he postulates that depressogenic 
cognitions (i.e. negative information processing biases) are triggered by dysphoric 
mood states, a theory that was supported by his research on mood priming and the 
subsequent assessment of dysfunctional attitudes in MDD (Lau et al., 2004; 
Teasdale, 1983, 1988). 
 
By no means does this brief overview on psychological theories of MDD 
claim completeness, yet it aims at demonstrating that all these influential MDD 
models agree on an essential role of self-blame (biases) and associated emotions 
in the pathogenesis of depression.  
Furthermore, the social model of MDD postulated by Brown & Harris 
(1978) assumes a key role for psychological factors such as low self-esteem in the 




mediation of the relationship between stressful life events and depression. 
Notably, as aforementioned, low self-esteem is a result of cognitive self-blaming 
biases, according to Abramson et al. (1978). Recent experimental evidence in 
MDD demonstrated that patients with MDD are further affected by a negative 
memory bias, ultimately, resulting in generalised biases towards negative self-
judgement (Hitchcock, Rees & Dalgeish, 2017). 
 
The widely formulated consensus on a central role of self-blaming 
emotions in MDD is in contrast to another influential model that postulates 
decreased positive and increased negative emotionality in MDD (Watson, Clark, 
& Carey, 1988a). Using a measure of positive and negative affect, the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988b), the 
authors investigated individuals diagnosed with anxiety or depressive disorders 
and found that both patient groups showed increased negative emotions, yet a 
significant reduction of positive emotions was distinctive for MDD (Watson et al., 
1988a; Watson et al., 1988b). Recent papers in remitted MDD, however, 
contradict the predictions of this model by use of the value-related moral 
sentiment task (VMST; Zahn et al., 2009b), showing a reduced level of negative 
emotions towards others (contempt/disgust and indignation/anger towards others) 
and a relative increase in overgeneralised self-blaming emotions, e.g. self-
contempt bias (Green, Moll, Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 2013; Zahn et al., 
2015b).  
 
Despite a strong theoretical case for the importance of self-blaming 
emotions in MDD, as outlined above, the evidence base so far is inconsistent. 




Research using the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) 
failed to show replicable evidence of self-blaming attributional styles in 
individuals vulnerable to MDD (Green et al., 2013). One reason for this might be 
that the ASQ uses hypothetical scenarios which are of different relevance to 
different participants. Also, the ASQ does not ask the participant about the 
emotional relevance of their attribution. Furthermore, it needs to be considered 
that self-blaming emotional biases found with the VMST have so far not been 
probed in symptomatic MDD. In addition, unpublished secondary data analyses of 
the data in Zahn et al. (2015b) point to self-blaming emotional biases being more 
pronounced in melancholic subtype patients. This finding calls into question 
whether these biases can be detected across a broader range of patients, including 
those resistant to full remission as seen in specialist clinics who often fall into the 
anxious distress subcategory of MDD (Fava et al., 2008; Gaspersz et al., 2017).  
 
In this thesis, I will assume a strong relationship between self-blaming 
emotions and cognitions that cannot be dissociated. This view is based on a 
neurocognitive model of complex socio-moral emotions and cognitions that 
presumes overlapping neural and cognitive elements of socio-moral cognition and 
emotion (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, 
Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). Specifications of this model are further explained in 
the following section of this chapter. This view is also in keeping with the 
differential activation hypothesis, which assumes a bi-directional and close 
relationship between emotions and cognitions (Teasdale, 1988). 
 




I.1.3) Self-blaming emotional biases and moral motivation 
Morality is understood as a set of values that are adopted by a cultural 
group and directive of social conduct (Moll et al., 2005). The term ‘moral 
motivation’ was coined by Francis Hutcheson, who postulated that actions and 
behaviours are motivated by moral sense (Bishop, 1996). According to this 
theory, moral sense, in turn, gives rise to pleasure or pain, both forms of desire, 
and thereby driving behaviour (Bishop, 1996). According to Hutcheson’s theory, 
moral sense can motivate action, but it is benevolence that motivates virtuous acts 
(Bishop, 1996). Contrary to Hutcheson’s view on moral sense, his successor 
Adam Smith claimed, that it is not self-interest, but ‘moral sentiments’, sympathy, 
in particular, that constitute the root source for moral motivation (Lamb, 1974). 
Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza & Moll (2018a) remark that it is the motivation that 
drives the action, which distinguishes cognitive and emotional components 
underpinning moral behaviour compared with social behaviour in general. 
Moll and colleagues define moral sentiments, feelings or emotions as 
complex subjective experiences that enable humans to be motivated by the needs 
of other individuals or directed by sociocultural norms (Moll et al., 2008, Zahn, 
De Oliveira-Souza, & Moll, 2013; Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza & Moll, 2011). Also, 
modern psychologists classify various feelings related to self-blame as ‘moral 
emotions’, i.e. guilt (O’Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; Tangney, 1991), shame 
(Tangney, 1991), self-directed anger (Freud, 1917, 1924), and self-directed 
contempt/disgust (Green et al., 2013). Further, feelings related to blaming others, 
such as moral disgust/contempt and indignation/moral anger towards others are 
considered moral emotions (Moll et al., 2007).  
 




Evolutionary simulation models showed that moral emotions related to 
blaming others, such as indignation towards others, are crucial determents in the 
enforcement of moral rules in societies by enabling so-called altruistic punishment 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Notably, altruistic punishment describes the instance 
when individuals risk their resources or health to punish people who act against 
the common welfare (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). Blaming others is also known as a 
defence mechanism in order to protect one’s self-esteem (Bentall, Kinderman, & 
Kaney, 1994; Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994). Thus, one would expect that self-
esteem and moral motivation critically depend on the balance between emotions 
related to self-directed blame and blaming others.  
 
I.1.4) The neural basis of self-blaming emotional biases in MDD 
The neural basis of affect is proven to be complex, even if emotions are 
experienced as distinct feelings (Kragel & LaBar, 2016). Different views have 
been expressed in the attempt to conclude whether representations of emotions in 
the brain involve discrete neural circuits for specific emotions (Hamann, 2012; 
Kragel & LaBar, 2014) or whether the brain basis of emotions consists of an 
integrated system underpinning all emotions (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist et al., 
2012). While two-dimensional models (implicating pleasure and arousal) have 
been shown to be applicable to the experience of emotion (Russel, 1980), they fail 
to explain why brain injury or mental illness can result in selective emotional 
impairment (e.g. the recognition of disgust) instead of causing damage to a 
broader scope of emotions (Calder, Lawrence & Young 2001). Neuroimaging 
studies implementing multivoxel pattern analysis provide further evidence against 
dimensional theories and support the notion that neural systems underlying 




emotion categories can be discriminated despite relying on distributed cortical and 
subcortical brain regions (Kragel & LaBar, 2016).  
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and an earlier 
version of the VMST, Zahn et al. (2009b) investigated the neural basis of context-
dependent moral sentiments in healthy control (HC) participants. Amongst other 
sentiments, such as pride and gratitude, the authors were particularly interested in 
exploring the neural architecture of guilt, employed in a negative self-agency 
condition, and indignation/anger, evoked in a negative other-agency condition. 
Activation in the right superior anterior temporal lobe (rSATL; Brodmann Area 
[BA] 38/22) was independent of agency and valence, and activation in this area 
was significantly associated with the level of descriptiveness of the social 
behaviour investigated. This finding confirmed previous results by the authors, 
who concluded that the rSATL represents conceptual knowledge that allows the 
comprehension and evaluation of social behaviours (Zahn et al., 2007). Specific to 
the guilt condition, but not the indignation/anger condition in the fMRI 
experiment, was activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (which was also 
found for pride). Activity in the subgenual cingulate, however, was only found to 
be a correlate for guilt (Zahn et al., 2009b). Conversely, feelings of 
anger/indignation towards others correlated with activity in the lateral 
orbitofrontal-insular cortices (Zahn et al., 2009b).  
In another study in HC participants (Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, 
Garrido, & Moll, 2009a), the same research group confirmed the link between 
subgenual activity and feelings of guilt. It is noteworthy, however, that in both 
studies (Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2009a; Zahn, Moll, et al., 2009b), the 
subgenual region was only associated with guilt, when individual differences were 




modelled for either proneness to guilt (Zahn, Moll, et al., 2009b) or empathic 
concern (Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza, et al., 2009a). Zahn et al. (2018a) concluded 
from these findings that the role the subgenual area plays in the experience of 
guilt might depend on proneness to guilt or empathic concern.  
Further, Moll et al. (2011) investigated prosocial sentiments, including 
guilt, pity and embarrassment, using a moral sentiment test in patients diagnosed 
with frontotemporal dementia. This research built on previous observations of 
inappropriate and less prosocial behaviour in individuals with lesions to the 
frontopolar and ventromedial frontal areas (Liu et al., 2004; Zahn, 2015a). Using 
18-Fluoro-Deoxy-Glucose-Positron Emission Tomography to assess participants’ 
regional cerebral glucose metabolism (Herholz, Carter & Jones, 2007), Moll et al. 
(2011) found that the degree of impairment of prosocial sentiments (guilt, pity and 
embarrassment) was linked with the degree of abnormalities of glucose 
metabolism in the frontopolar cortex, whereas the loss of feeling of guilt and pity 
was linked to septal dysfunction. Other-blaming emotions, e.g. anger or disgust 
towards others, were associated with abnormal glucose metabolism in the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala. 
Frontopolar activations were also associated with guilt compared with 
other unpleasant emotions in fMRI studies of HC populations (Basile et al., 2011; 
Moll et al., 2007; Morey et al., 2012) as further summarised in Zahn et al. 
(2018a). 
 
Zahn and Moll’s research findings of subgenual and adjacent septal 
activation in relation to guilt compared with indignation were complemented by 
research demonstrating subgenual activation in a charitable donation task in HC 




participants (Moll et al., 2006) and replicated in remitted MDD for the first time 
by Green, Lambon Ralph, Moll, Deakin & Zahn (2012).  
Green et al. (2012) were interested in investigating the neural architecture 
of self-blaming biases in MDD. Comparing a remitted MDD group with HC 
participants, the authors investigated whether the MDD group would show guilt-
selective connectivity abnormalities between the subgenual cingulate cortex/septal 
region and the rSATL as a marker of deficient functional integration, which could 
explain overgeneralised self-blaming biases in MDD. The hypothesis was based 
on fMRI evidence of functional integration between the rSATL and the subgenual 
cingulate region during the experience of guilt in HC participants. This signature 
was specific to guilt, contrary to a functional integration pattern of the rSATL 
with the lateral orbitofrontal cortex for indignation in HC participants (Green et 
al., 2010). In their investigation in remitted MDD, Green et al. (2012) recruited an 
MDD group that was medication-free, in remission for more than one year and 
comparable with HC participants regarding psychosocial functioning and 
depression scores (within a normal range). All participants underwent fMRI and 
completed the VMST post-scanning and were assessed for overgeneralised self-
blame by means of the validated Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire (IGQ; 
O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, Bush & Sampson, 1997). In their analyses, the authors 
controlled for the degree of negative valence and emotional intensity. As 
predicted, a guilt-selective decrease in connectivity between the rSATL and the 
subgenual/septal region was found compared with HC participants. In addition, 
connectivity between the rSATL and other brain regions was found, including 
medial frontopolar, right hippocampal and lateral hypothalamic areas (Green et 
al., 2012). The authors concluded from their findings that temporofrontolimbic 




connectivity abnormalities underpin self-blaming emotional biases in (remitted) 
MDD and are associated with an increased vulnerability to depression. 
 Further evidence for the neural basis of self-blaming emotions in remitted 
MDD was provided by Lythe et al. (2015). This study found self-blame to be 
associated with a selective hyper-connectivity pattern (relative to blaming others) 
between the rSATL and the posterior subgenual cortex (SC; BA 25) in those 
remitted from MDD who would develop another episode of MDD within 14 
months. The predictive accuracy was estimated at 75% (Lythe et al., 2015). The 
recurring MDD group was found to show significantly higher connectivity 
between these brain areas than the stable group and HC participants. The 
difference in the direction of self-blame-selective connectivity abnormalities in 
MDD between the studies by Lythe et al. (2015) and Green et al. (2012) is 
suspected of having occurred by differences in clinical features in both patient 
samples (Lythe et al., 2015). Specifically, in their prospective study, Lythe et al., 
(2015) report a significantly higher overall risk of recurrence, with only 23% of 
MDD patients having experienced only one previous MDE. On the contrary, 
Green et al. (2012) base the findings of their cross-sectional study on a sample 
comprised of MDD patients with a lower overall recurrence risk, with 56% of 
MDD patients having had only one MDE prior to study participation. 
 
 A systematic review on the neurobiology of shame and guilt, comprising 
21 studies, including studies in remitted MDD, further highlights activations in 
the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, posterior temporal regions and precuneus for 
guilt and activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex 
and sensorimotor cortex for shame (Bastin, Harrison, Davey, Moll, & Whittle, 




2016). Moreover, quantitative meta-analyses were published on the neural basis of 
guilt, e.g. Gifuni, Kendal & Jollant (2017) and are in partial support of the 
findings by Zahn and Moll as presented above. Nevertheless, Zahn et al. (2018a) 
stress methodological, appraisal and reporting issues of these reviewing studies 
(Bastin et al., 2016; Gifuni et al., 2017) which impede clear conclusions. As these 
reviews miss to stress subgenual/septal activation during the experience of guilt, 
Zahn et al., (2018a) remark that the focus of the studies included was not on 
controlling for individual differences in the experience of guilt-evoking stimuli or 
on employing optimised sequences for ventral frontal regions. 
To summarise, the literature on the neural basis of self-blame in HC 
participants and patients with frontotemporal dementia points to the importance of 
the frontopolar and subgenual cingulate cortices (extending posteriorly to the 
adjacent septal area) when compared against indignation towards others or other 
unpleasant emotions. Zahn et al. (2018a) provide an extensive summary of the 
current literature. Subgenual cingulate activations are only reproducible when 
individual differences in guilt proneness or empathic concern are modelled. These 
findings have been replicated in remitted MDD, with research in current MDD 
lacking. Lythe et al.’s study (2015) further emphasises the impact of self-blaming 
emotions and their rSATL-subgenual associated neural signature in MDD, even 
during phases of remission. Moreover, these findings stress the necessity to target 
self-blaming biases in MDD with effective interventional strategies to decrease 
MDD vulnerability and prevent recurrence risk in this population. 
 




I.1.5) Treatment of self-blaming emotional biases in MDD 
Cognitive therapy has been proven considerably successful in the 
treatment of depression (Strunk & De Rubeis, 2001), however, to my knowledge, 
its therapeutic effectiveness in tackling self-blaming emotions in depression 
specifically has not been investigated. This is if one assumes that the 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), designed to 
capture treatment targets for cognitive therapy, measures more than just self-
critical/self-blaming emotions.  
Some research exists on treating self-blame in post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), whereby cognitive processing therapy (CPT) is used, which was 
adapted from techniques from cognitive therapy and developed specifically for 
PTSD resulting from sexual assault (Resick & Schnicke, 1992). Implementing 
Socratic questioning, CPT has been found effective in the treatment of self-blame, 
i.e. guilt in PTSD (Resick, Nishith, Weaver, Astin, & Feuer, 2002) by focussing 
on distorted beliefs, including self-blame and overgeneralised beliefs about 
oneself and the world (Resick et al., 2002). 
Socratic questioning is also a key therapeutic strategy in cognitive therapy 
for depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979), and aims at deconstructing 
dysfunctional beliefs and assumptions by the use of therapist-guided, goal-
directed, open-ended questions that encourage the patient to develop new 
perspectives and integrate new information (Beck et. al., 1979; Rutter & 
Friedberg, 1999). Thereby, alternative responses to automatic negative thought 
processes are meant to be developed (Beck et al., 1979). Research on Socratic 
questioning in relation to treatment outcome is sparse, yet it was found to be 
predictive of a session-to-session decrease in depressive symptomatology in MDD 




(Braun, Strunk, Sasso, & Cooper, 2015). However, as aforementioned, cognitive 
therapy, and Socratic questioning as such, do not focus on self-blaming emotions 
in depression per se. 
 
Attribution retraining is a therapeutic technique central to cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) (Hilt, 2004; Laird & Metalsky, 2009). Besides being 
used in social skills training in school-based interventions (Carlyon, 1997), it 
finds its application across a variety of mental health disorders in adults 
(Forsterling, 1985; Metalsky et al., 1995), including MDD (Wang et al., 2011). 
Importantly, therapeutic attribution retraining for depression is found to be 
contraindicated for individuals diagnosed with depression who find themselves in 
an acute state of psychosis (Laird & Metalsky, 2009). Furthermore, attributional 
retraining is suggested to be less effective if dysfunctional attributional styles 
have been exerted for prolonged periods (Crick & Dodge, 1994). 
Attribution retraining is designed to increase the individuals’ ability to 
notice and critically assess their dysfunctional attribution patterns and to actively 
shift their focus on developing a more adaptive attributional style instead 
(Forsterling, 1985; Hilt, 2004). Critical therapeutic steps in the attempt to help 
patients with MDD change their dysfunctional attributions is the examination of 
the evidence for and against the individual’s depressogenic attributions. The 
therapist may challenge the individual’s biased thinking patterns by exploring 
whether blame and responsibility for causing a specific adverse event are truly 
absolute. Further techniques involve asking the patient if they would make similar 
attributions if someone other than themselves would be in the same situation 
(Laird & Metalsky, 2009). Following the practice of retraining attributions for 




specific situations, the patient is then encouraged to generalise this more realistic, 
adaptive thinking pattern in their evaluation of other negative life events (Laird & 
Metalsky, 2009). 
Being implemented as a substantial component of CBT, attribution 
retraining has been shown to be beneficial for patients with MDD in reducing 
symptoms of depression (Laird & Metalsky, 2009). However, only a few studies 
exist investigating the efficacy of attributional retraining independent of its CBT 
context. Hilt (2004) concludes that treatment outcome research remains poor 
regarding CBT-independent attribution retraining in adults. Wang et al. (2011) 
conducted a pilot study testing the therapeutic effect of attribution retraining in a 
group setting and found this technique to be beneficial in the improvement of 
feelings of hopelessness and well-being in MDD, the effect of attributional 
retraining on self-blaming emotions, however, was not assessed. 
 
 A more recent therapeutic approach, compassion-focused therapy (CFT) 
integrates scientifically based models, including CBT with mindfulness and 
Buddhist teachings (Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b). It targets feelings of self-criticism 
explicitly as one of its central components. Therefore, CFT was initially 
developed for individuals who present with high levels of self-criticism and 
shame, as often observed in MDD, its application, however, is extended to other 
mood and anxiety disorders and beyond. CFT teaches patients to feel 
compassionate towards themselves and to be accepting and kindly tolerant of 
distress in self and others. Specifically, patients are practising to detect self-
criticism in their thought processes and are then instructed to refocus with self-
kindness by generating and practising compassionate feelings and thoughts that 




are supportive and encouraging in nature (Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b). As a final step 
in this process, patients are helped to become aware of how this compassionate 
shift has positively helped them in their mental and emotional state.  
CFT is found to be an effective intervention in the treatment of self-
criticism and depressive symptoms across different groups of disorders and 
populations (Cuppage, Baird, Gibson, Booth, & Hevey, 2018). A systematic 
review by Leaviss & Uttley (2015) evaluated the clinical benefits of CFT as a 
psychotherapeutic intervention and confirmed that CFT shows promise in the 
treatment of mood disorders, particularly in patients with high levels of self-
criticism. It is noteworthy, however, that this review did not primarily focus on 
MDD, and studies varied profoundly in their treatment protocol. Furthermore, 
only three of the 14 studies included consisted of a randomised controlled study 
design. To conclude from the present state of research, more studies are needed, 
utilising a robust methodology to assess the effectiveness of CFT in targeting self-
blame specifically in MDD. 
 
I.1.6) Real-time fMRI neurofeedback as a novel approach to tackling self-
blaming emotional biases in MDD 
Real-time fMRI (rtfMRI) neurofeedback is a rather novel, investigational 
approach in the line of pharmaco-independent neuromodulation treatments in 
MDD. It aims at exploring the causal relationship between targeted brain 
functions and resultant behavioural changes (Sitaram et al., 2017; Watanabe, 
Sasaki, Shibata & Kawato, 2017). This method provides near real-time 
information about changes in neural activity, thereby facilitating the individual to 
execute self-regulation of brain function, cognition and behaviour (Stoeckel et al., 




2014; Thibault, Lifshitz, & Raz, 2016). Notably, it is based on measuring changes 
in neurovascular coupling and provides, therefore, only an indirect measure of 
neural activity (Linden, 2014). Research has demonstrated that rtfMRI enables 
individuals to gain voluntary control over the activity and connectivity of brain 
regions (Sulzer et al., 2013; Weiskopf, 2012) and has been shown to have positive 
clinical effects in various clinical populations, including psychiatric conditions, 
e.g. schizophrenia (Ruiz et al., 2013) and PTSD (Misaki et al., 2018; Zotev et al., 
2018), neurological disorders, e.g. stroke (Sitaram et al., 2012), as well as chronic 
pain (deCharms et al., 2005) and chronic tinnitus (Haller, Birbaumer, & Veit, 
2010). 
 
To this date, research on rtMRI neurofeedback in depression is still in its 
early stages (Young et al., 2017a; Young et al., 2018a; Young et al., 2018b; Yuan 
et al., 2014; Zotev, Phillips, Yuan, Misaki, & Bodurka, 2014; Zotev et al., 2016), 
even fewer studies have focused on investigating the clinical benefits of rtfMRI 
neurofeedback in MDD (Linden et al., 2012; Mehler et al., 2018; Young et al., 
2017b; Young et al., 2014), one review was published on the promise of 
amygdala-focused rtfMRI in MDD (Young et al., 2018b). 
Pioneering in exploring the application of rtfMRI neurofeedback as a 
therapeutic tool in MDD was a proof-of-concept study conducted by Linden et al. 
(2012). The authors applied four sessions of rtfMRI neurofeedback in a non-
randomised trial against a control intervention. The rtfMRI neurofeedback 
intervention sessions were stretched over a duration of 4-6 weeks and targeted a 
small sample of MDD patients (n=8) who were stable on antidepressant 
medication with no positive change in symptoms over the past six weeks prior to 




participating in the study. In the rtfMRI neurofeedback group, target regions of 
interest (ROIs) were identified for each participant separately, using a localiser 
procedure that detected networks responsive to positive images, i.e. the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and insula. Participants were trained in the 
upregulation of these specific brain regions associated with positive mood by the 
use of cognitive strategies. Similarly, the control group employed the same 
positive imagery strategies outside the fMRI scanner and without receiving 
rtfMRI neurofeedback. Among other clinical measures, improvement in 
depressive symptoms was assessed by means of the 17-item Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale (HDRS-17) and MDD patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback 
training were found to significantly reduce their depression scores by the end of 
the study compared to no significant reductions in symptoms in the control group 
(Linden et al., 2012).  
In a more recent study by the same research group (Mehler et al., 2018), 
the authors employed a single-blind, randomised controlled trial design, 
comparing the clinical benefits of rtfMRI neurofeedback in the upregulation of 
emotion areas (functional localiser, including limbic and frontal parts of the 
anterior telencephalon) with the upregulation of a control region implicated in 
mental imagery of visual scenes (i.e. parahippocampal place area). Target areas in 
both intervention groups were expected to be comparable in upregulation success 
and hence, in reward experience. Five interventions were appointed to each 
patient group, and the outcome assessed after 12 weeks post-baseline. Patients 
were on stable antidepressant medication for at least three months; ongoing non-
pharmacological treatment was excluded. Participants’ depression symptoms were 
evaluated by a blinded assessor using the HDRS-17; ultimately, data of 16 




completers in each group was analysed. A symptom reduction of 43% was 
recorded, interestingly, no group differences in depressive symptom reduction 
occurred between active and control group. Also, no differences were found in the 
upregulation of target areas. It is noteworthy that clinical improvements remained 
stable at a follow-up assessment six weeks post-outcome assessment. The authors 
reported that their results outweighed placebo effects reported in other 
intervention studies and concluded that the experience of success in the 
upregulation of brain areas during rtfMRI neurofeedback training might account 
for the reduction in depressive symptoms in both groups, rather than the specific 
targeting of emotion-regulation areas (Mehler et al., 2018). 
 
 Replicated support for the clinical benefits of rtfMRI neurofeedback in 
depressive populations has been provided by research targeting amygdala 
activation in MDD (Young et al., 2017b; Young et al., 2014). Young et al. 
(2017b) conducted the first double-blind randomised-controlled clinical trial 
investigating the clinical efficacy of rtfMRI neurofeedback in MDD, subsequent 
to delivering promising findings in a non-randomised study in a moderately sized 
sample of MDD patients (Young et al., 2014). This research group addressed the 
reduced hemodynamic amygdala activation in response to positive 
autobiographical stimuli (e.g. pleasant memories) in MDD by successfully 
training patients in rtfMRI amygdala neurofeedback. Results of two sessions of 
left amygdala enhancing rtfMRI neurofeedback during the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories were compared with the outcome of a control 
condition that employed two sessions of activating rtfMRI neurofeedback 




targeting parietal brain regions not involved in emotional processing, i.e. the left 
intraparietal sulcus.  
All MDD patients (n=36) were medication-free, with the majority of 
patients suffering from chronic MDD and half of the patient group had been 
treated with antidepressant medication at some point in their lives. Anxiety 
disorders were no exclusion criterion in this trial and patients scored in the 
moderate anxiety range as assessed with the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale 
(HAM-A). The primary outcome measure constituted of the reduction in symptom 
scores on the Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS). The 
authors reported comparable success rates in the upregulation of target areas 
between groups, however, only the amygdala neurofeedback group was found to 
show a response rate of 63%, marking a reduction in depressive symptomatology 
by at least 50% compared to a 12% response rate in the control condition (Young 
et al., 2017b).  
 A recently completed, double-blindly randomised proof of concept trial in 
MDD employed rtfMRI neurofeedback targeted at reducing self-blaming 
emotions in 28 patients with remitted MDD (Zahn et al., 2018b). Based on 
previous findings of guilt-selective connectivity decreases between the rSATL 
and the anterior subgenual cingulate cortex (Green et al., 2012), as outlined in 
section I.1.3 within this chapter, the rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention in the 
active condition was targeted at increasing rSATL–subgenual cingulate cortex 
connectivity during the experience of feelings of guilt compared with indignation. 
MDD patients received a single session of rtfMRI neurofeedback. Feelings of 
guilt and anger were evoked using autobiographical memories during the 
experiment. MDD patients were instructed to feel the emotion while trying to 




enhance the brain connectivity pattern that was fed back to them using a 
thermometer-like display (Zahn et al., 2018b). 
MDD patients were found to be successful in increasing connectivity 
levels between the rSATL and the anterior subgenual cingulate cortex (BA 24). 
Moreover, a significant improvement in self-esteem was recorded, as assessed 
with the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale. These findings differed significantly from 
the control intervention who received neurofeedback during the experiment that 
reinforced a stabilisation of baseline connectivity patterns instead of reinforcing 
an enhancement as in the active condition. This study was the first to show that, 
self-blame selective abnormal connectivity patterns can be targeted by rtfMRI 
neurofeedback in remitted MDD. Further, it confirmed the hypothesis that the 
abnormality of this connectivity pattern is crucial in compromised levels of self-
esteem in MDD (Zahn et al., 2018b). 
 
I.1.7) Gap of knowledge 
Real-time fMRI neurofeedback is found to be a non-invasive tool with 
potential clinical benefits in MDD, showing positive effects in targeting emotion-
related brain regions in current and remitted MDD, as an add-on treatment to 
stable antidepressant medication as well as an alternative intervention strategy in 
medication-free MDD. So far, only one study has tested the feasibility of rtfMRI 
neurofeedback targeting self-blame-selective neural connectivity abnormalities as 
demonstrated to be present in remitted MDD (Zahn et al., 2018b). Based on the 
current literature it remains unclear, however, whether self-blame-selective 
rtfMRI neurofeedback will show clinical potential in early treatment-resistant 
MDD, as the previous trial focussed primarily on remitted MDD and was 




designed as a technical proof-of-concept study rather than investigating clinical 
outcomes (Zahn et al., 2018b).  
Guilt-selective hyper-connectivity between the rSATL and posterior 
subgenual cingulate cortex (BA 25) has been shown to be predictive of recurrence 
risk in MDD. It is unknown to this date if self-blame selective posterior 
subgenual–anterior temporal hyper-connectivity can be successfully tackled using 
rtfMRI neurofeedback training, and whether a successful normalisation in 
abnormal connectivity patterns corresponds to an overall improvement in 
depressive symptoms, alongside a reduction in self-blaming emotional biases and 
a significant increase in measures of self-esteem.  
To address the substantial need for research investigating these critical 
questions, this PhD project aimed at exploring the neurocognitive basis of self-
blaming emotional basis in MDD further. This work developed a particular focus 
on investigating the feasibility and clinical benefits of a self-guided psychological 
intervention with and without additional rtfMRI neurofeedback training and 
tackling self-blame-selective posterior subgenual–anterior temporal hyper-
connectivity in early treatment-resistant MDD. These research endeavours are 
particularly important when considering the adverse impact of self-blaming 
emotional biases in MDD, the lack of interventions explicitly targeting self-blame 
in MDD and the urgent need for novel interventions as a high number of MDD 
patients only insufficiently respond to standard pharmaco-therapy or 
psychotherapeutic treatments.  
Finally, it is noteworthy, that current studies investigating self-blaming 
emotional biases or rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention strategies in MDD have 
not explored potential differences between subtypes of depression. A highly 




prominent subtype of MDD, particularly in treatment-resistant patients, is the 
anxious distress MDD subtype as classified according to the recently introduced 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria. Explicit research on this common subtype is still 
sparse, however, important prognostic differences between MDD with and 
without anxious distress symptoms have been reported in the literature, e.g. in 
treatment response, which points to the possibility of a different neurocognitive 
signature underpinning these subtypes and the necessity for different 
interventional approaches in MDD with anxious distress compared with non-
anxious MDD. 
 
I.1.8) General aims and hypotheses 
The research conducted and presented in this thesis aims at contributing to 
previous research findings that have highlighted the importance of acquiring a 
better understanding of the neurocognitive basis of self-blaming emotional biases 
in MDD. It further aims at testing the feasibility and initial evidence of the clinical 
potential of rtfMRI neurofeedback training compared with a solely self-guided 
psychological intervention tackling self-blaming emotional biases in early 
treatment-resistant MDD. Further, this thesis investigates differences in the 
neurocognitive architecture of self-blaming emotional biases in MDD with 
anxious distress compared with non-anxious MDD and HC participants. The 
specific aims and hypotheses of each chapter within this work are formulated as 
follows: 
Chapter II presents a clinical trial (NeuroMooD) that employed a single-
blind randomised controlled trial design in MDD patients who insufficiently 
responded to standard treatments. The superiority of guilt-specific rtfMRI 




neurofeedback was tested in the reduction of depressive symptoms and self-
blame, while increasing self-esteem. Furthermore, it was investigated whether 
MDD patients in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group were able to decrease self-
blame-selective hyper-connectivity between the rSATL and a posterior SC region 
(BA 25, see Figure I.1) and if improvements in symptoms in the neurofeedback 




Figure I.I: Display of BA 25, the posterior subgenual target region in the NeuroMooD study, 
which has previously been demonstrated to show hyper-connectivity with the rSATL as predictive 
of recurrence risk in remitted MDD (Lythe et al., 2015). BA 24 forms the anterior part of the 
subgenual cingulate cortex, which was found to show decreased connectivity with the rSATL in 
remitted DD with high self-contempt bias, irrespective of recurrence risk (unpublished secondary 








The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback training will show 
reduced depressive symptoms, decreased self-blame and increased self-worth 
when compared with the psychological intervention group. 
Hypothesis 2: Patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback training will show 
decreased connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC post-treatment 
compared to pre-treatment. 
Hypothesis 3: Decreased connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC 
region is associated with a reduction in depressive symptoms in MDD. 
 
Chapter III of this thesis investigates differences in self-blaming 
emotional biases and clinical characteristics between MDD with and without 
anxious distress to better understand differences in their response to the 
psychological and rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention employed in the 
NeuroMood trial. 
The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: MDD patients with anxious distress show higher indignation/anger 
towards others as compared with MDD patients with non-anxious MDD. 
Hypothesis 2: Self-blaming emotional biases will be more pronounced in MDD 
patients without anxious distress than MDD patients with anxious distress. 
Hypothesis 3: MDD patients with anxious distress have experienced stressful life 
events more frequently than MDD patients without anxious distress. 
 
Chapter IV presents the results of a novel experimental task, the social 
agency inference task (SAIT), specially developed for this thesis, and aimed at 




elucidating the role of overgeneralised perceptions of preceding events in self-
blaming emotional biases. This task thereby complemented previous tasks of self-
blaming emotional biases, the modified version of the VMST as employed in 
previous chapters (II and III).  
The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Patients with MDD show self-blaming emotional biases on the 
SAIT when compared with HC participants. 
Hypothesis 2: Patients with MDD show an overgeneralisation of negative 
preceding actions internalising blame relative to those externalising blame when 
compared with HC participants. 
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Chapter II: NeuroMooD trial  
II.1) Abstract 
Recent findings highlight the significance of excessive self-blaming 
emotions in major depressive disorder (MDD) and self-blame-selective hyper-
connectivity between the right superior anterior temporal lobe (rSATL) and the 
posterior subgenual cortex (SC) is considered a potential biomarker of MDD 
recurrence risk. Real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (rtfMRI) 
neurofeedback training was shown to be a feasible approach to modulating brain 
activity patterns in MDD. In this chapter, a single-blind randomised controlled 
trial is presented, designed to test the clinical benefits of a novel self-guided 
psychological intervention with and without additional rSATL-posterior SC 
rtfMRI neurofeedback, targeting self-blaming emotions in current and 
insufficiently remitted, early treatment-resistant MDD. Both interventions were 
demonstrated to be safe and therapeutically beneficial, resulting in a reduction of 
MDD symptom severity of 46% and response rates of more than 55%. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, no relationship was found between functional connectivity 
changes and changes in depressive symptoms. Differences in the clinical 
effectiveness of both interventions occurred between MDD patients with and 
without anxious distress. Although some contribution of placebo-like effects 
cannot be ruled out, the findings suggest that self-blame specific rtfMRI 
neurofeedback training may be superior over a solely psychological intervention 
in non-anxious MDD patients, which needs further confirmation in future studies.  
 




II.2) Introduction  
II.2.1) The need for developing novel interventions 
Depression is found to be the leading cause of ill health, and disability 
worldwide (WHO, 2017, 2008) and can affect anyone at any point in life 
(Friedrich, 2017). One reason for this is found in the observation that individuals, 
who experience more than one major depressive episode (MDE), suffer an 
increased risk of facing further episodes in the course of the disorder (Eaton et al., 
2008). The probability of further episodes rises to more than 70% after the second 
and more than 90% after the third MDE (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). A variety of pharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment approaches 
have been established, aiming at reducing MDD symptoms; yet in most cases, 
even optimised, standard treatment approaches fail to prevent recurrence in most 
patients with MDD.  
Meta-analyses show that pharmacological treatments (Viguera, 
Baldessarini, & Friedberg, 1998) and psychotherapy (Piet & Hougaard, 2011) are 
partially successful, reducing recurrence rates by 50% in the short-term; 
nevertheless, 60% of MDD patients experience further MDEs in the long run 
despite continuing medication (Viguera et al., 1998) or psychotherapy (Bockting 
et al., 2009). Further 30% of patients overall fail to achieve full remission, despite 
the provision of adequate treatment (Nierenberg & Amsterdam, 1990; Rush et al., 
2006). In addition, there is no clear evidence that combining medication and 
psychotherapy improves long-term outcomes (Lampe, Coulston, & Berk, 2013) 
and a high proportion of patients are not amenable to either treatment option 
(Prins, Verhaak, van der Meer, Penninx, & Bensing, 2009). It is noteworthy that a 




more recently published meta-analysis highlights the efficacy of mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy (MBCT) as a powerful treatment in the prevention of 
recurrence within a 60 week follow-up period, irrespective of the number of 
MDEs patients have experienced in the past (Kuyken et al., 2016). Further, 
MBCT appears to be particularly beneficial for patients with pronounced residual 
symptoms (Kuyken et al., 2016). The authors remark, however, that the protective 
effects of MBCT in preventing recurrence in MDD diminish with time (Kuyken et 
al., 2016). 
It can be concluded that there is an unmet need for developing novel 
treatment strategies aiming at effectively decreasing the patient’s depressive 
symptoms and vulnerability for recurrence in MDD. 
 
II.2.2) The neural basis of self-blaming emotional biases: a potential 
treatment target 
Recent findings highlight the importance of excessive self-blaming 
emotions in MDD (Green, Lambon Ralph, Moll, Deakin, & Zahn, 2012; Green, 
Moll, Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 2013). Using fMRI, abnormal functional 
connectivity between the rSATL and the anterior subgenual cingulate cortex was 
found to be associated with self-blame-specific emotional biases in remitted MDD 
(Green et al., 2012). The term ‘functional connectivity’ characterises a temporal 
interaction in fMRI data, describing the statistical association or correlation 
between anatomically distinct fMRI signal time courses, not implying how this 
correlation is mediated (Friston, 2011; Friston, Frith, Fletcher, Liddle, & 
Frackowiak, 1996). 
It is noteworthy that increased functional connectivity within the rSATL – 




posterior SC brain network was found to be predictive of elevated risk of future 
MDEs over the period of one year (Lythe et al., 2015), thereby identifying a 
potential fMRI biomarker of recurrence risk in MDD. These findings demonstrate 
that self-blaming emotional biases underlie the MDD patient’s condition even in 
remitted stages of MDD and are in keeping with postulated cognitive and 
attributional theories of MDD, which emphasise the link between feelings of self-
blame, the patient’s negative self-concept (Beck, 1963), and overgeneralised self-
blame and vulnerability for MDD (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). 
Moreover, these results stress the profound impact of self-blame on MDD 
symptoms as well as its persistence in patients whose symptoms have subsided 
during periods of remission.  
Whereas Moll et al. (2014) provided the technical proof-of-concept that 
changes in selective functional connectivity can be detected and fed back to 
healthy control (HC) participants during fMRI scanning, a recently completed 
double-blind, randomised clinical trial confirmed that fMRI neurofeedback can 
successfully train remitted MDD patients in rebalancing abnormal brain 
connectivity patterns (Zahn et al., 2018). 
 
II.2.3) Real-time fMRI neurofeedback in major depressive disorder 
Real-time fMRI neurofeedback is a training method that provides the 
individual with near real-time information about changes in neural activity to 
facilitate self-regulation of brain function, cognition and behaviour (Stoeckel et 
al., 2014; Thibault, Lifshitz, & Raz, 2016). It is a recent and less widely used 
experimental approach, yet using this technique, it has been demonstrated that 
individuals learn quickly to gain voluntary control over the activation and 




connectivity of specific brain regions (Sulzer et al., 2013; Weiskopf, 2012). Only 
a few studies to this date have administered rtfMRI neurofeedback in patients with 
depression (Young et al., 2017a; Young et al., 2018a; Young et al., 2018b; Yuan 
et al., 2014; Zotev, Phillips, Yuan, Misaki, & Bodurka, 2014; Zotev et al., 2016), 
and even fewer studies investigated the use of rtfMRI neurofeedback as a 
therapeutic intervention strategy in MDD (Linden et al., 2012; Mehler et al., 2018; 
Young et al., 2017b; Young et al., 2014). Linden et al.’s (2012) pioneering study 
applied rtfMRI neurofeedback training targeted at increasing activation in brain 
areas involved in the processing of positive emotions, i.e. the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex and insula, whereas Young et al. (2014) used neurofeedback 
training to enhance amygdala response during the recall of positive 
autobiographical memories. Both studies assessed whether the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback interventions would have a significant effect on symptom severity 
in MDD as assessed with the 17–item Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(Linden et al., 2012) and Profile of Mood States (POMS) depression ratings 
(Young et al., 2014). Although both studies delivered promising results and found 
significant reductions in symptom severity, it is noteworthy that they lacked 
randomisation and employed only small sample sizes (n=8 vs n=8 controls 
(Linden et al., 2012) and n=14 vs n=7 controls (Young et al., 2014)).  
A more recently published study by Young et al. (2017a) was the first 
randomised rtfMRI neurofeedback trial in MDD, investigating medication-free 
individuals allocated to moderately sized groups (n=19 vs n=17 controls). 
Similarly to the authors’ previous research approach (Young et al., 2014), rtfMRI 
neurofeedback was used in the aim of increasing the individual’s amygdala 
hemodynamic response to positive autobiographical memories. Symptom 




reduction was assessed using the Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale 
(MADRS). Young et al. (2017a) observed a significant symptom reduction in 
patients allocated to the active neurofeedback group compared to a minimal 
response in the control neurofeedback group. Contrary to Young et al.’s results 
(2017a), another randomised controlled rtfMRI neurofeedback trial conducted by 
Mehler et al. (2018) did not find differences between the active and control 
rtfMRI neurofeedback MDD group. Interestingly, both rtfMRI neurofeedback 
groups successfully upregulated targeted brain areas and reduced their depression 
symptoms by more than 40%. Further, patients’ symptoms remained stable at a 
follow-up assessment six weeks after trial completion (Mehler et al., 2018). 
 
It is noteworthy that previous clinical rtfMRI neurofeedback studies 
focussed on investigating remission from depressed states rather than early 
treatment resistance or recurrence risk. Apart from recent work conducted by 
Mehler et al. (2018), to my knowledge, no rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention has 
been developed to this date which aims to reduce symptoms in MDD patients who 
have only insufficiently responded to standard treatment, a strong clinical 
predictor of recurrence risk in MDD. It has not been explored yet if the clinical 
benefits of rtfMRI neurofeedback as a therapeutic tool are more profound in those 
patients who only insufficiently respond to standard treatment, which is the reason 
why the NeuroMooD trial was conducted in early treatment-resistant MDD 
patients. Given the importance in finding that the self-blame-selective signature of 
hyper-connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC (Brodmann Area 
[BA] 25) is predictive of recurrence risk in MDD (Lythe et al., 2015), the 




functional connectivity between those brain areas became target in the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback intervention in the NeuroMooD trial. 
 
II.2.4) NeuroMooD trial: aims and objectives 
Building on previous research findings as outlined above and grounded in 
the need for novel intervention strategies in the treatment of early treatment-
resistant MDD, this research investigated and compared the effectiveness of two 
novel approaches.  
Specifically, this clinical trial examined the clinical benefits of a novel 
rtfMRI neurofeedback protocol in current and insufficiently remitted MDD, 
aiming at self-blame-selective neural connectivity abnormalities between the 
rSATL and the posterior SC. The therapeutic effectiveness of this rtfMRI 
neurofeedback intervention was compared to the proposed benefits of a newly 
designed, self-guided psychological intervention. Clinically, both interventions 
aimed at alleviating symptoms of depression, and effectively reducing self-
blaming emotions, in addition to ameliorating the sense of self-worth. Moreover, 
specific to the rtfMRI neurofeedback condition, the aim was to determine whether 
rtfMRI neurofeedback training might be effective in moderating both, excessive 
self-blame and depressive symptoms through the normalisation (i.e. decrease) of 
self-blame-related functional connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior 









The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback training will show 
reduced depressive symptoms, decreased self-blame and increased self-worth 
when compared with the psychological intervention group. 
Hypothesis 2: Patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback training will show 
decreased connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC post-treatment 
compared to pre-treatment. 
Hypothesis 3: Decreased connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC 
region is associated with a reduction in depressive symptoms in MDD. 





This clinical proof-of-concept trial received ethical approval from the 
NHS Health Research Authority, NRES Committee London – Camberwell St 
Giles (REC reference: 15/LO/0577) and was pre-registered on the ISRCTN 
registration database (identifier: ISRCTN10526888). Research funding was 
provided by King’s College London and the Brain & Behavior Research 
Foundation. The single research site of this study constituted of the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London.  
Researchers involved in the conduction of this clinical trial affirm that 
study procedures complied with the ethical principles, standards and national and 
institutional guidelines for clinical trials and research involving human subjects 
and with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2008. 
 
II.3.1) Trial design  
A single-blind, randomised controlled trial design was used, and 
participants allocated to two distinct treatment arms, each comprising three 
intervention visits (visits 2, 3 & 4). Regardless of the intervention group, 
treatment sessions were scheduled 7-13 days apart, depending on the participants’ 
availability. 
Feasibility and effectiveness of both interventional approaches were 
compared by measuring the change in clinical outcomes between pre-treatment 
(visit 1) and post-treatment assessments (visit 5).  
One intervention condition implemented three sessions of a self-guided 
psychological intervention that consisted of cognitive reappraisal techniques, 




modified from cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw &Emery, 1979) and related 
approaches. Assigned to the second intervention condition, the rtfMRI treatment 
group, participants were asked to apply the same self-guided psychological 
strategies during three sessions of rtfMRI neurofeedback training, targeting 
rSATL-posterior SC correlation.  
 
It is important to mention that initially the NeuroMooD study was 
designed to compare three treatment arms, investigating the treatment effects of 
rtfMRI neurofeedback with an active, cathodal and a sham transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) intervention. Specifically, the original single-blind, 
randomised controlled design compared three sessions of the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback treatment as described above with three sessions of right superior 
temporal lobe cathodal tDCS plus self-guided psychological intervention and 
three sessions of sham right superior temporal lobe tDCS plus self-guided 
psychological intervention. Due to funding reasons, the original trial design had to 
be modified, and the data of 6 randomised participants, that had already been 
collected, was discarded. 
 
II.3.2) Randomisation method 
The randomisation of trial participants was performed by an automatised 
online system, set up by the Clinical Trials Unit, King’s College London. The 
randomisation process implied a stratified block design with randomly varying 
block sizes, deploying two stratification factors: gender (female/male) and 
baseline scores of the primary outcome measure, the Beck Depression Inventory-
II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). Baseline scores classified participants 




based on designated BDI-II categories of symptom severity as follows: BDI-II 
scores below 14 points indicating minimal depression, BDI-II scores between 14 
and 28 points comprising mild and moderate depression and BDI-II scores of 28 
points or higher, implying severe depressive symptoms. Participants were 
informed about their allocated treatment group upon completion of the baseline 
clinical and neuropsychological testing on their pre-treatment assessment (visit 1). 
 
II.3.3) Recruitment and reimbursement of participants 
The recruitment/randomisation phase consisted of a total of 15 months, 
from September 2016 to December 2017. Trial adverts were posted primarily 
online, further recruitment strategies entailed the dissemination of study adverts 
via university and institutional recruitment circulars, as well as presenting to self-
help groups at scheduled member meetings.  
Participants received compensation for the time taken to participate in the 
study in the form of high street gift vouchers or shopping vouchers. 
Reimbursement was appointed on a pro-rata basis on the final day of 
participation: vouchers worth £10 for the pre-trial assessment session (visit 1), 
vouchers worth £20 per treatment session (3 x £20 = £60 for visit 2, visit 3 and 
visit 4). Additional vouchers worth £30 for the final follow-up session (visit 5). 
 
II.3.4) Inclusion criteria 
Recruitment for this clinical trial was targeted at patients suffering from 
recurrent MDD according to diagnostic criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013), with a minimum of one past MDE of at least a two months duration. At 




baseline assessment (visit 1), patients either currently experienced an MDE or, 
insufficiently remitted, presented with significantly impairing or bothering 
symptoms, despite not fulfilling MDE criteria anymore. It was required that 
remaining symptoms would be significant in severity, classified as a psychiatric 
status rating of three (i.e. significant symptoms) or four (i.e. major symptoms) on 
the Longitudinal Interval Follow-up Interview (LIFE; Keller et al., 1987) over 
the past two weeks prior baseline assessment and randomisation. Further, MDD 
patients needed to be stable in symptoms for at least six weeks before 
randomisation to minimise the risk of including spontaneous remitters.  
Importantly, MDD patients were required to have shown an only 
insufficient response to at least one psychological intervention (e.g. cognitive 
behavioural therapy) or antidepressant medication before their enrolment in the 
study or were found to be not amenable to standard forms of intervention. MDD 
patients could only be included if they were not currently undergoing 
psychotherapeutic treatment. 
Antidepressant medication was no exclusion criterion, but patients 
needed to be on a stable dose for at least six weeks without improvement before 
their participation and were asked to remain on this stable dose throughout the 
study.  
Lastly, participants needed to be aged 18 years or older, right-handed (to 
ensure homogenous responses to the right hemispheric treatment target), and be 
proficient in English, so that reliable responses on newly developed secondary 
outcome measures could be collected. 
 




II.3.5) Exclusion criteria 
To ensure safety and minimise potential health risks, participants needed 
to be excluded if they presented with greater than a low risk of suicidality, 
violence or current self-harming behaviour. Additionally, participants presenting 
with a current MDE of lasting more than 12 months were excluded to not inhibit 
patients from accessing standard forms of treatment. 
Additional exclusion criteria were defined as follows: 
i. Standard MRI contraindications, i.e. non-removable ferromagnetic devices 
or implants due to the possible dangerous effects of the MRI magnet upon 
metal objects in the body 
ii. History of manic or hypomanic episodes, of schizophreniform symptoms 
or schizophrenia, or substance abuse 
iii. History of neurological disorders such as seizures, loss of consciousness 
following brain injury or medical disorders affecting brain function, blood 
flow or metabolism 
iv. History of learning disabilities, major medical, developmental or relevant 
other axis-I disorders 
v. Prior specialist diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), antisocial or borderline personality disorder  
vi. Significant impairment of psychosocial functioning before the last MDE 
indicating the possibility of a comorbid personality disorder  
vii. Current intake of benzodiazepines, GABAergic or benzodiazepine 
receptor agonists 
viii. Current recreational drug use  
ix. Past violence or current aggressive impulses  




x. Impairments of vision or hearing which cannot be corrected during the 
treatment sessions 
xi. Pregnancy  
 
II.3.6) Assessment and evaluation of participants: eligibility assessment 
The participant selection process commenced with a telephone-based 
screening of volunteers for inclusion and exclusion criteria. Before starting the 
formal evaluation, volunteers were informed about the content and rationale of the 
screening, and oral consent was obtained. In instances where volunteers met 
inclusion criteria following the phone screening interview, volunteers were invited 
to attend the pre-trial assessment (visit 1) to confirm their trial eligibility. 
Volunteers received a formal invitation via email asking candidates to read 
through the attached participant information sheet and study consent form. 
Importance was placed on ensuring that volunteers received both, information 
sheet and consent form, at least 24 hours before their initial study visit to allow for 
enough time to familiarise themselves with details about the trial and the 
conditions of their participation. Find the phone screening template attached as 
Appendix A.  
During the recruitment phase, a total of 311 volunteers interested in 
participating in the study were screened over the phone, and 71 volunteers 
attended the initial baseline assessment (visit 1). Following diagnostic and clinical 
evaluation, ultimately, N=43 participants were randomised into the study, of 
which n=35 participants completed this clinical trial. 
 




II.3.7) Assessment and evaluation of participants: clinical assessment  
The diagnostic, clinical and cognitive assessment comprised standardised, 
validated measures that have been used extensively in psychiatric research. 
Summary of standard clinical and cognitive instruments: 
i. Structured Clinical Interview (SCID) for DSM-5 (First, 2015) 
ii. AMDP Psychopathology Interview questions on depression (Faehndrich & 
Stieglitz, 1997) 
iii. Longitudinal Interval Follow-Up Evaluation (LIFE; Keller et al., 1987) 
iv. Clinical Global Impression (CGI-) Scale (Busner & Targum, 2007) 
v. Beck Depressive Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) 
vi. Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & 
Åsberg, 1979) 
vii. Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (QUIDS-SR16; Rush et 
al., 2003) 
viii. Hypomania Checklist-16 (Forty et al., 2010) 
ix. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
x. Profile of Mood States (POMS) Scale (McNair, Lorr & Dropplemen, 
1971) 
xi. MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (module on suicidality 
only; Sheehan et al., 1998) 
xii. Psychiatric Family History Screen (Weissman et al., 2000) 
xiii. Life Events Questionnaire (Brugha & Conroy, 1985) 
xiv. Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ; Bernstein & Fink, 1998) 
xv. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (Altman, Hedeker, Peterson & Davis, 
1997) 




xvi. Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE-III; Hsieh, Schubert, Hoon, 
Mioshi & Hodges, 2013) in patients >50 years only 
 
In addition to the abovementioned scales and measures, clinical evaluation 
of participants further entailed a non-structured clinical interview, as well as the 
documentation of the patient’s medical history and in females the day in their 
menstrual cycle. Furthermore, age at onset, episode duration(s), and total illness 
duration was recorded, along with details about the course of illness, i.e. number 
of episodes and medication history.  
 
II.3.8) Additional experimental neuropsychological testing 
Supplementary to clinical and cognitive assessments, participants were 
asked to provide ratings of autobiographical memories associated with feelings of 
self-blame and other-blame. Moreover, additional experimental tasks developed 
by our research group were administered, designed to explore neurocognitive 
aspects of implicit self-contempt biases and self- and other-blaming emotions: 
i. A modified short version of the VMST (Zahn et al., 2015a): this 
computerised task investigates emotions related to self-blame (i.e. guilt, 
shame, self-contempt, self-disgust, self-directed anger) versus blaming 
others (indignation, anger, contempt or disgust towards others). Preceded 
by the description of hypothetical scenarios of social behaviours of the 
participants themselves and their best friends, participants are instructed to 
select the emotion they are most likely to experience. We added items 
related to action tendencies (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), previously 
validated in an unpublished study. The following action tendencies were 




measured: creating distance from self, hiding, apologising, creating 
distance from friend, verbally or physically attacking/punishing friend or 
no action/other action. This task is presented in more detail in chapter III. 
ii. A modified version of the social knowledge differentiation task (Green et 
al., 2013): this computerised, neuropsychological test examines the 
participant’s ability to access differentiated social conceptual knowledge 
when instructed to appraise hypothetical scenarios of social behaviour of 
different contexts of agency (self-agency vs other-agency). The task was 
modified by restricting the original task to 30 items, focussing on 
negatively valenced scenarios only.  
iii. Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT): this computerised task was 
developed by our research group in collaboration with Prof Rüsch and Dr 
Bogenhausen. It is an indirect measure of self-contempt bias, evaluating 
the association of contempt or disgust with oneself relative to others. The 
task design is based on similar tests that have been validated to measure 
implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). This task is presented 
in more detail in chapter III. 
iv. Social agency inference task (SAIT): Specifically developed for this 
research project, this computerised task assesses whether changes in the 
perception of social agency underpin self-blaming biases in MDD. Chapter 
IV explains in detail how this task was constructed. 
 
Clinical and cognitive assessments, along with the administration of 
additional experimental neuropsychological tests were carried out by me, with 
exception of the AMDP, the Global Assessment Functioning (GAF) Scale, the 




Social and Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS) and observer-
rated outcome measures. For particulars on the assessor of outcome measures 
refer to section II.3.10. To optimise the quality of all assessments performed, I 
have received extensive clinical and diagnostic training, provided by a consultant 
psychiatrist, before the conduction of this study. 
An overview of research design and temporal staging of assessments 







II.3.9) Trial schedule chart 


















[email & phone] [day 0] 
[1-13 days 
after visit 1] 
[7-13 days 
after visit 2] 
[7-13 days 
after visit 3] 
[7-13 days 




     
Introduction to 
the clinical trial 
  
     
Assessment of 
eligibility 
    




          
















       
 
Mood assessment            
Risk assessment            




II.3.10) Pre-registered outcome measures 
Outcome measures comprised self-rated and observer-rated scales and 
assessments along with fMRI connectivity analyses as specified below. Observer-
rated outcomes were assessed by a senior psychiatrist (R.Z.) who was blinded to 
the treatment group allocation of participants throughout the trial.  
 
Primary outcome measure 
The primary outcome measure was defined as the reduction of depressive 
symptoms between pre-treatment visit 1 and post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days 
after final treatment session) as assessed with the BDI-II. 
 
Secondary outcome measures 
In addition to the primary outcome measure, the following secondary 
outcome measures had been pre-registered before the begin of the trial: 
i. Reduction of depressive symptoms between pre-treatment visit 1 and post-
treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as assessed with 
MADRS  
ii. Reduction of self-rated depressive symptoms between pre-treatment visit 1 
and post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as 
assessed with QUIDS-SR16  
iii. Reduction of self-rated depressive symptoms between pre-treatment visit 1 
and post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as 
assessed with POMS depression-dejection subscale  




iv. Increase in self-worth between pre-treatment visit 1 and post-treatment 
visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as assessed with Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale  
v. In the rtfMRI neurofeedback group: decrease in post vs pre-training 
rSATL–posterior SC correlation for self-blame relative to blaming others 
between the first and last treatment session (i.e. at the start of visit 2 and at 
the end of visit 4), using fMRI as measured by regression coefficients for 
the time series, as extracted by the software FRIEND (Functional Real-
time Interactive Endogeneous Neuromodulation and Decoding; Basilio et 
al., 2015; Sato et al., 2013)  
vi. Reduction in implicit self-blaming bias between pre-treatment visit 1 and 
post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as assessed 
with BIAT (subcategories contempt–anger and contempt–anxiety) 
vii. Reduction in agency-incongruent self-blame between pre-treatment visit 1 
and post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final treatment session) as 
assessed with the short version of the VMST 
viii. Self- and observer-rated clinical global impression at post-treatment visit 5 
(7-13 days after final treatment session) as assessed with the CGI-Scale  
ix. Withdrawal rates throughout the trial and separately for the period after the 
first treatment session until post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final 
treatment session) 
x. Adverse events throughout the trial and separately for the period after the 
first treatment session until post-treatment visit 5 (7-13 days after final 
treatment session) 




xi. Reduction in self-rated self-blame as assessed with the mean of self-blame 
ratings of two guilt-specific autobiographical events obtained prior the first 
(visit 2) and after final treatment session (visit 4) 
xii. Reduction in observer-rated self-blame as assessed with the Moral 
Emotion Addendum to the AMDP as the sum of all self-blaming emotion 
scores at baseline (visit 1) and post-treatment at visit 5 (7-13 days after 
final treatment session) 
 
II.3.11) Intervention procedures 
Both interventions, the psychological intervention as well as the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback training, consisted of three individual treatment sessions, 
scheduled 7-13 days apart, and involved equivalent preparation processes prior to 
the first treatment session.  
Before the first interventional session, participants were asked to provide 
two cue words, prompting them to remember two autobiographical events that 
would cause them to experience strong feelings of self-blame and guilt. Also, 
participants provided two cue words reminding them of life events where they 
experienced substantial feelings of indignation or anger towards other people 
while feeling low levels of self-blame.  
Before and after each treatment session, participants rated the intensity of 
evoked self-blame and indignation feelings on a Likert-type scale from 0 to 10. 
Moreover, they rated (from 0 to 10) how successful they felt in the emotional 
training during the intervention and estimated the percentage of time (0-100%) 
that they were able to focus during the session.  




Concluding each treatment session, the participant’s suicidality risk was 
assessed using the MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview suicidality 
module, focussed on the time period since the previous study appointment. In 
addition, the severity of depressive symptoms was monitored and assessed with 
the BDI-II. Participants were excluded if they expressed a suicidality risk greater 
than low, or if their depressive symptoms had worsened, as reflected in an 
increase of 10 points or more on the BDI-II compared to the baseline score prior 
randomisation. In such an instance, the protocol requested to un-blind the leading 
senior psychiatrist of the NeuroMooD trial (R.Z.), who discussed treatment 
recommendations with the patient if requested. By doing so, participants were 
assisted in accessing standard treatment options swiftly. 
 
II.3.12) Psychological intervention 
In the psychological intervention group, the cue words provided by 
participants of this treatment arm were programmed into a timed presentation 
format and played back to them during each treatment session. To help 
participants manage their feelings of self-blame constructively, they were 
instructed to use specific, self-guided psychological strategies. Participants were 
suggested to use the following strategies to help them manage their feelings, yet 
they could also develop their own strategies:  
i. Think about why you might not have been in control over the outcome of 
the event. 
ii. Think about why you might not be responsible for the outcome of the 
event. 
iii. Think about why the consequences for others might not be so bad. 
iv. Think about making up for things or apologising. 




v. Think about the other person forgiving you. 
vi. Think about forgiving yourself. 
 
These strategies were based on (1) attribution theory which highlights the 
importance of locus of control for self-blame (Abramson et al., 1978), on (2) 
omnipotent responsibility associated with depressogenic forms of guilt (O'Connor, 
Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002), on (3) neurocognitive models of self-blame, 
implicating representations of future consequences as important to guilt-proneness 
(Zahn R, de Oliveira-Souza & Moll, 2013), on (4) the associations of reparative 
action tendencies with adaptive forms of guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 
2007), as well as on (5) the focus on forgiveness and self-kindness as thematised 
in compassion-focused therapy (CFT; Gilbert, 2009a, 2009b; Gilbert & Procter, 
2006). 
 
The intervention consisted of four parts. In the first and the fourth part, 
participants were asked to only think about the autobiographical events triggered 
by their cue words, without using any strategies to manage their feelings of self-
blame. Before the second and third part of the intervention, participants were 
instructed to start using one or more self-guided strategies when seeing their guilt 
cue words to manage their feelings of self-blame constructively.  
Participants were given the following instructions before the treatment 
session was started: 
’At the beginning and end of the session, you will have to think about the self-
blame and anger events when shown your cue words. In between, you will be 
asked to keep thinking about the self-blame event while trying to use one or 
more strategies that best help you to cope with the self-blaming feeling. When 




numbers are presented on the screen, you will have to subtract seven from the 
number displayed.’ 
 
In the first and fourth part of the presentation, participants were shown 
their guilt, and their indignation cue words, parts two and three only contained the 
patient’s guilt cue words and no indignation provoking cue words. Parts 1 and 4 
were 408 seconds in length, including emotional blocks (guilt and indignation) 
and subtraction blocks, plus a 30-second reminder of task instructions. Parts 2 and 
3 consisted of a time sequence of 424 seconds each, containing guilt cue words 
and subtraction blocks, in addition to the display of instruction slides for 60 
seconds. Consequently, the intervention part of each treatment session was 
completed after approximately 30 minutes. 
 
The order of the displayed cue words and numbers was as follows:  
Part 1 of the intervention: instruction to only think about the 
autobiographical events without using psychological strategies  number  guilt 
cue word 1  number  indignation cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 1 
 number  indignation cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 2  number 
 indignation cue word 2  number  guilt cue word 2  number  
indignation cue word 2 
Part 2 of the intervention: instruction to keep thinking about the events, 
while trying to use psychological strategies to cope with self-blaming feeling  
number  guilt cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 1  number  guilt 
cue word 2  number  guilt cue word 2  




Part 3 was equal to part 2 of the intervention: instruction to keep thinking 
about the events, while trying to use psychological strategies to cope with self-
blaming feelings  number  guilt cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 1  
number  guilt cue word 2  number  guilt cue word 2 
Part 4 of the intervention: instruction to only think about the 
autobiographical events without using psychological strategies  number  
indignation cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 1  number  indignation 
cue word 1  number  guilt cue word 1  number  indignation cue word 2 
 number  guilt cue word 2  number  indignation cue word 2  number 
 guilt cue word 2. 
 
The mental subtraction blocks served as a distraction from the emotional 
load of the participants’ thought processes and to separate each emotional block. 
Self-blame cue words were presented in blue colour on a black background; 
indignation cue words appeared in red on black background and numbers were 
presented in yellow.  
 
 In both treatment groups, participants were instructed to implement the 
psychological strategies in their everyday lives and to use them in-between 
treatment visits whenever feelings of self-blame would arise. The frequency of 
use was recorded at the next treatment visit. Participants were instructed to 
continue using the strategies until the final assessment visit (visit 5). 
 
 




II.3.13) Real-time fMRI neurofeedback intervention 
The rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention aimed at targeting hyper-
connected brain correlation patterns between the rSATL seed and the posterior SC 
region of interest (ROI). In remitted MDD, functional hyper-connectivity between 
these brain areas was postulated to portray the neural signature of overgeneralised 
self-blaming emotions in depression, as remitted MDD patients were found to 
display abnormally increased connectivity when experiencing self-blaming 
emotions relative to experiencing other-blaming emotions such as indignation 
(Lythe et al., 2015).  
Analogous to the psychological intervention group, and before the first 
neurofeedback training session, participants were asked to decide on specific 
autobiographical memories that would evoke strong feelings of self-blame and 
other-blame when prompted by previously defined cue words. The self-blame-
evoking scenarios had to involve the participant as the main agent of the scenario. 
The other-blaming scenarios had to involve another person acting. To evaluate 
whether a change occurred in the attribution of blame, ratings on these events 
were obtained before and after each scanning session. Instructions were given 
through the MRI intercom, participants, however, responded with a button box to 
prevent extensive head movement while being in the scanner.  
 
Analogue to the psychological intervention group, each of the three 
rtfMRI neurofeedback sessions contained a paradigm of four runs, whereby the 
following procedure applied: 
 
 




The first and fourth run (204 volumes each; 408 seconds duration) were 
identical and served to determine pre- and post-neurofeedback effects. They 
constituted of rtfMRI data acquisition runs, consisting of four self-blame (guilt) 
blocks (15 volumes each) and four other-blame (indignation) blocks (15 volumes 
each), interspersed with eight mental subtraction condition blocks (10 volumes 
each). As mentioned earlier, during the subtraction blocks, participants were 
asked to mentally subtract seven from a 3-digit number (e.g. 101, 102). 
While run 1 measured the correlation coefficient of self-blaming emotions 
relative to other-blaming emotions (indignation), training effects on such 
correlations were assessed in run 4.  
During the neurofeedback training runs (run 2 and 3), an upward and 
downward moving thermometer scale was displayed to provide visual feedback 
on how successful participants were in modifying their brain correlation patterns 
between the rSATL seed and the posterior SC region ROI. The thermometer scale 
appeared in the form of a bar filled with colours that could reach different levels. 
Participants were instructed to think about the particular autobiographical 
scenario triggered by the display of the previously agreed cue word and to try and 
bring up the level to the top of the thermometer scale by using the psychological 
strategies they had been equipped with before the scanning session. 
Runs 2 and 3 (212 volumes each; 424 seconds duration) were identical and 
consisted of four guilt blocks (42 volumes per block), interspersed with four 
mental subtraction condition blocks (10 volumes each).  
Similar to the psychological intervention group, mental subtraction blocks 
were used to divert participants from the emotionally charged autobiographical 
memories, in addition to minimising resting-state activity in the posterior SC 




region (Bado et al., 2014).  
 
II.3.14) Real-time fMRI neurofeedback method 
The rtfMRI neurofeedback software FRIEND (Basilio et al., 2015; Sato et 
al., 2013) was used in the file version 1.0.0.257. It is noteworthy that FRIEND has 
previously been validated for correlation feedback in patients with MDD (Zahn et 
al., 2018).  
A detailed description of methodological specifications of FRIEND as a 
rtfMRI neurofeedback tool is provided by Sato et al. (2013) and Zahn et al. 
(2018). In the NeuroMooD trial, FRIEND provided ROI-based rtfMRI 
neurofeedback alongside executing fundamental pre-processing steps of fMRI 
data in real-time. Facilitated by native FSL codes, FRIEND performed motion 
correction using MCFLIRT, spatial smoothing with Gaussian Kernel (FWHM = 
6mm) and GLM calculation (Zahn et al., 2018).  
Signal-level normalisation was performed by subtracting the mean value 
of the voxels signals within the ROI over the entire preceding subtraction 
condition block from the current echo-planar images belonging to the guilt or 
indignation condition block, which minimises local signal trends (Zahn et al., 
2018).  
The rSATL seed and posterior SC ROI were pre-defined, warped from 
MNI space into subject space and ultimately back-transformed into native space, 
using inverse transformation algorithms of FSL FLIRT (affine,12 parameters) 
(Zahn et al., 2018). During run 1, 50% of the most activated voxels were selected 
in the native space ROI, contrasting the activation between guilt vs subtraction in 
the rSATL ROI, while contrasting guilt vs indignation in the posterior SC ROI. 




These voxels were used to extract the average signal for the subsequent rtfMRI 
neurofeedback training. The first five volumes of each emotional block were 
discarded due to high correlations guided by a decrease in time series after 
subtraction conditions (Zahn et al., 2018).  
Thermometer levels, as displayed in the neurofeedback training runs, were 
calculated from the participant’s correlation patterns with a delay of six seconds. 
Once the first ten time points had been acquired to compute a correlation 
coefficient, the thermometer was updated every two seconds as soon as a new 
time point had been collected (i.e. each acquired volume).  
FRIEND used a moving target correlation algorithm over a sliding time 
window of the last ten volumes, updated every two seconds, hence for each 
acquired volume. The minimum of the thermometer display was calculated based 
on the minimum value of the last 10 Pearson correlation coefficients, whereas the 
maximum of the thermometer was calculated based on the maximum value of the 
last ten correlations. 
 





Figure II.1: Display of the interface of the rtfMRI neurofeedback software FRIEND during a data 
acquisition run. During acquisition runs (run 1 and 4), participants are presented with their guilt 
and indignation cue words. Cue words refer to autobiographical memories of events that trigger 
patients to experience feelings of self-blame or indignation. During these runs, participants are 
solely thinking about these events and are not using any psychological strategies to manage 
associated feelings of guilt. In-between the emotional conditions, participants are presented with 
numbers which cue them to perform mental subtractions from a number displayed at the screen.  
 





Figure II.2: Display of the interface of the rtfMRI neurofeedback software FRIEND during a 
neurofeedback training run. In the scanner, participants are presented with their individualised 
guilt cue words or subtraction blocks. In the guilt condition, a thermometer display containing a 
moving colour bar appears and represents visual feedback of the patient’s functional connectivity 
patterns in real-time. During the rtMRI neurofeedback runs (run 2 and 3), participants are asked to 
bring up the level of the thermometer by using psychological strategies when thinking about 
autobiographical, guilt evoking events. The colour bar rises if functional (hyper-)connectivity 
between the rSATL and posterior SC successfully decreases.  
 
 




II.3.15) Image acquisition 
MRI scan facilities were booked at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, 
King’s College London. Image acquisition was carried out on an MR750 3.0T 
MR system (General Electric), using a hyperbolic secant (HS) excitation pulse, 
optimised for orbitofrontal and inferior temporal regions, minimising signal 
dropout (Wastling & Barker, 2015). A 32-channel head coil was chosen to 
support an optimal signal-to-noise ratio. 
Functional image acquisition was obtained in the AC-PC plane, top to 
bottom, using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imagining EPI (BOLD) sequence (TR 
= 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, matrix = 64x64, FOV = 211 mm, flip angle = 73°, voxel 
size = 3x3x3 mm; slice thickness =3 mm, slice gap = 0.3 mm, 36 slices). Auto 
shimming was applied before starting each experimental run, acquiring four 
additional volumes which were automatically discarded, accounting of T1 
equilibration effects. 
High-resolution anatomical images were acquired with a magnetisation–
prepared rapid gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (TR = 7.3 sec, TE = 3.0 sec, 
matrix = 256 x 256, FOV = 270 mm, slice thickness = 1.2 mm, 196 slices).  
Clinical images were acquired on the first day of treatment (visit 2) using 
an FRFSE (2 mm thickness, 72 slices) and FLAIR sequence (4 mm thickness, 36 
slices) and checked for anatomical brain abnormalities after the treatment session 
by a radiologist at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s College London, 
independent of additional, internal checks completed by the NeuroMooD study 
team.  
While being in the MRI scanner, the participant’s head motion was 
restricted using padding and heart rate measurements recorded via a finger pulse 




sensor. A mirror fitted to the head coil allowed MDD patients to view visual 
stimuli presented during image acquisition, i.e. autobiographical cue words and 
the visual feedback thermometer, as stimuli were projected to a screen located 
behind the participant’s head. Verbal instructions were communicated via the 
MRI intercom, participants, however, were instructed to respond using a button 
box placed in their hands to avoid incidental head movement. 
 
II.3.16) Statistical power and offline analyses 
Statistical power was calculated using G*POWER software and required a 
sample size of n=34 participants to achieve 85% power at p=.05, 2-sided (t-test). 
This calculation was based on a conservatively estimated effect size (d=1.06) 
lower than the effect size (d=1.5) reported in a previous rtfMRI neurofeedback 
study in MDD (Linden et al., 2012). The enrolment target consisted of n=45 MDD 
patients, including a 20% drop-out rate of 9 participants. Hence, this trial aimed to 
conclude with n=36 MDD study completers, above n=34 as needed per power 
calculation.  
Given that this clinical trial was conducted as a pilot study to test 
feasibility, the performed power calculation is not recommended as it is based on 
effect sizes which may have been inflated due to small sample sizes. To determine 
precise effect sizes, pilot studies are recommended to include at least 70 
participants (i.e. 35 participants per group) when estimating the pooled standard 
deviation for continuous outcomes in randomised controlled trials (Teare et al., 
2014). Furthermore, based on guidelines posited by the National Institute for 
Health Research, feasibility studies should not intend to be based on standard 
power calculations (Teare et al., 2014). 




Ultimately, n=43 participants were randomised into the study, whereby 
n=22 MDD patients were allocated to the fMRI neurofeedback group and n=21 to 
the psychological intervention group. A sum of 8 participants withdrew or was 
excluded during the duration of the trial, leading to a final of n=35 datasets for the 
analysis of the primary outcome measure (BDI-II). Further details about 
participant numbers and withdrawal rates in both treatment groups can be found in 
section II.3.6 and section II.4.3 and are included in the trial flow diagram in 
section II.3.17. 
Statistical analyses were executed using the software package IBM SPSS 
Statistics 24 (https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software). Group-
level analyses of primary and secondary outcomes, comparing pre- and post-
treatment effects (visit 1 vs visit 5), were obtained using the constrained 
longitudinal analysis (cLDA) model, the alpha-level was set to p=.05, two-tailed. 
Cohen’s d effect sizes were computed using the formula: 2 x t-value / square root 
of degrees of freedom (df) (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Where cLDA was 
inapplicable, intervention group comparisons were performed using Mann-
Whitney U tests and generalised linear models (ordinal logistics). 
A repeated measures ANOVA was chosen in the analysis of regression 
coefficients for z-transformed rSATL and posterior SC signals in the guilt and 
indignation conditions. Transforming the data into z-transformed values allowed 
for receiving standardised regression coefficients.  
Explorative data analyses of the anxious distress subtype of MDD were 
conducted using univariate GLM analysis, for secondary correlation analyses 
investigating functional connectivity changes, self-esteem and engagement in 




treatment, Spearman’s rho was computed. As analyses were either hypothesis-
driven or exploratory (secondary outcome measures in the feasibility trial), p-
value adjustments to correct for multiple comparisons were not carried out (Feise, 
2002).  
  






























Phone screened for eligibility 
(n=311) 
Assessed for eligibility at visit 1  
(n=71) 
Randomised (n=43) 
Allocated to rtfMRI NF intervention 
(n=22); ‘Intervention’ refers to a 
minimum of 1of 3 allocated 
treatment sessions 
 Received allocated intervention 
(n=21) 
 Did not receive allocated intervention 
(n=1; withdrew before visit 2 because 
of feeling too unwell to participate) 
Allocated to psychological 
intervention (n=21) 
 Received allocated intervention 
(n=18) 
 Did not receive allocated intervention 
(n=3; 2 withdrawals before visit 2 
because of feeling too unwell to 
participate, 1 withdrawal before visit 
2 due to time constraints) 
Lost to follow-up (n=0) 
 
Discontinued intervention (n=2; 2 
withdrawals after visit 2, 1 due to 
familial reasons, 1 due to 




Excluded from analysis of primary 
outcome measure (n=0) 
Lost to follow-up (n=0) 
 
Discontinued intervention (n=2; 1 
exclusion after visit 2 due to 
worsening of symptoms; 1 




Excluded from analysis of primary 





 Not meeting inclusion criteria 
(n=28) 
 Declined to participate (n=0) 














II.3.18) NeuroMooD protocol violations 
Minor violations of the NeuroMooD protocol occurred during the duration 
of this study due to difficulties in scheduling participants’ treatment and final 
assessment visits. Modified schedules had to be arranged for individual 
participants who were unable to attend study visits within the preferred interval of 
7 to 13 days between appointments due to time constraints. Also, limited 
availability of fMRI scanning slots at the MRI facilities of the Centre for 
Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s College London, affected MDD patients allocated 
to the rtfMRI neurofeedback group, occasionally causing a delay in the scheduling 
of treatment visits. As this issue became apparent early in the study, treatment 
visits for the psychological treatment group were scheduled in intervals 
comparable to those of the rtfMRI neurofeedback group. Ultimately, no 
significant difference was found between treatment groups regarding the total 
number of days included in the study (t=1.21, df=33, p=.237, two-tailed), 
considering the period from randomisation (visit 1) until trial completion (visit 5). 
On average, it took rtfMRI neurofeedback participants 40 days (SD=9.18) to 
complete the NeuroMooD trial. Similarly, participants randomised to the 
psychological intervention group participated on average for 37 days (SD=7.37). 
 




II.4.1) Clinical characteristics of participants 





















 range: 2-66 range: 1-110 
Current MDE 
Partially remitted  
MDD DSM-5 subtype 
Anxious Distress  
Melancholic Features 
Melancholic Features + Anxious Distress 
Atypical Features 




















Current medication   
Psychotropic medication 
Antidepressant (therapeutic dose) 







Life-time co-morbidity   
Current Persistent Depressive Disorder of 
the dysthymic subtype 
Past PTSD with residual symptoms 
Past PTSD fully remitted 
Current Social Anxiety Disorder 













Past Anorexia Nervosa  0 1 
Participants in the psychological intervention and rtfMRI neurofeedback groups did not differ on 
median numbers of previous episodes despite higher percentiles in the psychological intervention 
group (U=145, p=.832, two-tailed). MDE = major depressive episode, MDD = major depressive 
disorder, SSRI = selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, SNRI = serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake 
inhibitor, PTSD = posttraumatic stress disorder; m = male, f = female; M = mean, SD = standard 
deviation, [M-M] = Minimum-Maximum. In the rtfMRI neurofeedback group, one participant was 
suspected of displaying symptoms of autism spectrum disorder; one participant showed symptoms 
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of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder during childhood, one participant reported past heavy 
alcohol and substance use.  
 







   
 M;SD;[Min-Max]      M;SD;[Min-Max] 
Age in years 
Years of education 
37.63;9.74;[22-55] 
18.06;2.52;[13-22] 
    36,74;11.04;[20-59] 
      16.95;3.15;[11-23] 
Participants of both treatment groups did not differ in age (t=-2.50, df=33, p=.804) or years of 
education (t=-1.14, df=33, p=.262).  
 
II.4.2) Pre-registered outcome measures: primary outcome measure  
 A significant improvement, irrespective of treatment group, was found on 
the pre-registered primary outcome measure, the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). A 
comparison of BDI-II score means pre- and post-treatment showed an overall 
reduction of 46.07%, which corresponds to a baseline assessment (N=43) of 
M=29.14 points (SD=8.66) and M=15.71, (SD=9.75) on the final assessment day 
(n=35). CLDA estimated the effect of time as a post-treatment BDI-II score mean 
of M=13.39, SE=2.74, df=75, t=4.89, p<.001, 95% CI [7.93,18.85], with a strong 
effect size of Cohen’s d=1.13. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the analysis 
demonstrated no effect of intervention group on the primary outcome measure. 
The cLDA model revealed a difference in mean of diff=.07 points on the BDI-II 
(SE=3.17, df=75, t=.02, p=.984, 95% CI [-6.26, 6.3], Cohen’s d=.00) in the 
psychological intervention group (n=16; M=15.75, SD=9.75) compared with the 
rtfMRI neurofeedback group (n=19; M=15.68, SD=10.02). Thus, the 
psychological intervention was shown to be of equal effectiveness in reducing 
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depressive symptomatology compared with the rtfMRI neurofeedback training as 
assessed with the BDI-II (Figure II.3). 
 
 
Figure II.3: Pre- vs post-treatment comparison in score means on the BDI-II for the psychological 
intervention (n=16) and rtfMRI neurofeedback training group (n=19). The cLDA model estimates 
a common baseline BDI-II score across treatment groups (N=43). Both interventions were shown 
to be of equal effectiveness, consisting of 56.25% treatment responders in the psychological 
intervention group vs 57.89% treatment responders in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group. Treatment 
response was defined as an improvement of ≥50% on the defined outcome measure. Figure 
adapted from Zahn (2018). 
 
II.4.3) Pre-registered outcome measures: secondary outcome measures  
Measures of depression, self-esteem and self-blame 
 Intervention group comparisons on pre-registered secondary outcome 
measures are presented in Tables II.3, II.4 and II.5. In both intervention groups, 
there were significant improvements on measures of depressive symptoms, 
including the QUIDS-SR16 and the depression-dejection subscale of the POMS. 
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Similarly, participants of both intervention groups showed a substantial reduction 
in symptoms on observer-rated measures, e.g. the MADRS, on trial completion 
compared with baseline. Moreover, MDD patients’ self-esteem increased 
significantly post- vs pre-treatment, regardless of the intervention group they had 
been allocated to. Nevertheless, and inconsistent with the a priori hypothesis, the 
rtfMRI neurofeedback intervention was not found to be superior over the 
psychological intervention on any of the pre-registered secondary outcome 
measures. On all other measures, including observer- and self-rated measures of 
self-blame (Table II.5), no improvement in symptoms was observed in both 
treatment groups. 
 
Adverse events and withdrawal rates 
Adverse event and withdrawal rates were pre-registered as additional 
secondary outcome measures. Notably, rtfMRI neurofeedback training, as well as 
the solely psychological treatment, were found to be safe and feasible forms of 
intervention. No significant differences emerged regarding adverse events or 
withdrawal rates throughout the trial following randomisation or specifically, 
between the first treatment session and trial completion (Table II.4). Overall, six 
adverse events were reported following randomisation, three occurring at a time 
point subsequent to the first treatment session. A possible relationship with the 
study has been suspected in four of the overall six adverse events throughout the 
trial, while no relationship was observed in one case and a probable relationship 
was assumed in one other instance. In the latter case, the participant reported 
transient insomnia lasting one night after his first rtfMRI neurofeedback session.  
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All adverse events were mild and constituted to two withdrawals and one 
incident of exclusion from the study. The participant was excluded on the day of 
the first treatment session, after having been randomised to the psychological 
intervention group, as the patient presented with symptoms of depression that had 
worsened by 10 points on the BDI-II between baseline assessment and first 
intervention day. In addition, one adverse event occurred prior to randomisation 
and had no relation with the study. The participant’s result on the ACE-III was 
critical, and the participant was advised to consult a specialist for further testing. 
Throughout the trial, seven participants withdrew their consent and ended 
their participation in the study, four prior to the first day of intervention and three 
at different time points following their first treatment session. In the former 
instance, participants reported to not feel well enough to participate or to 
experience time-related challenges that would make it impossible to attend the 
five scheduled study appointments. In the situation of participants withdrawing 
after their first treatment session, they described family or financial reasons for 
their decision. As aforementioned, transient insomnia in the night following the 
first rtfMRI neurofeedback session was cause for one MDD patient to discontinue 
trial participation.  
 
Real-time fMRI neurofeedback group: rSATL–posterior SC connectivity 
post- vs pre-intervention 
 As a further secondary outcome measure, specific to the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback intervention group, functional connectivity between the rSATL 
and the posterior SC was measured for self-blame relative to blaming others, post- 
vs pre-intervention. Change in functional connectivity was assessed by calculating 
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regression coefficient means for time series pre- and post-rtfMRI neurofeedback 
training. As predicted, a significant training-induced reduction in connectivity 
between the rSATL and posterior SC was detected in the guilt condition relative 
to indignation by means of a significant time x condition interaction in a repeated 
measures ANOVA (Table II.6). Inconsistent with the prediction, this decrease was 
not found to be significant for the guilt condition itself (t=-.89, df=17, p=.387; 
n=18), the mean difference between conditions was -1.27 with a 95% confidence 
interval between -.43 and .18. Interestingly, as guilt-specific connectivity 
successfully reduced relative to indignation post-treatment, indignation-related 
connectivity between the rSATL and posterior SC was observed to increase with a 
mean difference of .09 post- vs pre-rtfMRI neurofeedback training (Figure II.4; 
Table II.6). This finding, however, was not significant itself (t=.68, df=17, 
p=.504, 95% CI [-1.76,3.43]. 
 




Figure II.4: Relative change in functional connectivity between rSATL and posterior SC in the 
guilt and indignation condition, measured as Cohen’s D for regression coefficient means for time 
series pre- and post-rtfMRI neurofeedback training, comparing the first and final treatment 
session.  
 
In addition to applying the CLDA model, the intention-to-treat (ITT) 
approach was chosen and compared with the per-protocol analyses, using the 
Pearson Chi-Square test to analyse the association between intervention group and 
treatment response on the primary outcome measure (BDI-II). The ITT analysis 
includes data of all randomised participants regardless of their adherence or 
withdrawal subsequent to randomisation (Fisher et al., 1990). Here, participants 
who withdrew from the study or did not complete the trial were treated as non-
responders. No relationship was found between intervention group and treatment 
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response χ2(1, N=43)=.029, p=.864. The estimated treatment effect is considered 
to be conservative in ITT analysis and caution is raised in terms of ITT’s 
susceptibility to type II errors. The ITT approach might miss proving the efficacy 
of an actually efficacious therapy (for a review see Gupta, 2011). Contrary to the 
ITT analysis, the per-protocol analysis risks to falsely present a treatment effect 
(type I error). It excludes participants who withdraw after randomisation and 
disregards data of those who do not complete the study. The per-protocol analysis 
may lead to significant reductions in statistical power by affecting the overall 
sample size (Gupta, 2011). Using this analysis, no association between 
intervention group and treatment response was found χ2(1, N=35)= .046, p=.830. 
The results of these additional analyses confirm findings based on the cLDA 
model and were contrary to our predictions. 
 
Throughout all treatment sessions and active neurofeedback runs, 
participants were able to successfully regulate the neurofeedback thermometer by 
more than ~50% (Figure II.5). This is remarkable considering that FRIEND 
implements a moving target algorithm steering to increase the difficulty in 
controlling the neurofeedback thermometer as connectivity between the rSATL-
posterior SC effectively reduces.  
 




Figure II.5: NF participants were successful in controlling the neurofeedback thermometer by 
~50%. Participants’ neurofeedback success occurred already in the first session and was stable 
throughout further sessions with a slight drop in the final active run. FRIEND’s moving target 
algorithm responds to successfully reduced functional rSATL-posterior SC correlations by 
increasing the difficulty in upregulating the NF thermometer. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to investigate differences in 
rSATL-posterior SC functional connectivity pre- vs post-intervention in the guilt 
vs indignation condition over the course of all three treatment sessions. This 
analysis approach was chosen to contrast the two psychological conditions and 
thereby control for non-specific correlations, which make up a large fraction of 
the signal when considering each condition in isolation. While a significant main 
effect was found for pre- vs post-intervention (F(1,17)=4.5, p=.049, Wilks’ 
Lambda=.79, ηp²=.21), there was only a trendwise interaction between session 
and pre- vs post-interventional rSATL- posterior SC connectivity (F(2,16)=2.79, 
p=.091, Wilks’ Lamda=.74, ηp²=.26). Pre- and post-interventional connectivity 




















 THERMOMETER VALUE MEANS OF 
NEUROFEEDBACK RUNS IN EACH SESSION 
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sessions are displayed in Figure II.6. This shows that guilt connectivity was 
indeed reduced after the neurofeedback training relative to indignation in 
concordance with our main analysis. It appears that most of this training effect 
occurred already after the first session (Session A), but this observation was only 
supported by a trendwise interaction between session and intervention effect. 
 
 
Figure II.6: Change in functional connectivity between rSATL and posterior SC in the guilt vs 
indignation condition, measured as Cohen’s D for regression coefficient means with standard 
errors for time series pre- and post-rtfMRI neurofeedback training in n=18 participants plotted for 
each neurofeedback session.  
 
There was no difference between non-anxious and anxious distress MDD 
patients with regard to their functional connectivity between the rSATL and 
posterior SC for guilt relative to indignation prior to the initial neurofeedback 
session (U=35.00, NMDDnon-anxious=6, NMDDanxious=13, p=.765, two-tailed) or after 
the final neurofeedback training (U=26.00, NMDDnon-anxious=5, NMDDanxious=13, 
p=.566, two-tailed). Similarly, no difference between patients groups was found in 
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the change of functional connectivity between the rSATL and posterior SC in the 
guilt versus indignation condition pre- versus post-treatment (U=30.00, NMDDnon-
anxious=5, NMDDanxious=13, p=.849, two-tailed). 
 
II.4.4) Exploratory secondary data analysis 
Major depressive disorder with and without anxious distress 
 Based on the primary finding of equally strong treatment responses in both 
intervention groups, subsequent exploratory data analyses of clinical subtypes of 
MDD investigated differences in the response of MDD patients with and without 
anxious distress. This analysis approach was chosen given the prominent 
frequency of MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype (n=21) amongst the 
completers of the study (n=35). Notably, univariate GLM analysis demonstrated 
the superiority of rtfMRI neurofeedback training in MDD patients without 
anxious distress relative to the solely psychological intervention, which showed 
relatively greater effectiveness in MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype 
(F(1,30)=4.98, p=.033, ηp²=.14; Figure II.7).  
 
 




Figure II.7: Post-treatment BDI-II estimated marginal means of MDD patients with and without 
anxious distress in both treatment groups (rtfMRI neurofeedback group: n=19, 13 with, six without 
anxious distress; psychological intervention group: n=16, eight with and eight without anxious 
distress). In the rtfMRI neurofeedback group, 46.14% MDD patients with anxious distress halved 
their BDI-II scores post-treatment, compared to 75% responders of the anxious distress subtype in 
the psychological intervention group. Similarly, 83.33% of patients without anxious distress 
responded to the rtfMRI neurofeedback training, compared with 37.5% in the psychological 
intervention group. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the baseline BDI-II value of 
28.60 points. There was no significant main effect of the MDD anxious/non-anxious subtype 
(F(1,30)=.78, p=.782, ηp² =.003), nor an effect of treatment group (F(1,30)=0, p=.989, ηp² =0).  
 
Change in connectivity on fMRI, self-esteem and engagement in treatment 
 Based on previous findings, where measures of self-esteem correlated with 
changes in functional connectivity between the rSATL and the anterior subgenual 
SC after rtfMRI neurofeedback training (Zahn et al., 2018), non-parametric 
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correlation analyses were conducted to explore this pattern in the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback group (Table II.7). Notably, no such correlation was found, a 
change in connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC in guilt relative to 
indignation was not associated with an increase in self-esteem in the patient 
group. Interestingly, however, improvement in depression scores correlated with 
an increase in self-esteem. Similarly, a positive correlation was found between 
increased self-esteem and engagement in treatment as assessed by the summed 
frequency of use of treatment-specific psychological strategies throughout the 












cLDA EFFECT OF TIME cLDA EFFECT OF GROUP 
 PSYCH&NFB PSYCH NFB BASELINE vs. FINAL PSYCH vs. NFB 
 M SD M SD M SD diff 
[df] 
SE p 95% 
CI 
t d diff 
[df] 




[PRE: 43; POST: 35] 
22.84 6.97 15.56 6.38 14.37 6.55 7.27 
[75] 
1.98 .00* 3.33 
 to 
11.22 
3.68 .85 1.19 
[75] 





[PRE: 43; POST: 35] 
16.79 6.53 10.88 6.53 10.16 4.41 5.92 
[75] 
1.67 .00* 2.58  
to 
 9.25 
3.53 .82 .72 
[75] 






[PRE: 43; POST: 35] 
10.91 4.47 7.81 4.59 7.21 5.67 3.09 
[75] 
1.41 .03* .29 
to  
5.90 
2.20 .51 .60 
[75] 






[PRE: 43; POST: 35] 
20.60 3.49 24.19 4.15 24.58 5.26 -3.59 
[75] 
1.20 .00* -5.98 
to 
-1.18 
-2.97 -.69 -.39 
[75] 






[PRE: 41; POST: 35] 
.00 39.00 -.28 .36 -.05 .39 .29 
[73] 
.11 .01 .06 
to 
 .51 
2.53 .59 -.23 
[73] 






[PRE: 38; POST: 35] 
.32 38.00 .24 .42 .24 .47 .08 
[70] 
.12 .50 -.16  
to 
.32 
.68 .16 .00 
[70] 






[PRE: 43; POST: 35] 
15.25 16.85 10.76 14.97 10.23 17.59 4.48 
[75] 
4.88 .36 -5.25 
to 
14.21 
.92 .21 .53 
[75] 




*=significant at p=.05, 2-sided. Between-group Cohen’s d scores were computed from t-values and degrees of freedom (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) of the differences 
between groups. Mean differences and 95% confidence intervals were taken from cLDA models for differences between post- vs pre-training. Implicit self-blame was 




rtfMRI neurofeedback group. CI = confidence interval, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error, diff = difference of means, df = degrees of freedom, d = 
Cohen’s d.  
 












MEDIAN RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
     PSYCH NFB PSYCH NFB PSYCH NFB PSYCH NFB 
Observer-Rated CGI 
Post-Intervention 
[35; NFB: 19; PSYCH: 16] 
129.00 .376 .461 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
Participant-Rated CGI 
Post-Intervention 
[35; NFB: 19; PSYCH: 16] 
139.50 .658 .683 2.50 2.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 
Withdrawal Rates 
throughout trial 
[43; NFB: 22; PSYCH: 21] 
218.50 .635  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Withdrawal Rates after 
first treatment session 
[43; NFB: 22; PSYCH: 21] 
221.00 .582  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Adverse Events  
throughout trial 
[43; NFB: 22; PSYCH: 21] 
208.00 .352  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Adverse Events after first 
treatment session 
[43; NFB: 22; PSYCH: 21] 
219.50 .527  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 












GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL  
ORDINAL LOGISTIC 
 
 PSYCH NFB PSYCH NFB EFFECT OF GROUP EFFECT OF TIME 
 Mdn Min Max Mdn Min Max Mdn Min Max Mdn Min Max Wald  
Chi-Square 










2.0 .0 7.0 2.0 .0 7.0 1.0 .0 4.0 1.0 .0 5.0 .00 1.00 1.00 11.81 7.00 .11 
Participant-rated self-blame scores are based on the mean of two autobiographical events per subject; Observer-rated self-blame scores are based on the moral emotion 
addendum of the AMDP Psychopathology Interview questions on depression (Faehndrich & Stieglitz, 1997). PSYCH = psychological intervention group, NFB = rtfMRI 
neurofeedback group. Mdn = Median, Min = Minimum, Max = Maximum, df = degrees of freedom. 
 
Table II.6: Post-training vs pre-training comparison of pre-registered secondary outcome measure rSATL – posterior SC correlation on fMRI 






REPEATED MEASURES ANOVA 
    NFB NFB TIME CONDITION TIMExCONDITION 
    M SD M SD F p F p F p 
Guilt: rSATL-SC regression effect 
[n=18] 
.29 .54 .16 .37 .29 .87 .43 .52 6.40 .02* 
Indignation: rSATL-SC regression 
effect [n=18] 
.15 .46 .24 .25       




Table II.7: Secondary correlation analyses  
 




BDI-II reduction in 
percent [post-pre]
Frequency of strategy 
use since visit 2
rSATL-SC connectivity,  
difference in Cohen's d, guilt 
vs indignation[post-pre]
rSATL-SC connectivity, 








Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.022 0.434 0.370




** 1.000 -0.241 -0.182 -0.214
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.164 0.470 0.394




* -0.241 1.000 0.260 0.048
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.022 0.164 0.298 0.850
N 35 35 35 18 18
Correlation 
Coefficient
0.197 -0.182 0.260 1.000 .472
*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.434 0.470 0.298 0.048
N 18 18 18 18 18
Correlation 
Coefficient
0.225 -0.214 0.048 .472
* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.370 0.394 0.850 0.048
N 18 18 18 18 18
Spearman's rho Rosenberg difference score [post-pre]
BDI-II reduction in percent [post-
pre]
Frequency of strategy use since visit 2
rSATL-SC connectivity,  difference in 
Cohen's d, guilt vs indignation [post-
pre]
rSATL-SC connectivity, difference in 
Cohen' s d, guilt [post-pre]





II.5.1) Discussion of main findings 
This single-blind, randomised, controlled proof-of-concept trial 
investigated the clinical benefits of a novel rtfMRI neurofeedback protocol 
compared to the therapeutic effects of a newly designed self-guided psychological 
intervention in current and insufficiently remitted MDD. It was hypothesised that 
patients randomised to the rtfMRI neurofeedback group show a reduction in 
depressive symptoms and self-blame while exhibiting an increase in self-worth 
compared to the psychological intervention group. Furthermore, it was proposed 
that patients undergoing rtfMRI neurofeedback training show a decreased 
functional connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC post-treatment 
compared to pre-treatment. Decreased functional connectivity between the rSATL 
and posterior SC region was predicted to be associated with a reduction in 
depressive symptoms in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group. 
 The results demonstrated that both interventions proved to be safe for 
MDD patients, with no relevant adverse events occurring in either group. There 
was a strong effect size for patients’ improvement on self-rated and observer-rated 
depression measures with response rates above 55% in both intervention groups. 
Thus, the safety and overall clinical benefits of the rtfMRI neurofeedback 
intervention in MDD is in keeping with previous studies (Linden et al., 2012, 
Mehler et al., 2018, Young et al., 2014, Young et al., 2017a). This is particularly 
remarkable as the NeuroMooD protocol asked participants to engage with 
negative rather than positive emotions, opposed to previous studies (Linden et al., 
2012, Mehler et al., 2018, Young et al., 2014, Young et al., 2017a). Contrary to 




the first hypothesis, no difference was found between the rtfMRI neurofeedback 
and the psychological intervention group on the primary outcome measure (BDI-
II). The second prediction was confirmed as the rtfMRI neurofeedback training 
resulted in a decrease in functional connectivity between the rSATL and the 
posterior SC for guilt relative to indignation. Contrary to the third hypothesis, no 
relationship was found between connectivity changes and the changes in 
depressive symptoms after three sessions of rtfMRI neurofeedback training. 
Various considerations need to be taken into account as to why no group 
differences were found on primary and secondary outcome measures. One 
possibility might be that the improvements observed in both intervention groups 
were due to spontaneous remission or placebo-like effects instead of being the 
result of the experimental treatment. This is possible, yet unlikely to be the only 
explanatory factor for this finding as the placebo response rate in MDD is 
generally found to be lower, usually around 30% (Walsh, Seidman, Sysko 
&Gould, 2002), well below the >55% response rate demonstrated in both 
treatment groups in the NeuroMooD trial. Furthermore, the NeuroMooD protocol 
aimed at minimising the risk of including spontaneously remitting patients by 
including MDD patients only if they were stable, i.e. with no improvement, in 
symptoms for at least six weeks before randomisation into the study, and by 
restricting inclusion to patients with early treatment-resistance and recurrent 
MDD. Lastly, the frequency of how often participants used the psychological 
strategies between treatment visits was found to positively correlate with an 
increase in self-esteem in both intervention groups, which further argues against 
spontaneous remission as an explanation for the observed findings. Another 
possible explanation as to why rtfMRI neurofeedback did not show superiority 




over the psychological intervention might be because the rtfMRI neurofeedback 
intervention provided no added value in reducing symptoms of depression in early 
treatment-resistant MDD compared with the strong effects of the self-guided 
psychological intervention. While this explanation cannot be ruled out, the 
secondary data analysis suggests that rtfMRI neurofeedback training is superior to 
the psychological intervention in the non-anxious distress subtype of MDD. This 
finding will, however, require further confirmation in future studies. 
 The observed rtfMRI neurofeedback training-induced reduction in 
functional connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior SC for guilt relative 
to indignation demonstrates that MDD patients were able to successfully modulate 
their brain connectivity as guided by the rtfMRI neurofeedback signal. The lack of 
association between functional connectivity changes and improvement in the 
severity of depressive symptoms is in keeping with the limited clinical benefit in 
the rtfMRI neurofeedback group overall. Considering that the majority of MDD 
patients in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group were of the anxious distress subtype 
(n=13 vs n=6 non-anxious MDD), the neural fMRI target may be irrelevant for the 
anxious distress subtype of MDD; a hypothesis that will be further examined in 
the next chapter. 
 
II.5.2) Limitations 
 The following potential limitations of the NeuroMooD trial need to be 
considered: firstly, the study might have been underpowered and, therefore, 
unable to detect a clinically meaningful difference between the two intervention 
groups. Nevertheless, the effect sizes for non-superiority of the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback group were so small, that even a large sample would have been 




unable to find differences between groups. Furthermore, the trial’s sample size 
was comparable to other randomised clinical trials investigating rtfMRI in MDD 
(Mehler et al., 2018; Young et al., 2017a). Young et al. (2017a) found a symptom 
reduction of more than 50% in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group compared to 8% 
in the control group as assessed one week after the completion of two amygdala-
targeting rtfMRI neurofeedback sessions. A further limitation of the NeuroMooD 
trial might consist in the heterogeneity of the sample with the inclusion of only 
few MDD patients of the non-anxious distress subtype and the inclusion of 
participants with current or past diagnoses of anxiety and trauma-related 
disorders, i.e. past PTSD with residual symptoms and current and past social 
anxiety disorder. 
Contrary to previous rtfMRI neurofeedback studies in MDD (Young et al., 
2014, Young et al., 2017a) that included medication-free patients, the majority of 
MDD patients participating in the NeuroMooD trial were taking antidepressant 
medication. Interactions of NeuroMooD interventions with medication effects 
cannot be out ruled as only 56% of participants were taking antidepressant 
medications in the psychological intervention group compared to 84% in the 
rtfMRI neurofeedback group. Despite the possibility that antidepressant 
medication may have negatively impacted on the participants’ performance during 
the rtfMRI neurofeedback training, Linden et al.’s, (2012) pioneering rtfMRI 
neurofeedback study targeted a sample on stable antidepressant medication 
comparable to NeuroMooD and demonstrated the superiority of the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback relative to the control condition. Finally, and opposite to Young et 
al. (2017a), the NeuroMooD study was limited by lacking a rtfMRI 
neurofeedback control arm. Notably, however, Young et al. (2017a) used the left 




intraparietal sulcus for the neurofeedback signal in the control condition which is 
not involved in the processing or recall of positive emotions, which might have 
interfered with the positive psychological effects of their control intervention.  
 
II.5.3) Conclusion 
 Both interventions were demonstrated to be safe and resulted in a 
reduction in symptom severity of 46% and a treatment response of more than 55% 
in the study sample of current and insufficiently remitted, early treatment-resistant 
MDD. Albeit some contribution of placebo-like effects cannot be ruled out, it is 
likely that the self-guided psychological intervention has demonstrated beneficial 
effects. Self-blame specific rtfMRI neurofeedback training may be more effective 
than the psychological intervention in MDD patients without anxious distress, 
which needs further confirmation in future studies.  
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Chapter III: Self-blaming biases and distinctive clinical features 
of major depressive disorder with and without anxious distress 
III.1) Abstract 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is frequently accompanied by 
prominent symptoms of anxiety, which is reflected in the introduction of the 
anxious distress subtype of MDD in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Research suggests that there is 
evidence for substantial differences between anxious and non-anxious MDD. The 
work presented in this chapter refers back to findings discussed in chapter II and 
explores self-blaming biases and distinct clinical characteristics of anxious and 
non-anxious MDD patients, in order to better understand the differential response 
of both patient groups to the clinical interventions in the NeuroMooD trial. 
It was hypothesised that MDD with anxious distress would be associated with 
higher levels of stressful life events and anger towards others, resulting in reduced 
self-blaming emotional biases. These predictions were partly confirmed. MDD 
patients with anxious distress showed elevated levels of anger and hostility on 
some, but not all measures, compared with non-anxious MDD patients and 
healthy control (HC) participants. Also, the anxious MDD subtype did not differ 
on measures of early life trauma but was found to have experienced past stressful 
life events more frequently. MDD groups did not differ on any other clinical 
measures. Notably, anxious and non-anxious MDD failed to show self-blaming 
biases on the experimental measure, the modified version of the value-related 
moral sentiment task (VMST), despite 70% of patients expressing at least 
moderate levels of self-blame when clinically assessed. The results suggest that 




self-blaming emotional biases in interpersonal situations, as measured on our 
experimental task, may only be relevant for some but not all subgroups of MDD. 
Further, the current findings highlight the need for the development of additional 
experimental measures to capture self-blaming biases in other contexts, such as 
when personal achievement is concerned. 
 





III.2.1) Background: anxious depression and MDD with anxious distress 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is found to be frequently accompanied 
by prominent symptoms of anxiety or comorbid with anxiety disorders (Schaffer 
et al., 2012). Gaspersz et al. (2018) discern that the term ‘anxious depression’ is 
commonly used to characterise three distinct anxiety-depression profiles: MDD 
with a comorbid anxiety disorder, MDD with anxiety symptoms above a cut-off 
score on an anxiety measure, and lastly, MDD with anxious distress, as assessed 
according to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).  
Researchers and clinicians distinguish anxious depression from non-
anxious depression due to substantial evidence on their differences, which are of 
clinical relevance. Not only is anxious depression very common (45.1-78%, Fava 
et al., 2006; Lamers et al., 2011; Zimmerman et al., 2017), but MDD patients with 
anxiety symptoms or comorbidities are found to have more severe and chronic 
courses of MDD (Fava et al., 2004; Fava et al., 2006; Goldberg & Fawcett, 2012; 
Rhebergen et al., 2011), poorer treatment response (Domschke, Deckert, Arolt, & 
Baune, 2010; Farabaugh et al., 2012; Fava et al., 2008; Ionescu, Niciu, Richards, 
& Zarate, 2014), higher rates of self-harm, suicidal ideation and suicide attempts 
(Fava et al., 2004; Fawcett, 2001; Goldberg & Fawcett, 2012) and lower quality 
of life and functioning (Chan et al., 2012) compared with non-anxious MDD 
patients. Furthermore, differences seem to exist in the neurobiology of their 
illness, including cortical thinning, functional connectivity abnormalities and 




immune response anomalies (Gaspersz et al., 2017c; Ionescu, Niciu, Mathews, 
Richards, & Zarate, 2013; Shim, Woo, & Bahk, 2016).  
Ultimately, the DSM-5 Mood Disorders Workgroup introduced and 
defined the MDD anxious distress specifier in DSM-5 (APA, 2013) which 
acknowledges the anxiety-dominant subpopulation in MDD. The DSM-5 anxious 
distress specifier consists of five items, capturing the presence of at least two of 
five symptoms during the majority of days of a major depressive episode (MDE): 
(1) feeling keyed up or tense, (2) feeling unusually restless, (3) having difficulties 
concentrating because of worrying, (4) feeling afraid that something awful may 
happen, (5) feeling that anxiety or worry would be out of control. In addition, the 
severity of anxious distress can be assessed, ranging from mild (two symptoms 
present) to severe (four or five symptoms present, with psychomotor agitation).  
Recent studies confirmed the reliability and validity of the anxious distress 
specifier (Gaspersz et al., 2017b; Zimmerman et al., 2014; Zimmerman et al., 
2017) and demonstrated the prevalence of the anxious distress subtype in MDD to 
be ranging from 54.2 % to 78% (Gaspersz et al., 2017a, Gaspersz et al., 2017b; 
McIntyre et al., 2016; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Post-hoc analyses found MDD 
patients of the anxious distress subtype to be suffering from a greater severity of 
MDD, higher rates of cognitive and functional impairment and increased suicidal 
ideation compared with non-anxious MDD (Maneeton et al., 2017; McIntyre et 
al., 2016; Zimmerman et al., 2014). In addition, patients with anxious distress 
endure a lower quality of life and profound insomnia (Maneeton et al., 2017; 
McIntyre et al., 2016). Gaspersz et al. (2018) concluded that the DSM-5 MDD 
anxious distress specifier captures a highly prevalent, clinically distinct and 
relevant subgroup of MDD patients who are characterised by a poorer clinical 




response and treatment outcome and who are not identified otherwise, as research 
shows that the anxious distress subtype overlaps only poorly with DSM-IV 
anxiety disorders (Gaspersz et al., 2017b). Rosellini (2018) points to higher co-
morbidity rates with anxiety disorders such as generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD).  
 
As outlined within the previous chapter of this thesis, MDD patients of the 
anxious distress subtype outweighed the number of non-anxious MDD patients in 
the NeuroMooD study. Considering the literature presented, this observation is 
not surprising, as the recruitment for NeuroMooD was targeted at MDD patients 
with at least some degree of treatment resistance. Interestingly, patients with and 
without anxious distress showed differences in their treatment response to the 
rtfMRI neurofeedback training and psychological intervention, which both aimed 
at addressing self-blaming biases in MDD.  
To my knowledge, no studies of self-blaming emotions or biases in MDD 
patients with anxious distress have been published at present, while there is some 
evidence for a weak association with anger in this MDD subtype (Zimmerman et 
al., 2014; Zimmerman et al., 2017). Furthermore, post-hoc analyses found 
symptoms of anxious distress in MDD to be co-occurring with irritability (i.e. the 
feeling of general frustration and annoyance) and decreased response to 
antidepressant treatment (Brown, DiBenedetti, Danchenko, Weiller, & Fava, 
2016).  
As it becomes apparent, evidence on the cognitive and clinical 
characteristics of the DSM-5 MDD anxious distress subtype is still scarce. This 
chapter serves the aim to explain the differences observed in anxious and non-




anxious MDD patient groups in their response to the treatment of self-blaming 
emotional biases in the NeuroMooD study, as presented in chapter II. 
 
III.2.2) Background: self-blaming emotional biases in MDD 
Self-blaming emotions are a frequently observed characteristic of MDD 
(Sartorius, Jablensky, Gulbinat, & Ernberg, 1980). Retrospective assessment of 
past MDEs in MDD revealed self-blaming emotions to be occurring in more than 
80% of MDD patients during their most severe MDE (Zahn et al., 2015b).  
Freud (1917) was the first to recognise excessive self-blame to be 
distinctive for MDD. Among modern psychological models, Abramson et al.’s 
(1978) revised learned helplessness model focusses on self-blaming biases most 
prominently, postulating that biases towards self-directed blame for failure are 
substantial in the vulnerability and development of MDD. The model posits the 
manifestation of such biases in hopelessness, feelings of depression and poor self-
worth. The revised learned helplessness model is in contrast to the widely 
acknowledged view that MDD is due to ‘negative affectivity’, i.e. an increase in 
negative emotions in general, alongside with a reduction in positive emotions 
(Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988).  
There is evidence in support of the revised learned helplessness model as 
recent studies demonstrate excessive self-blaming emotions, i.e. self-directed 
guilt, shame, and disgust/contempt towards oneself, to be a prominent 
characteristic even in remitted MDD (Green, Moll, Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 
2013). Contrary to the theory of an overall increase in negativity in MDD, 
however, negative emotions towards others, i.e. indignation and anger, 
disgust/contempt towards others, are found to be reduced (Green et al., 2013; 




Zahn et al., 2015a). These findings provide further evidence for attributional 
models of MDD that propose an increase in relative self-blaming emotions to 
occur as well as a relative diminishment of other-blaming emotions in MDD 
(Weiner, 1985). Green et al. (2013) and Zahn et al. (2015a) were the first to assess 
self-directed blame relative to other-blame in MDD while controlling for negative 
valence, by using an experimental task, the VMST, instead of standardised 
questionnaires.  
 
Although Zahn et al. (2015b) found self-contempt/disgust to be more 
prominent in MDD compared to guilt and shame, standard clinical assessments 
are often limited to measuring (excessive) guilt. The DSM-5 acknowledges 
inappropriate guilt to be a core symptom of melancholic MDD but does not assess 
other self-blaming emotions. 
Characteristics of shame and guilt and their link to MDD psychopathology 
have been discussed extensively in the literature, revealing opposing views on the 
depressogenic nature of these emotions. Tangney et al. (1991; 1992) view guilt as 
a form of behavioural self-blame concerning a distinct action or behaviour. In this 
view, guilt is considered to be adaptive and not necessarily associated with poor 
psychological adjustment (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Further, the 
authors argue that shame, however, reflects a global form of self-blame, 
devaluating and scrutinising the entire self and resulting in feelings of 
worthlessness, therefore being associated more closely with MDD 
psychopathology (Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007; Tangney et al., 1992). 
Contrary to this viewpoint, O’Connor and colleagues propose that guilt 
can inherit a characterological quality in that as excessive empathy can give rise 




to maladaptive forms of guilt (Lynn E. O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; L. E. 
O'Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002; O'Connor, Berry, Lewis & Stiver, 
2011). Using the Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire (IGQ-67; O’Connor, Berry, 
Weiss, Bush & Sampson, 1997), a measure of characterological guilt, the authors 
found survivor guilt to be highly associated with MDD (O’Connor et al., 1997, 
O’Connor et al., 1999, O’Connor et al., 2002) and maladaptive attributional 
styles, such as ‘blaming oneself for the misfortunate of others’ or ‘being incapable 
of taking credit for own successes’ (O’Connor et al., 2011).  
 
Various studies in MDD have found evidence in support of the relevance 
of characterological self-blame (e.g. shame, self-contempt, self-disgust) over 
behavioural self-blame (i.e. guilt) (Tangney et al., 1992; Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, 
Felton, & Ciesla, 2008), while other findings demonstrated an increase of both, 
guilt- and shame-proneness in MDD (Alexander, Brewin, Vearnals, Wolff, & 
Leff, 1999; Berrios et al., 1992; L. E. O'Connor et al., 2002). Green et al. (2013) 
conclude that the contradiction in findings may be caused by inconsistencies in 
the definition of these self-conscious emotions, in addition to being due to 
differences in how these emotions were operationalised. 
It is noteworthy that Tangney & Dearing (2002) found individuals to be 
performing poorly at distinguishing guilt and shame, which is why the Test of 
Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3) focuses on action tendencies rather than 
subjective emotional qualities (Tangney & Dearing, 2000). Action tendencies are 
thought to be reflective of particular emotions, hence, function as a proxy for 
them (Tangney et al., 2000).  
 




The study presented in this chapter employed the concept of action 
tendencies (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994) by implementing action tendencies 
in the VMST, thereby modifying previous versions of this experimental task 
(Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2015a; Zahn et al., 2009). The aim was to assess 
subjective emotional qualities and action tendencies with one instrument.  
The specific action tendencies implemented in the modified VMST 
include: 1) feeling like creating distance from oneself, 2) hiding, 3) apologising, 
4) creating a distance from one’s friend and 4) verbally or physically 
attacking/punishing one’s friend. These action tendencies corresponded to the 
moral sentiments entailed in the VMST, i.e. guilt, shame, contempt/disgust 
towards self and others, and indignation/anger towards others.  
Feeling like hiding is classically thought to be associated with shame 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2000), whereas attacking or punishing others is thought to 
be linked to anger. Creating a distance from oneself or others is thought to be 
reflective of disgust, based on existing literature that finds moral disgust to be 
associated with withdrawing from others rather than approaching tendencies as 
entailed in anger (Haidt et al., 2003; Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza & Moll, 2013). 
Apologising was included as an action tendency in the modified VMST as it 
classically is associated with adaptive forms of guilt (Haidt et al., 2003; Tangney 
& Dearing, 2000; Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow 1989).  
As predicted by the authors, Green et al. (2013) found the guilt measure on 
the VMST to capture non-depressogenic forms of self-blame rather than 
overgeneralised forms or characterological guilt. Further, guilt on the VMST was 
demonstrated to be selectively correlating with TOSCA-guilt, but not with the 




shame measure on the TOSCA-3. TOSCA-shame, in turn, was found to be 
associated with the self-contempt measure on the VMST (Green et al., 2013).  
 
The rationale for using the (modified) VMST for the research question 
presented in this chapter, was based on previous studies that found the VMST to 
be successful in capturing proneness to experiencing self- and other-blaming 
emotions in remitted MDD (Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2015a) as outlined 
above. The VMST measures self-contempt bias by subtracting the percentage of 
contempt/disgust experienced towards others from the percentage of self-directed 
contempt/disgust. Specifics of this task will be further explained in section III.3.7.  
 
III.2.3) Specific aims and hypotheses 
This chapter aims to identify the differences between anxious and non-
anxious MDD patients in relation to self-blaming emotional biases and clinical 
characteristics.  
The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: MDD patients with anxious distress show higher indignation/anger 
towards others as compared with MDD patients with non-anxious MDD. 
Hypothesis 2: Self-blaming emotional biases will be more pronounced in MDD 
patients without anxious distress than MDD patients with anxious distress. 
Hypothesis 3: MDD patients with anxious distress have experienced stressful life 
events more frequently than MDD patients without anxious distress. 
 





III.3.1) Study design 
 Data for this research was collected as part of ‘The cognitive architecture 
of blame biases study’, (study 2) of the NeuroMooD protocol, which received 
ethical approval by the NHS Health Research Authority, NRES Committee 
London – Camberwell St Giles (REC reference: 15/LO/0577). 
This case-control study aimed at exploring self-blaming emotional biases 
in MDD compared with HC participants. Based on findings obtained from the 
NeuroMooD trial (see chapter II), hence, the differences observed between MDD 
with and without anxious distress regarding treatment response, this research 
focused on comparing self-blaming biases and clinical features of anxious and 
non-anxious MDD patients with HC participants.  
 
III.3.2) Recruitment and reimbursement of participants 
MDD patients were recruited, screened and clinically assessed as part of 
their participation in the NeuroMooD trial. For details on recruitment and 
assessment procedures and reimbursement, refer to chapter II.3. HC participants 
were recruited through study adverts, which were posted online or disseminated 
via university recruitment circulars. HC participants received compensation for 
the time taken to participate in the study in the form of shopping vouchers worth 
£20 if included in the study, and £10 if excluded after an initial clinical 
assessment.  
 




III.3.3) Eligibility assessment 
All participants underwent an initial phone screening interview, giving 
oral consent before formal evaluation. If initial inclusion criteria were met, 
participants were invited to attend a clinical assessment visit to confirm the 
eligibility of their participation. Volunteers received a formal invitation via email 
at least 24 hours before their study visit, providing volunteers with the participant 
information sheet and study consent form. Where inclusion criteria were met, 
participants proceeded with the completion of all tasks, tests, and questionnaires. 
For details of study procedures and measures used, see sections III.3.6, III.3.7 and 
III.3.8. MDD patients and HC participants underwent identical assessment 
procedures. 
 
A total of 85 HC participants were screened over the phone and 
consequently, 21 volunteers were seen for a clinical assessment to confirm 
eligibility. Following this assessment, 18 HC participants were included in the 
study and completed all assessments.  
For details on recruitment and assessment of MDD patients, please see 
chapter II.3.3-II.3.7. Participants who could not be included in the NeuroMooD 
study but fulfilled criteria for ‘The cognitive architecture of blame biases study’ 
were offered to participate. Data of n=49 MDD patients was acquired for this 
research, 33 MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype, 16 MDD patients 
without anxious distress.  
 




III.3.4) Inclusion criteria 
MDD patients meeting the following criteria were considered for inclusion 
into the study: 
i. Recurrent MDD according to DSM-5 with at least one MDE of at least 
two months duration, currently experiencing an MDE or being 
insufficiently remitted for at least six weeks, with significantly bothering 
or impairing symptoms (Psychiatric Status Rating of 3-5) 
ii. If treated with antidepressants, on a stable dose for at least six weeks prior 
to participating and planning to stay on this dose for the duration of the 
study 
iii. Patients have insufficiently responded to at least one course of cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) or antidepressants or are not amenable to these 
standard treatments. MDD patients are not currently undergoing 
psychotherapy. 
iv. Age range: 18 or older 
v. Right-handedness  
vi. Proficiency in English  
 
HC participants were age- and education-matched to the MDD study 
population, proficient in English language and right-handed. Importantly, HC 
participants had no current or history of psychiatric or neurological disorders.  
 
III.3.5) Exclusion criteria 
Participants were not eligible for inclusion if any of the following criteria applied: 
i. History of learning disabilities or developmental disorders 




ii. Impairments of vision or hearing which cannot be corrected during the 
experiment 
iii. History of manic or hypomanic episodes, of schizophreniform 
symptoms or schizophrenia, or substance abuse, neurological disorders 
such as seizures, loss of consciousness following brain injury or 
medical disorders affecting brain function, blood flow or metabolism  
iv. Current intake of benzodiazepines, GABAergic or benzodiazepine 
receptor agonists 
v. Current recreational drug use 
vi. Pregnancy 
 
In addition to the above criteria, HC participants were excluded if they had 
a family history of MDD, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia or psychosis, a history 
of psychiatric disorders themselves or past use of psychotropic medications. 
 
MDD patients, on the other hand, were excluded if they had received a 
specialist diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or 
personality disorder or showed significant impairment of psychosocial functioning 
with at least moderate impairment outside their MDEs as a sign of a possible co-
morbid personality disorder. 
 
III.3.6) Clinical assessment 
Clinical and experimental, neuropsychological testing occurred in 
accordance with the NeuroMooD protocol as outlined in detail in chapter II.3 and 
summarised below. Diagnostic, clinical and cognitive assessment constituted of 




standardised, validated measures in addition to the conduction of a non-structured 
clinical interview and the notion of the participant’s medical history. In MDD 
patients, age at MDD onset and total illness duration was documented, along with 
details about the course of illness, i.e. number of episodes and episode duration(s). 
 
Summary of standard clinical and cognitive instruments: 
i. Structured Clinical Interview (SCID) for DSM-5 (First, 2015) 
ii. AMDP Psychopathology Interview questions on depression (Faehndrich & 
Stieglitz, 1997) 
iii. Longitudinal Interval Follow-Up Evaluation (LIFE; Keller et al., 1987) 
iv. Clinical Global Impression (CGI-) Scale (Busner & Targum, 2007) 
v. Beck Depressive Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) 
vi. Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & 
Asberg, 1979) 
vii. Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (QUIDS-SR16; Rush et 
al., 2003) 
viii. Hypomania Checklist-16 (Forty et al., 2010) 
ix. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
x. Profile of Mood States (POMS) Scale (McNair, Lorr & Dropplemen, 
1971) 
xi. MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (module on suicidality 
only; Sheehan et al., 1998) 
xii. Psychiatric Family History Screen (Weissman et al., 2000) 
xiii. Life Events Questionnaire (Brugha & Conroy, 1985) 
xiv. Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ; Bernstein & Fink, 1998) 




xv. Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (Altman, Hedeker, Peterson & Davis, 
1997) 
xvi. Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE-III; Hsieh, Schubert, Hoon, 
Mioshi & Hodges, 2013) in patients >50 years only 
 
A consultant psychiatrist assessed patients’ scores on the AMDP, LIFE, 
MADRS, CGI, Global Assessment Functioning (GAF) Scale and Social and 
Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale (SOFAS). I conducted all other parts 
of the clinical and neuropsychological assessment, after having received extensive 
training prior to the start of the study supervised by a consultant psychiatrist. 
Assessment of HC participants was conducted solely by me. Data collection 
occurred in the absence of adverse events.  
 
III.3.7) Experimental neuropsychological testing: value-related moral 
sentiment task  
MDD patients and HC participants completed experimental tasks that had 
been developed by our research group, aiming at investigating neurocognitive 
underpinnings of self- and other-blaming emotions. For a full list of tasks, refer to 
chapter II.3.8.  
Of particular interest for this study was the administration of a modified 
version of the VMST, a computerised task, investigating emotions related to self-
blame (i.e. guilt, shame, self-contempt, self-disgust, self-directed anger) vs 
blaming others (indignation, anger, disgust, disgust or towards others). The 
VMST is based on normative data (Zahn et al., 2007; Zahn et al., 2009) and has 
been validated in previous studies (Green et al., 2013; Pulcu et al., 2014; Zahn et 




al., 2009). Markedly, the modified version of the VMST contains a reduced 
number of stimuli (36 items, 50% self-agency, 50% other-agency) compared to 
the original version of the VMST (90 items; Zahn et al., 2015a; Zahn et al., 2009), 
yet implements an added response category related to action tendencies (Roseman 
et al., 1994). These action tendency categories have previously been validated 
(Lythe et al., 2015 unpublished data).  
The VMST presents participants with hypothetical scenarios of social 
behaviours in which either the participant (in the self-agent condition) or the 
participant’s best friend (in the other-agent condition) act contrary to social and 
moral values (see Figure III.1 and Figure III.2). Participants are instructed to 
select the strongest emotion they would most likely experience in the given 
unpleasant hypothetical situation (guilt, shame, contempt/disgust towards self, 
contempt/disgust towards friend, indignation/anger towards friend, no 
feeling/other feeling) and rate the intensity of unpleasantness they would endure 
as a result of this situation using a 1-7 point Likert scale. Participants are then 
asked to select the action that they would most strongly feel like doing (creating 
distance from self, hiding, apologising, creating distance from friend, verbally or 
physically attacking/punishing friend or no action/other action). Based on the 
concept that discrete emotions evoke distinct action tendencies (Roseman et al., 
1994), these action tendencies correspond to a list of moral sentiments and 
participants are asked to select the strongest emotion experienced. Before starting 
the task, participants enter their name and the name of their best friend and rate 
how close they feel towards their best friend. 
 
 





Figure III.1: Self-agency condition of the modified version of the VMST (Zahn et al., 2015a). 
The participant (X) acts unpleasantly towards their best friend (Y). Participants rate the 
unpleasantness of the scenario, the feeling they would most strongly experience and the action 
they would strongly feel like doing in response to the scenario and experienced emotion. 
 
 
Figure III.2: Other-agency condition of the same hypothetical scenario of the modified version of 
the VMST presented in Figure III.1. Now the participant’s friend (Y) acts unpleasantly towards the 
participant (X). The same measures are collected as in the self-agency condition. 




III.3.8) Experimental neuropsychological testing: Brief Implicit Association 
Test  
The self-contempt Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT), another 
experimental measure developed by our research group in collaboration with Prof 
Rüsch and Dr Bogenhausen, was employed as an indirect measure of self-
contempt biases, evaluating the association of contempt or disgust with oneself 
relative to others. Further, we included an established BIAT (Sriram & 
Greenwald, 2009) used to assess implicit self-esteem. The rationale for the 
development of this computerised task was based on the endeavour to measure 
self-contempt biases without the participants’ awareness of what the task captures. 
This strategy is meant to prevent distortions in the participants’ response. The task 
design is based on a similar test, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), which has been validated to measure implicit self-
esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).  
The BIAT uses complementary pairs of concepts and attributes which the 
participant needs to sort together. The speed in which participants respond is 
reflective of the strength of the association within the two pairs of categories that 
have to be sorted together (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). Specifically, participants are instructed to decide with a response 
if two sets of items match an associated concept-attribute pair and are asked to 
give a different response should the item pairs not match (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000). Participants respond as quickly as possible by pressing left and right keys 
on a computer keyboard (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). As aforementioned, the 
automatic association between a concept (e.g. self) and an attribute (e.g. 
contemptuous) is assessed by calculating differences in speed between two 




conditions. In condition 1, words indicative of ‘self’, i.e. the participant, and 
words relating to contempt share the same response key (i.e. require the pressing 
of the right-side key). In condition 2, words that address the ‘self’ (i.e. the 
participant) and words that relate to anxiety share the same response key (here, the 
left key needs to be pressed). Examples of incorrect and correct answers in both 
conditions are given in Figure III.3 (condition 1) and Figure III.4 (condition 2). 
 
 
Figure III.3: Condition 1 of the BIAT implicit self-contempt task, measuring response speed and 
correct responses for the concept ‘self’ and contempt vs ‘other’ and contempt, alongside the non-
focal category anxiety. Correct responses in this condition are words related to ‘self’ and 
contempt. 
 





Figure III.4: Condition 2 of the BIAT implicit self-contempt task, measuring response speed and 
correct responses for the concepts ‘self’ and contempt versus ‘other’ and contempt, alongside the 
non-focal category anxiety. Correct responses in this condition are words related to ‘other’ and 
contempt. 
 
The BIAT consists of two experimental tasks that assess implicit self-
contempt, whereby the categories consist of self-agency, other-agency, contempt 
and a non-focal category which is either anxiety or anger. In the implicit self-
esteem task, the categories ‘self’ and ‘other’ are attributed to ‘good’ (positive 
valence) and ‘bad’ (negative valence). Greenwald et al. (2002) emphasise that this 
task design, due to its use of complementary pairs of concepts and attributes, is 
limited to measuring the relative strength of pairs of associations rather than the 




absolute strength of single associations. The authors conclude, however, that the 
task is meaningful in practice due to the opposing, yet complementary quality of 
many socially meaningful categories, i.e. good and bad (Greenwald et al., 2002; 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
 
III.3.9) Statistical Analysis 
 Statistical analysis of clinical features and self-blaming emotional biases 
was of an explorative nature, aimed at investigating patterns of MDD patients 
with and without anxious distress compared to a sample of HC participants. This 
approach was chosen based on findings of the NeuroMooD trial that showed 
differences in treatment response between MDD patients of the anxious distress 
subtype and patients without anxious distress (see chapter II).  
Data obtained through the administration of the modified VMST was 
exported from Excel and analysed with SPSS 24 
(https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software). Percentage values of 
emotions and action tendencies chosen for each social scenario were aggregated 
per participant in the self-agency, and other-agency conditions, mean and standard 
deviation were calculated for measures of unpleasantness in both conditions. 
Identical to analysis strategies in previous studies (Green et al., 2013, Zahn et al., 
2015a), self-contempt bias was measured by subtracting percentage values of 
contempt/disgust towards the best friend in the other-agency condition from self-
directed contempt in the self-agency condition.  
BIAT data was exported from Inquisit 3 
(https://www.millisecond.com/products/Inquisit3/) and analysed with SPSS 24 
(https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software). Scoring algorithms and 




analyses strategies were based on the improved scoring algorithm created by 
Nosek (2005, May 27). 
Trials with an error rate of higher 30% of 32 trials were excluded from the 
analyses; similarly, trials, where more than 10% of participant responses had a 
latency of less than 300 milliseconds, were excluded. Self-contempt bias was 
measured by subtracting the mean value of latency for the category ‘self and 
contempt’ (16 trials) minus the mean value of the latency for the category ‘other 
and contempt’ (16 trials), divided by the standard deviation of latency computed 
for all 32 trials. Hereby, a more positive total score is understood as being 
indicative of a higher degree of self-contempt. In the analysis of implicit self-
esteem, the categories ‘others and good’ were subtracted from the ‘self and good’ 
category. Hereby, a more positive total score is meant to be reflective of a lower 
degree of self-esteem.  
 
 





III.4.1) Demographic characteristics 
Table III.1: Demographic characteristics of the study groups 























 M; SD 
[Min - Max] 
M; SD 
[Min - Max] 
M; SD 
[Min - Max] 
Age in years 37.42; 10.81 
[20 - 59] 
33.88; 8.25  
[20 - 49] 
42; 16.16  
[20 - 59] 
Years of education  17.06; 2.49 
[11 - 22] 
17.27; 3.46  
[11 - 23] 
16.61; 2.64  
[11 - 21] 
NeuroMooD part. = NeuroMooD participants, NeuroMooD comp = NeuroMooD completers, m = 
male, f = female; M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n/a = not applicable; [M-M] = Minimum–
Maximum. Mean age all MDD: M=36.72; SD=10.10, [20–59]; Mean years of education all MDD: 
M=17.22; SD =2.82, [11-23]; No between-group differences in demographical characteristics, F(4, 
126)=1.15, p=.338; Wilks' Lambda=.93; ηp²=.04. 
 
III.4.2) Hypothesis-driven analysis of moral sentiments on the modified 
VMST: indignation/anger towards others and self-blame emotional biases 
A multivariate general linear model analysis was conducted, exploring 
moral sentiments and self-blaming emotional biases in N=65 participants, 
including MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype (n=31), MDD patients 
without anxious distress (n=16) and HC participants (n=18). Descriptive statistics 
of this sample are presented in Table III.2. At a multivariate level, no effect of 
group was detected, no differences were found between MDD groups and HC 




participants in the selection of moral sentiments on the modified VMST, F(10, 
116)=.85, p=.586, Wilks' Lambda=.87, ηp² =.07.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, levels of indignation and anger directed 
towards others were not found to be increased in MDD patients of the anxious 
distress subtype, F(2,62)=2.06, p=.136, ηp²=.06, nor were differences found 
between MDD groups and HC participants in the tendency to show self-blaming 
emotional biases, such as shame (F(2,62)=0.58, p=.564, ηp²=.02), guilt 
(F(2,62)=0.20, p=.822, ηp²=.01), agency incongruent self-blame (F(2,62)=0.93, 
p=.401, ηp²=.03) or self-contempt (F(2,62)=0.52, p=.600, ηp²=.02). Self-blaming 
emotional biases were not found to be more pronounced in MDD without anxious 
distress compared to MDD with anxious distress. Equality of error variances was 
assumed. 
 
Table III.2: Descriptive statistics: VMST moral sentiments  
Condition and study group M SD n 
VMST_oa  
indignation/anger 
towards friend (pgt) 
MDD  
anxious distress 
34.23 20.94 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
21.88 12.08 16 
HC 31.48 23.34 18 





25.81 13.19 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
29.87 12.97 16 
HC 29.32 16.70 18 





30.29 13.90 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
27.28 14.49 16 
HC 28.40 14.87 18 
Total 29.15 14.13 65 





agency incongruent self-blame 
MDD  
anxious distress 
16.31 19.19 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
17.71 16.63 16 
HC 10.19 16.20 18 





6.09 17.47 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
4.86 16.47 16 
HC -0.31 30.46 18 
Total 4.02 21.46 65 
Agency incongruent self-blame = self-blaming emotions in the other-agency condition; M = mean, 
SD = standard deviation, n = sample size, VMST =value-related moral sentiment task (modified 
version), oa = other-agengy, sa = self-agency, pgt = percentage of trials where this response was 
selected; MDD = major depressive disorder, HC = healthy control participants 
 
III.4.3) Explorative analysis of action tendencies on the modified VMST 
A multivariate general linear model was used in the analysis of differences 
between groups regarding action tendencies.  
In the present sample of MDD patients with anxious distress (n=31), MDD 
without anxious distress (n=16) and HC participants (n=18), groups did not differ 
at a multivariate level, F(8,118) =1.58, p=.139, Wilks' Lambda=.82, ηp²=.10. 
Equality of error variances could not be assumed for the tendency to distance 
oneself in the other-agency condition (Levene’s test, F(2,62), p=.053). 
Demographics are displayed in Table III.3. 
There was a trend for an interaction effect between groups and the 
tendency to hide from the best friend in the self-agency condition, F(2,62)=2.90, 
p=.062, ηp²=.09. The tendency to hide was increased in MDD patients with 
anxious distress compared with HC participants, but not compared with MDD 




patients without anxious distress. This trend only became significant when 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons t(2)=2.41, SD=3.50, p=.019. 
 
Table III.3: Descriptive statistics: VMST action tendencies 
Condition and study group M SD n 
VMST_oa 
attacking friend (pgt) 
MDD  
anxious distress 
9.14 12.05 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
3.13 6.08 16 
HC 4.01 14.49 18 
Total 6.24 11.85 65 
MST_oa 
distance from friend (pgt) 
MDD  
anxious distress 
39.78 18.82 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
36.11 16.85 16 
HC 44.14 30.10 18 
Total 40.09 21.95 65 
MST_sa 
distance from self (pgt) 
MDD  
anxious distress 
10.22 13.15 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
7.99 9.29 16 
HC 4.01 7.33 18 





13.98 13.06 31 
MDD 
non-anxious 
11.11 13.15 16 
HC 5.56 7.38 18 
Total 10.94 12.15 65 
M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = sample size, VMST = value-related moral sentiment task 
(modified version), oa = other-agency, sa = self-agency, pgt = percentage of trials where this 
action tendency was selected; MDD = major depressive disorder, HC = healthy control 
participants 
 




III.4.4) Investigating clinical features between groups: stressful life events 
At a multivariate level, there was a significant effect of group on stressful 
life event measures (F(6,80)=3.06, p=.009; Wilks' Lambda=.66; ηp²=.19). 
Analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.017, showed that there was no contribution of the number of stressful life events 
experienced in the last year as measured with the Life Events Questionnaire, 
F(2,42)=1.27, p=.291; ηp²=.06. Equality of error variances could not be assumed, 
Levene’s test F(2,42)=3.44, p=.041. The three study groups differed in regard to 
the number of stressful life events experienced more than a year ago, F(2,42) = 
5.38, p=.008; ηp²=.20, and in terms of the CTQ self-report measure, F(2,42)=.24, 
p=.009, ηp²=.20. MDD patients with anxious distress experienced significantly 
more stressful life events more than a year ago than MDD patients without 
anxious distress or HC participants (Table III.4). MDD patients of the anxious 
distress subtype and non-anxious patients did not differ regarding their sum scores 
on the CTQ, yet patients with anxious distress scored significantly higher on this 
measure than HC participants (Table III.5). 
 
Table III.4: Descriptive statistics: past stressful life events 
Condition and study group M SD n 
Life Events Questionnaire 




1.15 1.07 13 
MDD 
non-anxious 
1.36 1.34 14 
HC 0.78 0.73 18 
Total 1.07 1.05 45 
Life Events Questionnaire 




5.31 2.90 13 
MDD 
non-anxious 
3.00 2.48 14 
HC 2.44 2.12 18 
Total 3.44 2.71 45 





Questionnaire sum score  
MDD  
anxious distress 
43.54 13.07 13 
MDD 
non-anxious 
40.50 12.12 14 
HC 31.44 7.99 18 
Total 37.76 11.97 45 
M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = sample size, MDD = major depressive disorder, HC = 
healthy control participants 
 
Table III.5: Study group comparisons: past stressful life events 
Dependent variable and study groups M Dif SE p 
95% CI for 
Difference 
LB UB 
Life Events  
Questionnaire 
Number of events  







-0.20 0.40 .617 -1.02 0.61 







0.20 0.40 .617 -0.61 1.02 
HC 0.58 0.37 .128 -0.17 1.33 
HC MDD  
anxious 
distress 




-0.58 0.37 .128 -1.33 0.17 
Life Events  
Questionnaire 
Number of events  










 0.38 4.23 
HC 2.86 0.90 .003
*









 -4.23 -0.38 
HC 0.56 0.88 .532 -1.22 2.34 









-0.56 0.88 .532 -2.34 1.22 
Childhood Trauma 
Questionnaire  







3.04 4.22 .476 -5.48 11.56 
HC 12.09 3.99 .004
*

























-3.04 4.22 .476 -11.56 5.48 
HC 9.06 3.90 .025
*
 1.18 16.94 











 -16.94 -1.18 
The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. Confidence intervals for mean difference are 
adjusted for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
M Dif = mean difference, SE = standard error of the mean, CI = confidence interval, LB = 
lower bound, UB = upper bound 
 
III.4.5) Further explorative analyses of additional clinical measures 
There was a significant effect of group in the multivariate GLM analysis 
of self-esteem and implicit self-contempt in MDD patients and HC participants, 
F(8,100)=13.04, p<.0005, Wilks' Lambda=0.24, ηp²=.51. Furthermore, an 
interaction effect of study group with scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
was found F(2,53)=77.54, p<.0005, ηp²=.75, implying that MDD patients with 
anxious distress showed significantly lower scores, M dif=-13.97, SE=1.21, p< 
.0005, CI[-16.39;-11.56]. No significant differences in explicit self-esteem 
(Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale) or implicit self-esteem (BIAT) were found 
between MDD patient groups. MDD patients and HC participants did not differ 
on measures of implicit self-contempt. Group statistics are presented in Table 
III.6. 
 
Table III.6: Descriptive statistics: self-esteem and implicit self-contempt measures 





0.34 0.37 28 






0.30 0.28 12 
HC 0.38 0.63 16 





0.03 0.38 28 
MDD 
non-anxious 
-0.06 0.42 12 
HC -0.05 0.40 16 





0.57 0.44 28 
MDD 
non-anxious 
0.39 0.51 12 
HC 0.69 0.35 16 
Total 0.57 0.44 56 




19.96 3.27 28 
MDD 
non-anxious 
19.33 3.52 12 
HC 33.94 4.89 16 
Total 23.82 7.48 56 
M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = sample size, MDD = major depressive disorder, HC = 
healthy control participants 
 
Further explorative analyses, specific to the MDD patient groups only, 
compared MDD with and without anxious distress on additional clinical 
measures. Independent samples t-tests established significant differences between 
MDD patient groups on the POMS anger-hostility and POMS tension-anxiety 
subscales, with MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype presenting higher 
scores on both measures (Table III.7, Table III.8). These findings, however, were 
not reflected in correlation analyses of POMS scores and variables of the modified 
VMST (Table III.9).  




MDD patient groups did not differ on other clinical measures, including 
BDI-II and MADRS scores, number of previous MDEs or GAF and SOFAS 
scores. 
 
Table III.7: MDD group statistics: clinical measures  
Clinical measure and study group  n M SD  SE 
Baseline_BDI MDD  
anxious distress 
33 31.36 9.90 1.72 
MDD 
non-anxious 
16 28.31 6.85 1.71 
Baseline_MADRS MDD  
anxious distress 
28 24.04 6.44 1.22 
MDD 
non-anxious 
15 20.60 7.59 1.96 




28 13.32 25.63 4.84 
MDD 
non-anxious 
15 10.00 16.40 4.23 
GAF_baseline MDD  
anxious distress 
27 54.70 6.14 1.18 
MDD 
non-anxious 
15 56.07 6.43 1.66 
SOFAS_baseline MDD  
anxious distress 
28 58.79 7.88 1.49 
MDD 
non-anxious 






28 7.64 4.08 .77 
MDD 
non-anxious 






28 10.14 4.25 .80 
MDD 
non-anxious 
15 5.73 3.31 .85 
Insignificant results of independent t-tests of the clinical measures listed, all two-tailed: BDI-II: 
t(47)=1.11, p=.274, MADRS: t(41)=1.57, p=.125, Number of MDEs: t(41)=.45, p=.653, GAF: 
t(40)=-.68, p=.509, SOFAS: t(41)=.37, p=.714; MDEs = major depressive episodes, n = sample 
size, M = Mean, SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error of the mean 
 




Table III.8: Independent samples t-test: POMS subscales 
  
t-test for Equality of Means 
t df p M Dif  
95% CI of the 
Difference 








3.49 41 .001 4.41 1.26 1.86 6.96 
Equal variances assumed, significance level of p≤.05, 2-tailed; df = degrees of freedom, M = 
mean, Dif = difference, SE = standard error of the mean  
 
Table III.9: Spearman's rho correlations: action tendencies, sentiments and POMS 




























 0.092 0.179 -.259
*
 0.179 
Sig.    0.007 0.556 0.251 0.036 0.151 












Sig.  0.007   0.077 0.009 0.443 0.040 





CC 0.092 0.272 1.000 .523
**
 0.052 0.194 
Sig.  0.556 0.077   0.000 0.740 0.212 









 1.000 -0.236 0.105 
Sig.  0.251 0.009 0.000   0.127 0.505 






 -0.096 0.052 -0.236 1.000 -0.030 
Sig.  0.036 0.443 0.740 0.127   0.810 






 0.194 0.105 -0.030 1.000 
Sig.  0.151 0.040 0.212 0.505 0.810   
N 66 66 43 43 66 66 
CC = correlation coefficient, Sig. = (2-tailed); 
**
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed); 
*
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 




There was no statistically significant difference between MDD patients 
with and without anxious distress in the overall engagement with treatment in the 
NeuroMooD trial, assessed as the summed frequency in strategy use throughout 
the trial (U=102.000, nMDDanxious=21, nMDDnon-anxious=14, p=.135, two-tailed). 
Finally, Pearson chi-square analyses did not show significant associations 
between MDD of the anxious distress subtype vs patients without anxious distress 
and the intake of effective dosages of antidepressant medication χ
2
(1)=0.19, 
p=.666. In the anxious distress group, n=15 patients were on a stable dose of 
antidepressants compared with n=7 MDD patients in the non-anxious group. 
Further, no associations were found between MDD of the anxious/non-anxious 
subtype and NeuroMooD withdrawal rates after randomisation, χ
2
(1)=1.04, 
p=.307, six MDD anxious distress patients and one non-anxious MDD patient 
withdrew. No associations were found between MDD anxious/non-anxious 
subtypes and first-degree family history of axis-I disorders, χ
2 
(1)=1.56, p=.211. 
Twenty-one MDD patients with anxious distress presented with a family history 
of MDD and nine patients without anxious distress. 
 





III.5.1) Discussion of main findings 
This chapter aimed to explore differences between MDD patients of the 
anxious and non-anxious subtype as classified with the anxious distress specifier 
of DSM-5 (APA, 2013). It was hypothesised that MDD patients with anxious 
distress would show increased indignation/anger towards others compared with 
MDD patients without anxious distress. It was further predicted that self-blaming 
emotional biases would be more pronounced in non-anxious MDD and that 
patients of the anxious distress subtype would have encountered stressful life 
events in higher frequency compared with non-anxious MDD patients. 
The first prediction was confirmed in that MDD patients with anxious 
distress showed higher levels of hostility/anger on the POMS compared with both 
non-anxious MDD and HC groups. Contrary to our prediction, however, this 
increased proneness towards external anger was not found when using the 
modified version of the VMST, neither when examining the subjective emotional 
quality (anger/indignation towards others), nor the associated action tendency 
(attacking others). Interestingly, anxious distress subtype patients displayed higher 
levels of feeling like hiding when blaming themselves compared with the HC 
group, although this pattern did not differ significantly from the non-anxious 
distress patient group.  
The second prediction was not confirmed as both MDD subgroups failed 
to show evidence of self-blaming emotional biases on the modified VMST. 
The third prediction was confirmed partly by showing that anxious distress 
subtype patients had experienced past stressful life events more frequently than 




patients without anxious distress, although patient groups did not differ on 
measures of early life trauma. Nevertheless, MDD patients with anxious distress 
were found to have experienced childhood trauma more frequently than HC 
participants. Anxious and non-anxious MDD patients did not differ on any other 
clinical measures. 
 
The finding of increased anger/hostility on the POMS in the anxious 
distress MDD group is in keeping with the clinical literature but has not 
previously been demonstrated using a psychometric scale. Anger on the POMS 
was associated with attack tendencies on the modified VMST, suggesting that 
there is indeed an association with approach tendencies rather than withdrawal. 
On the other hand, hiding was found to be increased compared with HC 
participants, suggesting a co-existence of both withdrawal and approach-related 
action tendencies in patients with anxious distress. Based on these observations, 
increased anger in these patients could have interfered with response to the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback intervention in the NeuroMooD trial. It will be important to 
investigate the neural differences between self-blaming biases in MDD patients 
with low and high levels of hostility/anger. 
It was surprising to see no significant differences between both MDD 
groups and the HC participant group on self-contempt biases and anger, despite 
finding abnormalities in previous studies of remitted MDD (Green et al., 2013, 
Zahn et al., 2015a). Considering that a shortened version of the VMST was 
employed in the current research (36 items), compared to a more extensive (90) 
item set of the original VMST, a reduction of power may account for the non-
significant findings. Furthermore, previous studies consisted of greater sample 




sizes (n=55 MDD, Green et al., 2013; n=101 MDD, Zahn et al., 2015a) compared 
with the current study. Drawing on their findings, Green et al. and Zahn et al. 
speculate that self-contempt biases might be particularly characteristic of 
melancholic MDD rather than of other subtypes (Green et al., 2013, Zahn et al., 
2015a, unpublished secondary analysis). Notably, the study sample of the research 
presented in this chapter consisted of low numbers (n=11) of MDD patients of the 
melancholic subtype, yet this interpretation is in keeping with a trend towards 
higher self-contempt bias in the melancholic subtype patients in this study 
(nMDDnon-melancholic=32, nMDDmelancholic =11, t(41)=-1.61, p=.115, MDif =-8.97, 
SE=5.53, CI[-20.2;2.27], two-tailed). Lastly, the observed high individual 
variability on self-contempt biases in the current study may account for the failure 
to detect self-contempt biases in the MDD sample, which may suggest that, 
instead of being a general feature of MDD, different subgroups of MDD with and 
without self-contempt may exist in the MDD population. 
The finding of an increased prevalence of past stressful life events in the 
anxious distress subtype of MDD patients suggests that anger/hostility, as well as 
anxiety, may potentially be mediated by a traumatic response to previous stressful 
life events. In the current sample, however, comorbid cases of past PTSD were 
rare, although these patients reported their residual PTSD symptoms to be 
significantly enhanced during MDEs. 
 
III.5.2) Limitations  
The following potential limitations of this research need to be considered. 
Formulation of hypotheses and analysis strategies, comparing anxious and non-
anxious MDD, was based on previous explorative analyses of the acquired 




NeuroMooD data. MDD subgroups were of unequal sample sizes. Despite 
differentiating between MDD patients with and without anxious distress, the 
severity of anxious distress experienced within the anxious distress patient sample 
was not further assessed. Therefore, differences in anxious distress severity may 
have varied across patients of this MDD subtype and may account for variability 
within this patient group across applied measures. Analyses, including the POMS 
tension/anxiety subscale, were conducted only to explore differences between, but 
not within non-anxious and anxious MDD patient groups.  
 Results of the modified VMST administered in the current study 
might be limited in their comparability to findings obtained by use of previous, 
more extended versions of the task. Contrary to the previous versions, the 
modified VMST lacks validation, which further restricts the interpretation of 
the current findings. Validity ensures that the measure captures what it intends 
to capture in the population where it is applied, while test validation requires a 
performance comparison of the novel (unvalidated) instrument with a validated 
measure (Fitzpatrick et al., 1998). Considering that no validation data has been 
generated for the modified VMST prior to its implementation in this study, its 
suitability for measuring self-blaming biases remains uncertain. It is 
noteworthy that the VMST assesses interpersonal guilt only and neglects blame 
related to achievement-related failures. Therefore, it might be that both MDD 
groups did have self-blaming biases, but that they were undetected due to the 
nature of the experimental task. This interpretation is supported by the 
observation that the majority (>70%) of MDD patients did express at least 
moderate levels of guilt, shame or self-contempt during the initial clinical 
assessment, using a validated psychopathology interview (Zahn et al., 2015b). 





Research on the DSM-5 anxious distress subtype of MDD is still sparse, 
with a complete lack of studies investigating self-blaming emotions and related 
concepts in the anxious distress subtype. Furthermore, at present, no rtfMRI 
neurofeedback study in MDD has differentiated between anxious and non-anxious 
subtypes or investigated neural correlates of response to rtfMRI neurofeedback 
treatment in the anxious distress subtype. Considering the high prevalence of the 
anxious distress subtype in MDD populations, more research is needed to identify 
and explain observed differences further and to contribute to improvements in the 
understanding and treatment of this particular MDD subtype. 
 





Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned 
helplessness in humans: critique and reformulation. J Abnorm Psychol, 
87(1), 49-74.  
Alexander, B., Brewin, C. R., Vearnals, S., Wolff, G., & Leff, J. (1999). An 
investigation of shame and guilt in a depressed sample. Br J Med Psychol, 
72 ( Pt 3), 323-338.  
Altman, E. G., Hedeker, D., Peterson, J. L., & Davis, J. M. (1997). The Altman 
Self-Rating Mania Scale. Biological Psychiatry, 42(10), 948-955.  
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (5
th
 ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Bernstein, D. P. & Fink, L. (1998). Childhood Trauma Questionnaire. A 
retrospective self report. Manual. San Antonio, TX: The Psychological 
Corporation, Harcourt Brace & Company. 
Berrios, G. E., Bulbena, A., Bakshi, N., Dening, T. R., Jenaway, A., Markar, H., . 
. . Mitchell, S. L. (1992). Feelings of guilt in major depression. Conceptual 
and psychometric aspects. Br J Psychiatry, 160, 781-787.  
Brown, T. M., DiBenedetti, D. B., Danchenko, N., Weiller, E., & Fava, M. 
(2016). Symptoms of Anxiety and Irritability in Patients with Major 
Depressive Disorder. J Depress Anxiety, 5(3), 237-243. doi:10.4172/2167-
1044.1000237 
Brugha, T., & Conroy, R. (1985). Categories of Depression: Reported Life Events 




in a Controlled Design. British Journal of Psychiatry, 147(6), 641-646. 
doi:10.1192/bjp.147.6.641 
Busner, J., & Targum, S. D. (2007). The clinical global impressions scale: 
applying a research tool in clinical practice. Psychiatry (Edgmont), 4(7), 
28-37. 
Chan, H. N., Rush, A. J., Nierenberg, A. A., Trivedi, M., Wisniewski, S. R., 
Balasubramani, G. K., . . . Fava, M. (2012). Correlates and outcomes of 
depressed out-patients with greater and fewer anxious symptoms: a CO-
MED report. Int J Neuropsychopharmacol, 15(10), 1387-1399. 
doi:10.1017/S1461145711001660 
Domschke, K., Deckert, J., Arolt, V., & Baune, B. T. (2010). Anxious versus non-
anxious depression: difference in treatment outcome. J Psychopharmacol, 
24(4), 621-622. doi:10.1177/0269881108097723 
Faehndrich, E., Stieglitz, R.D., 1997. Das AMDP-System, Manual zur 
Dokumentation psychiatrischer Befunde, 6th ed. Hogrefe Verlag, 
Goettingen. 
Farabaugh, A., Alpert, J., Wisniewski, S. R., Otto, M. W., Fava, M., Baer, L., . . . 
Thase, M. E. (2012). Cognitive therapy for anxious depression in STAR(*) 
D: what have we learned? J Affect Disord, 142(1-3), 213-218. 
doi:10.1016/j.jad.2012.04.029 
Fava, M., Alpert, J. E., Carmin, C. N., Wisniewski, S. R., Trivedi, M. H., Biggs, 
M. M., . . . Rush, A. J. (2004). Clinical correlates and symptom patterns of 
anxious depression among patients with major depressive disorder in 
STAR*D. Psychol Med, 34(7), 1299-1308.  




Fava, M., Rush, A. J., Alpert, J. E., Balasubramani, G. K., Wisniewski, S. R., 
Carmin, C. N., . . . Trivedi, M. H. (2008). Difference in treatment outcome 
in outpatients with anxious versus nonanxious depression: a STAR*D 
report. Am J Psychiatry, 165(3), 342-351. 
doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.06111868 
Fava, M., Rush, A. J., Alpert, J. E., Carmin, C. N., Balasubramani, G. K., 
Wisniewski, S. R., . . . Shores-Wilson, K. (2006). What clinical and 
symptom features and comorbid disorders characterize outpatients with 
anxious major depressive disorder: a replication and extension. Can J 
Psychiatry, 51(13), 823-835. doi:10.1177/070674370605101304 
Fawcett, J. (2001). Treating impulsivity and anxiety in the suicidal patient. Ann N 
Y Acad Sci, 932, 94-102; discussion 102-105.  
First, M. B. (2015). Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM (SCID). In R. L. 
Cautin & S. O. Lilienfeld (Eds), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology. 
Chichester: Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781118625392.wbecp351 
Fitzpatrick, R., Davey, C., Buxton, M. J., & Jones, D. R. (1998). Evaluating 
patient-based outcome measures for use in clinical trials. Health Technol 
Assess, 2(14), i-iv, 1-74. 
Forty, L., Kelly, M., Jones, L., Jones, I., Barnes, E., Caesar, S., Fraser, C., 
Gordon-Smith, K., Griffiths, E., Craddock, N. & Smith, D. J. (2010). 
Reducing the Hypomania Checklist (HCL-32) to a 16-item version. J 
Affect Disord, 124(3), 351-356.  
Freud, S. (1917). Mourning and melancholia (14
th
 ed.). London: Vintage. 
Gaspersz, R., Lamers, F., Kent, J. M., Beekman, A. T., Smit, J. H., van Hemert, 
A. M., . . . Penninx, B. W. (2017b). Longitudinal Predictive Validity of the 




DSM-5 Anxious Distress Specifier for Clinical Outcomes in a Large 
Cohort of Patients With Major Depressive Disorder. J Clin Psychiatry, 
78(2), 207-213. doi:10.4088/JCP.15m10221 
Gaspersz, R., Lamers, F., Kent, J. M., Beekman, A. T. F., Smit, J. H., van Hemert, 
A. M., . . . Penninx, B. (2017a). Anxious distress predicts subsequent 
treatment outcome and side effects in depressed patients starting 
antidepressant treatment. J Psychiatr Res, 84, 41-48. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2016.09.018 
Gaspersz, R., Lamers, F., Wittenberg, G., Beekman, A. T. F., van Hemert, A. M., 
Schoevers, R. A., & Penninx, B. (2017c). The role of anxious distress in 
immune dysregulation in patients with major depressive disorder. Transl 
Psychiatry, 7(12), 1268. doi:10.1038/s41398-017-0016-3 
Gaspersz, R., Nawijn, L., Lamers, F., & Penninx, B. (2018). Patients with anxious 
depression: overview of prevalence, pathophysiology and impact on 
course and treatment outcome. Curr Opin Psychiatry, 31(1), 17-25. 
doi:10.1097/YCO.0000000000000376 
Goldberg, D., & Fawcett, J. (2012). The importance of anxiety in both major 
depression and bipolar disorder. Depress Anxiety, 29(6), 471-478. 
doi:10.1002/da.21939 
Green, S., Moll, J., Deakin, J. F., Hulleman, J., & Zahn, R. (2013). Proneness to 
decreased negative emotions in major depressive disorder when blaming 
others rather than oneself. Psychopathology, 46(1), 34-44. 
doi:10.1159/000338632 




Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & 
Mellott, D. S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, 
self-esteem, and self-concept. Psychol Rev, 109(1), 3-25.  
Greenwald, A. G., & Farnham, S. D. (2000). Using the implicit association test to 
measure self-esteem and self-concept. J Pers Soc Psychol, 79(6), 1022-
1038.  
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring 
individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. J 
Pers Soc Psychol, 74(6), 1464-1480.  
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. 
Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 852-870). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hsieh, S., Schubert, S., Hoon, C., Mioshi, E., & Hodges, J. R. (2013). Validation 
of the Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination III in Frontotemporal 
Dementia and Alzheimer's Disease. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive 
Disorders, 36(3-4), 242-250. doi:10.1159/000351671 
Ionescu, D. F., Niciu, M. J., Mathews, D. C., Richards, E. M., & Zarate, C. A., Jr. 
(2013). Neurobiology of anxious depression: a review. Depress Anxiety, 
30(4), 374-385. doi:10.1002/da.22095 
Ionescu, D. F., Niciu, M. J., Richards, E. M., & Zarate, C. A., Jr. (2014). 
Pharmacologic treatment of dimensional anxious depression: a review. 
Prim Care Companion CNS Disord, 16(3). doi:10.4088/PCC.13r01621 
Keller, M. B., Lavori, P. W., Friedman, B., Nielsen, E., Endicott, J., McDonald-
Scott, P., & Andreasen, N. C. (1987). The Longitudinal Interval Follow-up 




Evaluation. A comprehensive method for assessing outcome in 
prospective longitudinal studies. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 44(6), 540-548.  
Lamers, F., van Oppen, P., Comijs, H. C., Smit, J. H., Spinhoven, P., van Balkom, 
A. J., . . . Penninx, B. W. (2011). Comorbidity patterns of anxiety and 
depressive disorders in a large cohort study: the Netherlands Study of 
Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). J Clin Psychiatry, 72(3), 341-348. 
doi:10.4088/JCP.10m06176blu 
Lythe, K. E., Moll, J., Gethin, J. A., Workman, C. I., Green, S., Lambon Ralph, 
M. A., . . . Zahn, R. (2015). Self-blame-Selective Hyperconnectivity 
Between Anterior Temporal and Subgenual Cortices and Prediction of 
Recurrent Depressive Episodes. JAMA Psychiatry, 72(11), 1119-1126. 
doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.1813 
Maneeton, N., Suttajit, S., Maneeton, B., Likhitsathian, S., Eurviyanukul, K., 
Udomratn, P., . . . Srisurapanont, M. (2017). Clinical and socio-
demographic correlates of anxious distress in Asian outpatients with major 
depressive disorder. Nord J Psychiatry, 71(7), 503-508. 
doi:10.1080/08039488.2017.1335344 
McIntyre, R. S., Woldeyohannes, H. O., Soczynska, J. K., Vinberg, M., Cha, D. 
S., Lee, Y., . . . Kennedy, S. (2016). The prevalence and clinical 
characteristics associated with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Version-
5-defined anxious distress specifier in adults with major depressive 
disorder: results from the International Mood Disorders Collaborative 
Project. Ther Adv Chronic Dis, 7(3), 153-159. 
doi:10.1177/2040622315627805 
McNair, D., Lorr, M., Dropplemen, L. (1971). Edits manual: Profile of mood 




states. San Diego: Educational and Industrial Testing Services. 
Montgomery, S. A. & Asberg, M. (1979). A new depression scale designed to be 
sensitive to change. Br J Psychiatry, 134, 382-389. 
Nosek, B. (2005, May 27). SAS MACRO FOR SCORING THE IMPLICIT 
 ASSOCIATION TEST. Retrieved from 
http://projectimplicit.net/nosek/papers/scoringalgorithm.sas.txt 
O'Connor, L. E., Berry, J., B Lewis, T., & Stiver, D. (2011). Empathy-Based 
Pathogenic Guilt, Pathological Altruism, and Psychopathology. In B. 
Oakley, A. Knafo, G. Madhavan & D. S. Wilson (Eds.), Pathological 
Altruism (pp. 10-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738571.003.0024 
O'Connor, L. E., Berry, J. W., Weiss, J., Bush, M., & Sampson, H. (1997). 
Interpersonal guilt: the development of a new measure. J Clin Psychol, 
53(1), 73-89. 
O'Connor, L. E., Berry, J. W., Weiss, J., & Gilbert, P. (2002). Guilt, fear, 
submission, and empathy in depression. J Affect Disord, 71(1-3), 19-27.  
O'Connor, L. E., Berry, J. W., & Weiss, J. (1999). Interpersonal Guilt, Shame, and 
Psychological Problems. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 18(2), 
181-203. doi:10.1521/jscp.1999.18.2.181 
Pulcu, E., Lythe, K., Elliott, R., Green, S., Moll, J., Deakin, J. F., & Zahn, R. 
(2014). Increased amygdala response to shame in remitted major 
depressive disorder. PLoS One, 9(1), e86900. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086900 
Rhebergen, D., Batelaan, N. M., de Graaf, R., Nolen, W. A., Spijker, J., Beekman, 
A. T., & Penninx, B. W. (2011). The 7-year course of depression and 




anxiety in the general population. Acta Psychiatr Scand, 123(4), 297-306. 
doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2011.01677.x 
Rosellini, A. J., Bourgeois, M. L., Correa, J., Tung, E. S., Goncharenko, S., & 
Brown, T. A. (2018). Anxious distress in depressed outpatients: 
Prevalence, comorbidity, and incremental validity. J Psychiatr Res, 103, 
54-60. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2018.05.006 
Roseman, I. J., Wiest, C., & Swartz, T. S. (1994). Phenomenology, behaviors, and 
goals differentiate discrete emotions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67(2), 206-221. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.206 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Rush, A. J., Trivedi, M. H., Ibrahim, H. M., Carmody, T. J., Arnow, B., Klein, D. 
N., Markowith, J.C., Ninan, P. T., Kornstein, S., Manber, R., Thase, M. E., 
Kocsis, J. H., & Keller, M. B. (2003). The 16-Item Quick Inventory of 
Depressive Symptomatology (QIDS), clinician rating (QIDS-C), and self-
report (QIDS-SR): a psychometric evaluation in patients with chronic 
major depression. Biol Psychiatry, 54(5), 573-583. 
Sartorius, N., Jablensky, A., Gulbinat, W., & Ernberg, G. (1980). WHO 
collaborative study: assessment of depressive disorders. Psychol Med, 
10(4), 743-749.  
Schaffer, A., McIntosh, D., Goldstein, B. I., Rector, N. A., McIntyre, R. S., 
Beaulieu, S., . . . Anxiety Treatments Task, F. (2012). The CANMAT task 
force recommendations for the management of patients with mood 
disorders and comorbid anxiety disorders. Ann Clin Psychiatry, 24(1), 6-
22.  




Sheehan, D. V., Lecrubier, Y., Sheehan, K. H., Amorim, P., Janavs, J., Weiller, 
E., Herqueta, T., Baker, R. & Dunbar, G. C. (1998). The Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.): the development and 
validation of a structured diagnostic psychiatric interview for DSM-IV and 
ICD-10. J Clin Psychiatry, 59 Suppl 20, 22-33. 
Shim, I. H., Woo, Y. S., & Bahk, W. M. (2016). Associations between immune 
activation and the current severity of the "with anxious distress" specifier 
in patients with depressive disorders. Gen Hosp Psychiatry, 42, 27-31. 
doi:10.1016/j.genhosppsych.2016.07.003 
Sriram, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2009). The Brief Implicit Association Test. Exp 
Psychol, 56(4), 283-294. doi:10.1027/1618-3169.56.4.283 
Tangney J. P. & Dearing R. L. (2002). Shame and guilt. New York: Guilford. 
Tangney, J. P. & Dearing, R. L. (2000). The test of self-conscious affect-3 
(TOSCA-3). Fairfax: George Mason University. 
Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: the good, the bad, and the ugly. J Pers Soc 
Psychol, 61(4), 598-607.  
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral 
behavior. Annu Rev Psychol, 58, 345-372. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145 
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Proneness to shame, 
proneness to guilt, and psychopathology. J Abnorm Psychol, 101(3), 469-
478.  
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P. E. & Gramzow, R. (1989). The Test of Self-Conscious 
Affect. Fairfax: George Mason University. 




Tilghman-Osborne, C., Cole, D. A., Felton, J. W., & Ciesla, J. A. (2008). 
RELATION OF GUILT, SHAME, BEHAVIORAL AND 
CHARACTEROLOGICAL SELF-BLAME TO DEPRESSIVE 
SYMPTOMS IN ADOLESCENTS OVER TIME. J Soc Clin Psychol, 
27(8), 809-842. doi:10.1521/jscp.2008.27.8.809 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Carey, G. (1988). Positive and negative affectivity 
and their relation to anxiety and depressive disorders. J Abnorm Psychol, 
97(3), 346-353.  
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and 
emotion. Psychol Rev, 92(4), 548-573.  
Weissman, M. M., Wickramaratne, P., Adams, P., Wolk, S., Verdeli, H., & 
Olfson, M. (2000). Brief screening for family psychiatric history: The 
family history screen. Archives of General Psychiatry, 57(7), 675-682. 
doi:10-1001/pubs.Arch Gen Psychiatry-ISSN-0003-990x-57-7-yoa8214 
Zahn, R., De Oliveira-Souza, R., & Moll, J. (2013). Moral Emotions. In J. 
Armony & P. Vuilleumier (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Human 
Affective Neuroscience (pp. 491-508). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511843716.027 
Zahn, R., Lythe, K. E., Gethin, J. A., Green, S., Deakin, J. F., Workman, C., & 
Moll, J. (2015a). Negative emotions towards others are diminished in 
remitted major depression. Eur Psychiatry, 30(4), 448-453. 
doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2015.02.005 
Zahn, R., Lythe, K. E., Gethin, J. A., Green, S., Deakin, J. F., Young, A. H., & 
Moll, J. (2015b). The role of self-blame and worthlessness in the 




psychopathology of major depressive disorder. J Affect Disord, 186, 337-
341. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2015.08.001 
Zahn, R., Moll, J., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., Garrido, G., & Grafman, J. (2007). 
Social concepts are represented in the superior anterior temporal cortex. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 104(15), 6430-6435. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0607061104 
Zahn, R., Moll, J., Paiva, M., Garrido, G., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., & Grafman, J. 
(2009). The neural basis of human social values: evidence from functional 
MRI. Cereb Cortex, 19(2), 276-283. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn080 
Zimmerman, M., Chelminski, I., Young, D., Dalrymple, K., Walsh, E., & 
Rosenstein, L. (2014). A clinically useful self-report measure of the DSM-
5 anxious distress specifier for major depressive disorder. J Clin 
Psychiatry, 75(6), 601-607. doi:10.4088/JCP.13m08961 
Zimmerman, M., Clark, H., McGonigal, P., Harris, L., Holst, C. G., & Martin, J. 
(2017). Reliability and validity of the DSM-5 Anxious Distress Specifier 
Interview. Compr Psychiatry, 76, 11-17. 
doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2017.02.010 




Chapter IV: Social agency inference in major depressive disorder 
IV.1) Abstract 
The interpretation of social knowledge influences how we perceive 
positive and negative outcomes of situations and social interactions. This 
information is critical for major depressive disorder (MDD) as psychological 
models suggest that maladaptive causal attributions for negative events contribute 
to an overgeneralisation of self-blame and self-criticism in MDD, which persists 
even during symptom remission. One poorly understood aspect of social 
knowledge is how we interpret social outcomes in different contexts of preceding 
events. At present, it remains unclear whether internally biased causal inferences 
for negative outcomes contribute to the experience of overgeneralised self-blame 
in MDD. The work presented in this chapter aimed at contributing to the 
investigation of neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning self-blaming emotional 
biases in MDD. For this purpose, a novel experimental task was developed, the 
social agency inference task (SAIT) and tested in MDD patients with and without 
anxious distress and healthy control (HC) participants. 
Contrary to the non-anxious MDD group, MDD patients of the anxious 
distress subtype were not found to present with self-blaming biases. This finding 
confirms results from the previous chapter, which demonstrated that this patient 
group tends to externalise blame more compared with MDD patients without 
anxious distress. There was no evidence of overgeneralisation of preceding 
actions related to internalising or externalising blame in either group. 
Modifications to the task design may be required to transform the SAIT into a 
more useful measure. 






 Social knowledge is crucial for the interpretation of daily life events and 
the evaluation of our own and others’ social behaviour. Because such 
interpretations determine how we feel about ourselves, our successes and failures 
as well as other people, this information is vital for our mental health. This is why 
it is of particular importance to understand the underlying cognitive architecture 
of social knowledge in MDD.  
Although previous studies have investigated different characteristics of the 
cognitive architecture of social knowledge (Green et al., 2013b; Green, 2011; 
Moll, De Oliveira-Souza & Zahn, 2008; Zakrzewski, 2008), one still poorly 
understood aspect of social knowledge is, how we interpret social outcomes (e.g. 
‘I failed in the exam’) in different contexts of preceding events (e.g. ‘I got drunk 
the night before the exam’ vs ‘I struggled with preparing for the exam, because I 
had trouble understanding my textbook’). Investigating the representation of this 
knowledge is important in order to understand how people make inferences about 
the causal agency for social actions.  
Causal agency for social actions has classically been investigated using the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982). This instrument, 
however, is based on fictitious social actions created by the authors of the 
questionnaire rather than being based on empirical evidence collected from 
participants. This is one of the factors that may explain the ASQ’s failure to detect 
reproducible abnormalities of causal attribution in patients with MDD (Green et 
al., 2013a).  




Research suggests that patients diagnosed with MDD present with an 
overgeneralisation of self-blame (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and 
self-criticism (Beck, 1967) which might contribute to the vulnerability to 
depressive symptoms and is persistent even during remission (Green, Moll, 
Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 2013b). At present, it remains unclear if internally 
biased causal inferences for negative outcomes contribute to the experience of 
overgeneralised self-blame in MDD. Investigating the cognitive architecture of 
self-blaming emotions, however, is important for the development of better 
neurocognitive and psychological treatment approaches to MDD. Learning, how 
MDD patients process causal inferences in social scenarios compared to non-
clinical individuals may provide further insights. 
 
IV.2.2) Specific aims and hypotheses 
With the purpose of contributing to the investigation of neurocognitive 
mechanisms underpinning self-blaming emotional biases in current and 
insufficiently remitted MDD, I developed a novel task: the social agency 
inference task (SAIT). Specifically, the SAIT seeks to determine the frequency 
and intensity of agency-incongruent internalisation and externalisation of blame in 
hypothetical social scenarios. Here, agency-incongruence means internalising 
blame when another person is the agent of a social scenario and externalising 
blame when oneself is the agent. The rationale for designing the task in this way 
was based on data obtained from a pre-study that I conducted in healthy control 
(HC) participants. Interestingly, when HC participants were asked to provide 
preceding events that may have caused a given negative interpersonal action, it 
emerged that retribution for something the harmed person in the scenario had 




done before was used as the most frequent cause for the negative interpersonal 
action.  
Justified retribution can be used to either blame oneself for something 
someone else has done to oneself (agency-incongruent self-blame) or to blame 
someone else for something one has done to them (agency-incongruent other-
blame). Given the literature on self-positive biases in healthy individuals (Dunn, 
Dalgleish, Lawrence, & Ogilvie, 2007; Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence, & 
Dalgleish, 2009; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 
1988) and blame externalisation as a defence mechanism to stabilise self-esteem 
(Bentall & Kaney, 2005), the overall prediction was that participants with MDD 
would show a bias towards internalising rather than externalising blame when 
compared with HC participants. In order to investigate this prediction with the 
SAIT, the task was administered in a sample of symptomatic MDD patients and 
HC participants. 
 
The following hypotheses were postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Patients with MDD show self-blaming emotional biases on the 
SAIT when compared with HC participants. 
Hypothesis 2: Patients with MDD show an overgeneralisation of negative 
preceding actions internalising blame relative to those externalising blame when 
compared with HC participants. 
 





Social inference in MDD was investigated using the SAIT, which I have 
developed specifically for this study and was used to explore whether changes in 
social agency inferences underpin self-blaming emotions in MDD. The SAIT was 
developed based on data obtained from a pre-study that I carried out as outlined 
further in this chapter. The administration of the SAIT in MDD and HC 
participants occurred as part of the NeuroMooD protocol (see chapter II) and 
received ethical approval by the NHS Health Research Authority, NRES 
Committee London – Camberwell St Giles (REC reference: 15/LO/0577). 
 
IV.3.1) Development of the SAIT: conduction of a pre-study 
SAIT pre-study: methods 
 In order to obtain data for the SAIT, an online pre-study (REC reference 
number LRS-14/15-1003) was conducted upon receiving ethical approval granted 
by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee, King’s 
College London. This pre-study aimed at investigating how individuals represent 
knowledge of events and actions preceding socially relevant outcomes. 
Specifically, it resulted in collecting agency-incongruent preceding events that 
were thought to contain a causal relationship to a number of hypothetical social 
actions of self- and other-agency. The pre-study consisted of two complementary 
versions of an online questionnaire that were disseminated to self-identifying HC 
participants by use of the online research tool Survey Monkey.  
HC participants were presented with 60 hypothetical social scenarios (30 
positive and 30 negative) and asked to vividly picture themselves and their best 




friend in the presented scenario. Participants were asked to provide two different 
examples of potential preceding events for each social scenario. Preceding events 
should have occurred within the past couple of weeks prior to the (hypothetical) 
scenario and inherit a causal influence on the situation. Similarly to the ASQ 
(Peterson et al., 1982), participants were then asked to rate how much they would 
attribute outcomes to internal or external factors. Specifically, participants were 
asked how much they would blame/credit themselves or others for the situation 
and how much they would blame/credit uncontrollable factors. Furthermore, 
participants were instructed to rate the pleasantness/unpleasantness of the 
situation, taking the provided preceding event into account, and answered how 
familiar they felt with the situation and the likelihood of such a situation occurring 
following each preceding event. 
Contrary to the ASQ, which is based on fictitious social actions created by 
the authors of the questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982), the stimuli (i.e. social 
scenarios) presented in this pre-study were based on previously collected 
empirical data (Zahn et al., 2007). Zahn et a. (2007) asked HC participants to 
provide examples of social behaviours that cause individuals to feel 
guilty/shameful and grateful/proud. For a detailed description of these stimuli, see 
also the online supplementary methods provided by Green et al. (2013a). The 
stimuli chosen for the SAIT pre-study were modified by making slight 
amendments to the wording of the original items and by converting American 
English into British English. Due to the change in syntax and sentence structure, 
the word count of the original items was altered. The terms ‘agent’ and ‘recipient’ 
were changed to ‘you’ and ‘your best friend’. Despite these modifications to the 
original items, the conceptual meaning was not changed in order to allow items to 




be still attributed to formerly established classification categories of social 
behaviour as evocative of a particular moral emotion (guilt/shame and 
gratitude/pride). For a full list of the 30 negative and 30 positive items in the self-
agency and other-agency condition that were included in the pre-study, please 
refer to Appendix B. An example of a task scenario is given in Figure IV.1 and 
Figure IV.2. Before proceeding with the actual questionnaire, the following 
instructions were given, followed by two example runs before participants 
accessed the actual task: 
‘Please complete all tasks, as this will help us to gain more 
information about how people evaluate their own and others' social 
behaviour, and how they interpret social outcomes in different 
contexts of preceding events. 
We will present you with different statements describing particular 
imaginary scenarios, involving you and your ‘best’ friend. For 
these tasks, please think about the closest of your friends who fits 
the following requirements: your best friend should be the same 
gender as you. Your friend should not be related to you either 
genetically or by marriage. She/he should be around the same age 
as you (+/- 5 years), and the two of you should have comparable 
educational levels. You should not have a sexual relationship with 
her/him. 
Please try to vividly picture yourself and your best friend in the 
presented fictional situations. Even if you do not think that some of 
the behaviours are characteristic of either you or your best friend, 
please try to imagine acting in the described way. 




For each scenario, you will be asked to give two different examples 
of a preceding event or action that might have led to the described 
situation. 
We will then ask you to rate how much you would blame/praise 
yourself or others for the situation, and how much you would 
blame/credit uncontrollable external factors. (…).’ 
 





Figure IV.1: Display of the online answer sheet 1 (of 2) for an item presented in the SAIT pre-
study. Participants were asked to provide two distinct preceding events for each social scenario 
followed by questions about how much they would blame themselves, others, or external factors 
for the situation. 





Figure IV.2 Display of the online answer sheet 2 (of 2) for an item presented in the SAIT pre-
study. Participants were asked to provide two distinct preceding events for each social scenario 
followed by questions about how much they would blame themselves, others, or external factors 
for the situation. 
 




SAIT pre-study: participants 
Participants were recruited through the use of online adverts and university 
mailing lists. The adverts included the study’s inclusion and exclusion criteria and 
contained the study link. Following the link, individuals were forwarded to the 
study’s participant information sheet which occurred as a landing page on the 
study-specific Survey Monkey website. 
Participants were eligible to participate if they were native in English 
language and of 18 years or older with no history of current psychiatric or 
neurological disorders, including substance or alcohol abuse. They were asked to 
confirm their eligibility and give online consent before proceeding with their 
participation. Participants were given the opportunity to answer either version (A 
or B) or to complete both versions of the online task. 
Participants had the option to remain anonymous, but if they opted to 
provide their email address at the end of the questionnaire, they were reimbursed 
for the time taken with a £10 gift voucher. Participants email addresses were only 
stored until confirmation was received that the online gift voucher was redeemed. 
Until then, the participants’ email address was stored separately from the research 
data.  
 
SAIT pre-study: responses 
In total, n=94 participants responded to version A of the online pre-study 
questionnaire, n=84 responders accessed version B of the study. Ultimately, only 
responses of n=19 version A participants and n=38 version B participants were 
considered meaningful and further regarded for the development of the SAIT. 
Participants who only completed the practice task of the questionnaires or 




participants who mainly provided meaningless responses, e.g. single words, 
personal comments, letters or numbers instead of examples of preceding events 
were excluded. The high number of meaningless responses stopped once a note 
was added to the instructions, stressing that reimbursement would only be made 
available if meaningful responses were provided.  
 
IV.3.2) Development of the SAIT: SAIT task design 
 Based on data obtained from the pre-study, the SAIT was designed 
to investigate whether changes in the perception of social agency inference 
contribute to self-blaming biases in MDD. So far, measures such as the ASQ 
(Peterson et al., 1982) which is based on fictitious social actions have failed to 
detect reproducible abnormalities of causal attributions in patients with MDD 
(Green et al., 2013a). Notably however, Alloy et al. (2000) used a composite of a 
modified version of the ASQ, the Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ) and a 
modified version of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 
1978) to distinguish between high and low cognitive vulnerability for depression 
in initially non-depressed individuals. The CSQ assesses the attributional 
dimensions of internality, stability and globality alongside measuring participant’s 
styles for inferring causes, consequences and self-characteristics following the 
occurrence of positive and negative events (Alloy et al., 2000). The authors found 
high cognitive risk for depression, based on the CTQ and modified DAS, to be 
associated with a higher lifetime prevalence of MDD compared with low 
cognitive vulnerability for depression (Alloy et al., 2000).  
However, similar to the ASQ, the CSQ is also using fictitious social 
actions. The SAIT was developed as the first instrument to investigate the 




influence of causal agency for social actions based on empirical evidence 
collected from participants. 
  
The SAIT measures the frequency and intensity of self-directed 
(internalised) and externalised blame directed towards others in hypothetical 
social scenarios occurring between the participant and their best friend. These 
social situations are negative and manipulated in the attribution of causal agency 
(e.g.: ‘In a meeting, you take credit for your best friend’s effort’ / ‘In a meeting, 
your best friend takes credit for your effort.’).  
For each scenario, 15 events are presented that may have preceded and led 
to the social situation. These 15 events were kept the same for all social scenarios 
and based on the data collected in the pre-study. SAIT participants are asked to 
choose the preceding event(s) that are most likely to have contributed to the 
situation.  
The following instructions are given before starting the task: 
‘Please imagine the situation described below and then choose the 
preceding event(s) which would most likely have led to this situation. 
Please only check more than one preceding event, if you find several 
preceding events equally likely. In this case, please check all of the ones 
which equally apply. Even if you think none of the listed preceding events 
is very likely, please try to find at least one preceding event that could 
have occurred prior to the described situation.’ 
 
Before proceeding to the next task item, participants are asked to rate how 
much they blame themselves and how much they blame their best friend for the 




social situation on a 7-point Likert scale. Figure IV.3 and Figure IV.4 present an 
example of the same task item in the self-agency (participant) and other-agency 
(participant’s best friend) condition. The SAIT consists of 15 items presented in 
the self-agency and other-agency condition, ultimately constituting a total of 30 
social scenarios presented.  
 
 
Figure IV.3: Self-agency item of the SAIT: The participant (X) takes credit for their best friend’s 
(Y) effort. All preceding events that could have led to the presented negative social situation depict 
the participant’s best friend (Y) as the agent. 
 





Figure IV.4: Other-agency item of the SAIT: The participant’s best friend (Y) takes credit for the 
participant’s (X) effort. All preceding events that could have led to the presented negative social 
situation depict the participant (X) as the agent. 
 
Although the pre-study provided data not only for negative items/social 
situations, causing guilt or shame, but also for positive social situations evoking 
feelings of gratitude and pride, only negative items were considered for the 
development of the SAIT. This decision was based on the focus of the research 
question (blame), alongside with practical considerations such as the number of 
overall items and task duration. Overall completion time for the SAIT was 
planned to not exceed 20–30 minutes. It took most MDD patients, however, 
considerably longer to complete the task compared with HC participants. 
 
IV.3.3) Statistical analysis of the SAIT 
Statistical analyses of SAIT data compared MDD patients with and 
without anxious distress and HC participants. The change in analysis strategy 
which originally aimed at comparing MDD and HC participants without 




distinguishing between MDD subtypes was based on the results of the explorative 
analyses of the NeuroMooD data which highlighted potential differences between 
MDD patients of the anxious and the non-anxious subtype (see chapter III). 
Moreover, the SAIT was analysed in the MDD completers of the NeuroMooD 
study to investigate differences in task results pre-treatment versus post-treatment. 
Self-blaming emotional biases on the SAIT were analysed by measuring 
means of self-blaming and other-blaming ratings on 7-point Likert scales in the 
self-agency and other-agency condition for each participant and across study 
groups. A repeated measures ANOVA was used to probe the effects of group and 
agency as well as their interaction.  
The SAIT conceptualises overgeneralisation of agency-incongruent 
internalised blame relative to externalised blame as an increased number of 
negative internalising preceding events chosen in the other-agency condition 
relative to the sum of preceding externalising events chosen in the self-agency 
condition. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to investigate differences 
between MDD groups with and without anxious distress and HC participants. 
Furthermore, a repeated measure ANOVA was used to test changes on the 
SAIT in the treatment groups of the NeuroMooD study completers, comparing 
task results at baseline and after completing the NeuroMooD study. 
Lastly, an explorative hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted to develop a 
better understanding of the structure of the data. 
 
 





IV.4.1) SAIT results: self-blaming emotional biases 
 Data was analysed for self-blaming emotions relative to blaming one’s 
best friend (other-blame) in the self-agency condition and other-agency condition 
of social scenarios presented in the SAIT. Results were compared by study groups 
(MDD with anxious distress vs MDD without anxious distress vs HC 
participants). Difference scores were computed for each individual using the 
means of the self-blame and other-blame ratings across the 15 trials in each 
condition (self- and other-agency) (Table IV.1).  
 
Table IV.1: Self-blame relative to other-blame across groups 
Condition Study Group Mean SD n 
Self-agency:  
Mean of self-blame 
relative to other-blame 
MDD anxious distress   .56 1.57 32 
MDD non-anxious 1.25 1.86 16 
HC participants -.18 1.36 18 
Total   .52 1.65 66 
 
Other-agency: 
Mean of self-blame 
relative to other-blame 
 
MDD anxious distress 
 





MDD non-anxious   .21 1.70 16 
HC 1.07   .88 18 
Total   .61 1.51 66 
No statistically significant effect of group (F(2,63)=.26, p=.772, ηp²=.008) or agency (F(1,63) 
=.07, p=.793, ηp²=001) were found using a repeated measures ANOVA. An interaction effect was 
detected between agency and group (F(2,63)=5.22, p=.008, ηp²=.0142). Self-blaming biases were 
found only for the non-anxious MDD group in the self-agency condition (see Figure IV.5), HC 
participants and MDD patients with anxious distress did not present with self-blaming biases. SD 
= standard deviation; n = sample size. 
 





Figure IV.5: MDD patients without anxious distress show self-blaming biases in the self-agency 
condition (SE=.59, t=2.60, p=.011). MDD patients of the anxious distress subtype and HC 
participants do not present with self-blaming biases in the self-agency or other-agency condition. 
sMDD = symptomatic MDD, sa = self-agency, oa = other-agency. 
 
IV.4.2) SAIT results: overgeneralisation of preceding event information 
The sum of preceding events chosen in the self- and other-agency 
condition was calculated as an indicator of overgeneralised blame. Means for the 
sum values were calculated per group (MDD with anxious distress vs MDD 
without anxious distress vs HC participants) as displayed in Table IV.2. The SAIT 
requires participants to choose at least one preceding event per scenario and only 
more than one if other preceding events are perceived as equally likely. A sum 
value of 15 preceding events constitutes the minimum, a total of 225 events the 








Table IV.2: Sum of preceding events chosen  
Condition Study Group Mean SD n 
Self-agency:  
 
MDD anxious distress 22.13 10.25 32 
MDD non-anxious 18.19   6.56 16 
HC participants 22.67 11.89 18 












MDD non-anxious 17.94   6.93 16 
HC 23.50 13.10 18 
Total 22.42 13.27 66 
The SAIT measures overgeneralisation of internalised blame relative to externalised blame as an 
increased number of preceding internalising blame events chosen in the other-agency condition 
relative to the number of preceding externalising blame events chosen in the self-agency condition. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, a repeated measures ANOVA did not reveal differences between 
groups in the number of preceding events chosen (F(2,63)=1.21, p=.306, ηp²=.037) and no effect 
of agency was detected (F(1,63)=1.03, p=.314, ηp²=.016). Moreover, no interaction effect of group 
and agency was observed F(2,63)=.64, p=.531, ηp²=.020. 
 
IV.4.3) SAIT results: NeuroMooD MDD group pre- vs post-treatment 
 Because there were no baseline abnormalities on the number of preceding 
events chosen on the SAIT in MDD patients, I focused the longitudinal data 
analysis on the self-blaming emotional bias detected in the self-agency condition 
at baseline in MDD patients without anxious distress. Testing whether changes in 
self-blaming emotional biases occurred on the SAIT in MDD completers of the 
treatment groups of the NeuroMooD study, task results at baseline (visit 1) were 
compared with results post-treatment (visit 5) in the psychological intervention 
and the rtfMRI neurofeedback group (see Table IV.3). 
 




Table IV.3: Difference scores for self-blame relative to other-blame ratings pre- vs 
post-treatment in NeuroMooD MDD patients 
Condition 
 




NFB MDD non-anxious 2.41 1.71 6 
Psych MDD non-anxious 0.68 1.81 8 




NFB MDD non-anxious 2.20 1.32 6 
Psych MDD non-anxious 0.50 2.23 8 
Total MDD non-anxious 1.23 2.03 14 
Analyses were run only in MDD patients without anxious distress in both treatment groups and 
only for the self-agency condition of the SAIT, as it was only MDD patients without anxious 
distress that showed self-blaming biases and those were restricted to the self-agency condition of 
the SAIT (see section IV.4.1). No change in self-blaming bias occurred post-treatment compared 
with baseline in the non-anxious MDD group as no effect of time was found, using a repeated 
measures ANOVA (F(1,12)=.24, p=.633, ηp²=.020). There was no significant effect of treatment 
group with only a trend-wise difference (F(1,12)=3.55, p=.084, ηp²=.023) and no interaction effect 
between time and treatment group (F(1,12)=.00, p=.964, ηp²=.000). 
 
IV.4.4) SAIT results: explorative analysis of response structure 
A hierarchical cluster analysis was performed to explore further the 
structure of responses given by all participants (n=66; MDD patients with anxious 
distress: n=32, MDD without anxious distress: n=16, HC participants: n=18). 
Based on the dendrogram in Figure IV.6, it appears that participants gave 
meaningful responses and did not choose preceding events randomly. Participants 
showed preferences for certain preceding events in a meaningful way as preceding 
events of similar meaning are located in close proximity to each other in the 
dendrogram, displaying high levels of co-occurrence across participant responses.  






Figure IV.6: Dendrogram displaying proximity-based co-occurrence of chosen responses across 
participants.  
 





IV.5.1) Discussion of main findings 
 This research aimed to test the hypotheses that patients with MDD would 
firstly show self-blaming emotional biases on the SAIT and secondly present with 
an overgeneralisation in their perception of preceding events when internalising 
rather than externalising blame. The results confirmed the first hypothesis in 
MDD patients without anxious distress who showed self-blaming emotional bias, 
which was found in the self-agency condition as one would expect. This self-
blaming emotional bias did not change after the intervention, and there was no 
significant difference between intervention groups. These results differed from 
MDD patients with anxious distress and HC participants who showed no self-
blaming emotional biases on the SAIT. There was no support for the second 
hypothesis in that there was no evidence of overgeneralisation of preceding 
actions related to internalising or externalising blame in either group. 
The finding that MDD patients without anxious distress showed self-
blaming emotional biases compared to the other groups confirms the results of the 
previous chapter in which patients with anxious distress were shown to externalise 
blame more than the non-anxious distress group. These findings are in keeping 
with the known association between anxiety and reactive anger and 
externalisation of blame, clinically acknowledged in that irritability is a DSM 
diagnostic criterion for generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). 
Finding evidence of self-blaming biases in the self-agency condition rather 
than other-agency condition was expected, given that the self-agency condition 




was designed to elicit self-blame and the other-agency condition was designed to 
elicit blaming one’s best friend as described in previous papers probing moral 
sentiments (Zahn et al., 2009). Finding no change in self-blaming emotional 
biases, on the other hand, might be the result of a very low sample size in the 
different subgroups that were modelled (type of intervention). 
Failing to find evidence for overgeneralisation of preceding events in 
MDD when internalising or externalising blame, could be explained by the task 
not being able to measure the intended function or an indicator that patients with 
MDD show intact inferences regarding preceding events with no 
overgeneralisation of those related to internalising blame. Arguments for the task 
not being a valid measure of overgeneralisation are overall low numbers of 
preceding events chosen which could be due to the task not offering enough 
events that were perceived as potentially relevant to the presented social 
situations. Contrary to the aim of the online pre-study, the data collected may not 
have resulted in preceding events with a close causal relationship to the social 
situation and instead related to tit-for-tat representations of moral indebtedness. 
Moreover, concluding from participants’ qualitative feedback after completing the 
SAIT, it was challenging for them to envision the presented social scenarios as it 
felt difficult for them to imagine their best friend would act in such negative ways 
towards them. Arguments against the task being invalid are that the cluster 
analysis shows meaningful associations between chosen preceding events, 
indicating that participants made meaningful choices rather than giving responses 
at random. If one assumes that the task did capture 
differentiation/overgeneralisation of preceding social actions/events, then one 
would have to conclude the remarkable intactness of this complex cognitive 




system in patients with MDD. Following this argument, observed self-blaming 
biases in MDD could then not be explained on the basis of difficulties in 
differentiated inferences regarding preceding events. 
 
IV.5.2) Limitations 
The following limitations need to be considered. Analogous to the 
modified version of the VMST, the SAIT lacks test validation, which impacts on 
the interpretability of the collected data. Given that participants reported 
challenges in relation to the stimuli/social scenarios presented in the SAIT, it is 
likely that this affected participants’ responses. The SAIT may have failed to offer 
relevant preceding events with a close causal relationship to the scenarios, which 
could have contributed to the failure in finding evidence for an overgeneralisation 
of negative preceding actions internalising or externalising blame. Further, it 
might be disadvantageous that the task implicates the participant’s best friend, as 
participants perceived it as difficult to imagine their best friend acting negatively 
towards them. This suggests that a task design which targets an unspecified or 
even disliked person might be preferable and would make it easier for participants 
to relate and hence, complete the SAIT. 
 
IV.5.3) Conclusion 
MDD patients with anxious distress did not show self-blaming emotional 
biases on the SAIT. This confirms results from the previous chapter, which 
demonstrated that this patient group tends to externalise blame more compared 
with MDD patients without anxious distress. Modifications of the task may turn 
the SAIT into a more useful measure. Changes in the design of the task could 




contribute to creating a greater overlap in applicability between preceding events 
for a given social scenario, thereby allowing participants to overgeneralise more 
easily. In addition, it might be useful to gather further normative data to establish 
a greater pool of preceding events with a closer causal relationship to the 
situation. Given that it was difficult for participants to imagine that their best 
friend could act negatively towards them, one could consider choosing an 
unspecified person or a disliked, but well-known person in the other-agency 
condition rather than the best friend. 
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Chapter V: General discussion 
V.1) Introduction 
V.1.1) Theoretical foundation and relevance of this research 
The work presented within this thesis builds on research in support of the 
revised learned helplessness model as postulated by Abramson, Seligman & 
Teasdale (1978). This attributional model of major depressive disorder (MDD) 
claims that a particular dysfunctional attributional style predisposes individuals to 
depression. Specifically, it posits that attributing blame for negative life events in 
an overgeneralised and persistent manner, such that the individual automatically, 
yet falsely assumes themselves as being responsible for negative outcomes, 
increases the risk for depression. Such beliefs may develop particularly when the 
individual is confronted with negative life events beyond their control.  
The revised learned helplessness model stresses the profound impact of 
self-blaming tendencies as a consequence of this maladaptive attributional style, 
which corresponds to overgeneralised and persistent feelings of guilt and leads to 
low levels of self-esteem as a further important characteristic of MDD. For 
example, the situation may occur that an individual fails in an exam after not 
having had access to the learning material required to prepare for the test 
adequately. A maladaptive internal, stable and global attribution style may cause 
the individual to conclude: ‘I fail at everything. I am stupid. There is nothing I can 
do that would help me pass an exam.’. Such thought processes omit the belief of 
being able to achieve better outcomes in the future. According to the revised 
learned helplessness model, the expectation of uncontrollability in future 




situations is considered to generate many of the symptoms observed in depression, 
including low mood, also anxiety, dysregulation of appetite, low activity and 
drive, and cognitive deficits. Moreover, it is thought to contribute to changes in 
neurochemistry that might increase the susceptibility to MDD (Hoffman et 
Al’Absi, 1998).  
Considerable research has been established in support of the revised 
learned helplessness model, highlighting the depressogenic characteristic of 
overgeneralised self-blaming biases in MDD compared to a diminished tendency 
to experience other-blaming emotions, i.e. indignation/anger towards others 
(Green, Moll, Deakin, Hulleman, & Zahn, 2013; Zahn et al., 2015). The neural 
basis of self-blaming biases in MDD has been established in medication-free 
remitted MDD and found to be involving abnormal connectivity patterns between 
the right superior anterior temporal lobe (rSATL) and the subgenual cingulate 
cortex. Hyper-connectivity between the rSATL and the posterior subgenual cortex 
(SC) was associated with recurrence in remitted MDD within 14 months (Lythe et 
al., 2015). These findings built the foundation for the work presented in this 
thesis, as they inspired the investigation of self-blaming biases by means of a 
newly designed experimental task, the social agency inference task (SAIT) and 
the testing of the clinical benefits of a novel treatment protocol. A self-guided 
psychological intervention was employed, with and without real-time fMRI 
(rtfMRI) neurofeedback, aimed at tackling the neurocognitive architecture of self-
blaming emotional biases in MDD. The development of novel treatment 
approaches is needed as a high number of MDD patients do not fully respond to 
standard forms of treatment and present with a recurrent course of illness with 
multiple major depressive episodes (MDEs) or a chronic persistence of symptoms. 




This is particularly the case for the anxious distress subtype of MDD, which 
seems to vary from non-anxious MDD in certain clinical characteristics, often 
showing a poor response to treatment (Gaspersz et al., 2017). In current clinical 
practice, complex interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) do 
not target self-blaming biases in MDD specifically. Compassion-focused therapy 
(CFT) comes closest to this aim by facilitating that patients tackle their 
maladaptive self-criticism with self-kindness. Cognitive therapy addresses 
dysfunctional beliefs more broadly, using Socratic dialogue.  
The research presented in this thesis aimed at investigating the 
neurocognitive basis of self-blaming emotional biases in MDD, while addressing 
the need for new intervention approaches for early treatment-resistant MDD. 
 
V.1.2) Hypotheses, findings and limitations of this work 
In chapter II, using a randomised controlled trial in MDD patients with 
early treatment-resistance (NeuroMooD), I investigated whether guilt-rtfMRI 
neurofeedback is superior over a psychological intervention in reducing 
depressive symptoms and self-blame while increasing self-esteem. The study 
further investigated whether the rtfMRI neurofeedback group was able to decrease 
self-blame-selective hyper-connectivity between the posterior SC and the right 
rSATL. Further, the study hypothesised that improvements in symptoms should 
be associated with decreases in self-blame-selective hyper-connectivity in the 
rtfMRI neurofeedback group.  
 Both interventions were demonstrated to be safe for MDD patients and 
found to improve depression scores by 46%, with response rates of more than 
55% in both treatment groups. These findings are in line with previously 




published studies that established clinical benefits of rtfMRI neurofeedback 
interventions in MDD (Linden et al., 2012; Mehler et al., 2018; Young et al., 
2017; Young et al., 2014). Contrary to the hypothesis, however, rtfMRI 
neurofeedback was not found to be superior in reducing depression scores 
compared with the psychological intervention group. Nevertheless, as predicted, 
rtfMRI neurofeedback training resulted in a reduction in functional connectivity 
between the posterior SC and the rSATL for guilt relative to indignation. This 
change in connectivity was, however, not associated with the reduction in 
depressive symptoms within the rtfMRI neurofeedback group. 
Although no intervention group differences could be demonstrated on 
primary and secondary outcome measures, it is unlikely that the improvement in 
depressive symptoms solely occurred as the consequence of spontaneous 
remission or due to placebo-like effects. Placebo-response rates are generally 
estimated to be approximately 30% (Walsh, Seidman, Sysko, & Gould, 2002), 
well below the >55% observed in this study. Further, inclusion was restricted to 
early treatment-resistant, and recurrent MDD patients were included with stable 
symptoms, which further minimises the likelihood of symptom changes occurring 
due to spontaneous remission.  
Similar to this study, also Mehler et al. (2018) found no group differences 
between the active rtfMRI neurofeedback group and the rtfMRI control group in 
the reduction of depression scores, yet clinical improvement correlated with 
increased self-efficacy. The authors interpreted this as an indicator that perceived 
success in modifying the rtfMRI signal might have served a therapeutic role in 
both rtfMRI neurofeedback groups. In the NeuroMooD study, benefits were 
associated with patients’ engagement in treatment as the summed frequency of the 




use of psychological strategies throughout the trial correlated with an increase in 
self-esteem. Improved self-esteem, in turn, was found to be associated with a 
reduction in depression scores in both groups. This again shows that placebo-like 
or spontaneous remission effects are unlikely the sole explanation for 
improvements of patients after the NeuroMooD interventions. 
The lack of correlation between functional connectivity changes and 
improvement in depressive symptomatology in the rtfMRI neurofeedback group 
might have been the result of a limited treatment response of MDD patients of the 
anxious distress subtype who constituted the majority patients in the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback group (n=13 anxious vs n=6 non-anxious MDD). Interestingly, 
MDD patients with anxious distress were found to benefit significantly less from 
the rtfMRI neurofeedback training compared with non-anxious MDD, only 
46.14% of anxious distress MDD patients halved their depression scores post-
treatment, compared to a treatment response in 83.33% of patients without 
anxious distress. These results suggest that rtfMRI neurofeedback may show 
superiority over the solely psychological intervention in non-anxious MDD 
patients, whereas MDD patients with anxious distress show a strong response to 
the psychological treatment: 75% responders of the anxious distress subtype vs 
only 37.5% of non-anxious MDD halving their depression scores in this treatment 
arm. Further, these results indicate that the self-blame-selective rSATL-posterior 
SC neurofeedback target might be irrelevant for MDD of the anxious distress 
subtype, a hypothesis which requires further investigations of neural differences 
between MDD patients with and without anxious distress.  
Various potential limitations are important in the interpretation of the 
presented findings, as differences between the rtfMRI neurofeedback and the 




psychological intervention group might have been missed due to inadequate 
power. However, the effect sizes for non-superiority of the rtfMRI neurofeedback 
group were so small that it is unlikely that clinically relevant group differences 
would have been detectable in a larger sample. Moreover, the sample size was 
comparable to other studies that showed significant superiority of the active 
rtfMRI neurofeedback condition (Young et al., 2017). Effect size estimates, 
however, need to be interpreted with caution when derived from small samples, 
because of imprecise estimates of variance.  
Contrary to other studies (Young et al., 2017, Young et al., 2014), the 
majority of patients in the rtfMRI intervention group was taking antidepressant 
medication which might have influenced patients’ performance during the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback training and affected patient selection. However, this design is 
more in keeping with the clinical need of interventions in treatment-resistant 
patients, and this approach has also been taken in rtfMRI neurofeedback studies 
by Linden et al. and Mehler et al. (Linden et al., 2012; Mehler et al., 2018).  
Contrary to other randomised rtfMRI neurofeedback trials in MDD 
(Mehler et al., 2018, Young et al., 2017), the NeuroMooD study was limited by 
lacking a rtfMRI neurofeedback control arm. As mentioned above, Mehler et al. 
(2018) did not find a significant difference between groups, while Young et al. 
(2017) demonstrated a symptom reduction of more than 50% in the active rtfMRI 
neurofeedback group targeting amygdala upregulation compared to only 8% 
improvement in the control group. It is noteworthy, however, that the control 
condition in Young et al.’s study did not target brain areas involved in emotion 
processing, which might have interfered with potentially positive psychological 
effects of their control intervention.  




Importantly, the heterogeneity of patients in the NeuroMooD trial might 
have impacted on the presented findings, as MDD patients with anxious distress 
were predominant in number over only a few non-anxious MDD patients. 
Furthermore, comorbidities of past anxiety or trauma-related disorders were 
included with MDD patients experiencing enhanced residual symptoms during 
MDEs.  
 
In chapter III, this thesis referred back to the findings of the previous 
chapter and explored differences between anxious and non-anxious MDD 
subtypes to understand their differential response to the interventions in the 
NeuroMooD trial. I hypothesised that MDD with anxious distress is associated 
with higher levels of stressful life events and anger towards others and that this 
leads to reduced self-blaming emotional biases as measured on the experimental 
tasks.  
The predictions were confirmed partly, in that MDD patients with anxious 
distress showed elevated levels of anger and hostility on some (i.e. POMS 
subscale), but not all measures (modified VMST) compared with non-anxious 
MDD patients and HC participants. Also, the anxious MDD subtype did not differ 
on measures of early life trauma compared with non-anxious MDD but was found 
to have experienced past stressful life events more frequently. MDD groups did 
not differ on any other clinical measures. Notably, anxious and non-anxious MDD 
failed to show self-blaming biases on the modified VMST, which was a striking 
finding considering that more than 70% of MDD patients, when clinically 
assessed, expressed moderate to severe levels of guilt, shame, or self-directed 
contempt/disgust.  




The finding of increased anger/hostility on the POMS in the anxious 
distress MDD group is in keeping with clinical observations of anger-related 
symptoms in anxiety disorders, e.g. irritability in generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD). The association between anger and attack tendencies on the modified 
VMST are particularly interesting in the context of additional increases in hiding 
tendencies of the anxious MDD group compared with HC participants and 
suggests a co-existence of both withdrawal and approach-related action tendencies 
in MDD with anxious distress. The increased anger in these patients could have 
reduced their self-blaming biases in interpersonal contexts and thereby explain 
their limited response to the self-blaming bias focussed rtfMRI neurofeedback 
intervention in the NeuroMooD trial. It will be important to investigate the neural 
differences between self-blaming biases in MDD patients with low and high 
levels of hostility/anger and anxiety. Considering the involvement of amygdala in 
fear and anxiety and that MDD rtfMRI interventions that target amygdala 
response in MDD with moderate anxiety levels have been demonstrated to be 
effective (Young et al., 2017, Young et al., 2014), one could speculate that 
amygdala-focussed rtfMRI neurofeedback might be particularly useful for the 
anxious subtype of depression. This is supported by studies showing positive 
effects of amygdala rtfMRI in disorders with significant anxiety features, such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Nicholson et al., 2017; Zotev et al., 2018). 
There is evidence that stressful early life events cause reduced positive memory 
bias in remitted MDD later in life, which further supports the application of 
amygdala-enhancing rtfMRI paradigm neurofeedback for positive 
autobiographical memories (Young et al., 2017; Young et al., 2014).  




Failing to find differences between both symptomatic MDD groups and 
the HC participants in self-contempt biases or levels of indignation towards others 
on the modified VMST is in contrast to the existing literature that demonstrated 
such findings in remitted MDD (Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2015). One 
explanation for this discrepancy is the employment of a shortened version of the 
VMST, further influenced by a smaller sample size compared to previous studies 
(Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2015). It may also be due to the nature of the task, 
which assesses interpersonal self-blame rather blaming oneself for failure. The 
latter may be more relevant in the predominantly anxious MDD population 
selected for this trial. Previous studies using the VMST assessed remitted MDD 
patients contrary to the early treatment-resistant MDD population included in this 
study which created different selection biases as anxious distress patients are more 
likely to exhibit a chronic course and were therefore probably underrepresented in 
previous studies of fully remitted MDD. It is further suggested, that self-blaming 
biases may be a particular characteristic of the melancholic subtype of MDD 
rather than specific to other subtypes (Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2015). 
Ultimately, the current findings highlight the need for developing additional 
experimental tasks to capture self-blaming biases in non-interpersonal contexts. 
 
In chapter IV, I developed a novel task, the SAIT, that probed self-
blaming emotional biases at the level of preceding events that may be perceived 
as the cause of negative social outcomes, to address questions raised by the 
previous chapter. The SAIT was used to investigate whether patients with MDD 
show self-blaming emotional biases and overgeneralised representations of 
preceding events when internalising blame.  




The hypotheses were confirmed partly as the results demonstrated self-
blaming emotional biases in the self-agency condition of the SAIT in the non-
anxious MDD group, whereas MDD patients with anxious distress and HC 
participants did not show self-blaming emotional biases. Further, no change in 
self-blaming emotional biases post-intervention was detected in MDD patients 
with and without anxious distress who participated in the NeuroMooD trial, 
irrespective of treatment group. Contrary to the hypothesis, patients with MDD 
did not show an overgeneralisation of preceding actions related to internalising 
blame relative to externalising blame on the SAIT. 
The finding that MDD patients with anxious distress did not show self-
blaming emotional biases confirms the results of the previous chapter that 
demonstrated that this patient group tends to externalise blame more than non-
anxious MDD patients. As aforementioned, this finding is further supported by 
the clinical acknowledgement of irritability as a DSM diagnostic criterion for 
anxiety disorders, such as GAD or trauma-related disorders such as PTSD. 
Finding evidence of self-blaming emotional biases in the self-agency condition 
only, but not in the other-agency condition validates the task design which is 
constructed to evoke self-blame in the self-agency condition and blaming one’s 
best friend in the other-agency condition (Green et al., 2013; Zahn et al., 2009). 
Failing to find a change in self-blaming emotional biases in the non-anxious MDD 
group post-treatment compared to baseline might have been due to low sample 
sizes in both intervention groups. Failing to find evidence for an 
overgeneralisation of negative preceding actions internalising or externalising 
blame, however, could also be due to potential weaknesses in the task design, 
such as, that the task may not have presented relatable social situations or may 




have failed to offer relevant preceding events with a close causal relationship to 
the scenarios. This was despite best efforts to base its design on pre-study data.  
Further, a task design that targets an unspecified or even disliked person 
instead of the participant’s best friend might have been preferable, as participants 
reported to struggle in imagining that their best friend could act negatively 
towards them. Despite these challenges, participants were found to make 
meaningful choices in their responses, which argues for the SAIT’s validity. 
Consequently, failing to find evidence for an overgeneralisation tendency might 
then indicate that most MDD patients are indeed able to make intact causal 
inferences regarding preceding events. In turn, this would suggest that self-
blaming emotional biases must arise at a different cognitive level and are not due 
to difficulties in differentiated inferences regarding preceding events. This 
conclusion will require confirmation through further research in larger samples 
after optimising the SAIT further and potentially combined with qualitative 
research in order to provide further evidence of its validity. The most important 
modifications to the SAIT for such future studies, in my opinion, imply the 
generation of a closer causal relationship between preceding events and social 
situations based on the collection of further normative data. 
 
V.1.3) Overall conclusion 
The self-blame-targeted, self-guided psychological intervention with and 
without additional rtfMRI neurofeedback, developed for the NeuroMooD trial, 
was found to be a safe approach to the treatment of current and insufficiently 
remitted, early treatment-resistant MDD. The clinical benefits of these 
interventions are comparable and resulted in a reduction of depressive symptoms 




by 46% and response rates of more than 55% in both treatment groups. Although 
the influence of placebo-like effects cannot be excluded, it is likely that the 
engagement with self-guided psychological intervention components specifically 
contributed to beneficial effects. Differences appear to exist in the efficacy of 
these interventions for different MDD subtypes. MDD patients without anxious 
distress were found to respond better to the combined rtfMRI neurofeedback plus 
psychological intervention of self-blaming emotions.  
It remains unclear whether higher levels of anger in MDD patients with 
anxious distress interfered with their treatment response to the rtfMRI 
neurofeedback and whether the rSATL-subgenual connectivity target might be 
less relevant for this MDD subtype. More research is needed to investigate these 
issues further, and future studies need to replicate the findings presented in this 
work. Future studies should control for non-specific effects. Given that the 
presented trial was lacking a treatment-as-usual group, a possible contribution of 
non-specific treatment effects to the improvement in both intervention groups 
cannot be excluded. Future studies should also investigate the long-term benefits 
of self-blame targeted rtfMRI neurofeedback and psychological interventions in 
MDD; a valuable endeavour that could contribute to developing novel treatment 
approaches for MDD patients who do not benefit from standard interventions. 
A discrepancy between clinical and experimental measures of self-blaming 
emotions stress the need for developing novel tasks that assess self-blaming 
emotional biases in MDD in interpersonal and achievement-related contexts. It 
further highlights the importance of modifying existing measures to better capture 
the neurocognitive basis of self-blaming emotional biases in MDD.  




Ultimately, the findings presented in this thesis are in partial support of the 
revised learned helplessness model in MDD. Interventions explicitly targeting 
self-blaming emotions in MDD were found to be associated with a significant 
improvement in depressive symptoms as well as self-esteem, which was 
particularly valid for non-anxious MDD patients who were found to present with 
self-blaming emotional biases on some, but not all measures. Finding evidence for 
the applicability of the revised learned helplessness model for MDD patients with 
anxious distress, however, appears to be rather challenging. There was 
experimental evidence contrary to the model’s predictions in MDD patients of the 
anxious distress subtype by showing their increased levels of anger directed at 
others. Should future studies confirm the observation of these differences between 
anxious and non-anxious MDD, this might imply that a different theoretical and 
neural basis may underpin distinct subtypes of MDD. Ultimately this would 
suggest establishing differentiation in core themes in the treatment of specific 
MDD subtypes, in terms of neuromodulatory as well as psychotherapeutic 
approaches.  
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Appendix A: Phone screening template 
NeuroMooD 







Instructions for Interviewer are marked in bold. 
Text to be read literally is put into quotation marks and ‘italic’. 
 
Oral consent to be read first: 
This is the ethics approved wording which cannot be changed! 
 
'I would like to do a short phone interview with you, which will take around 15 
minutes. This is necessary to see whether some conditions rule out that we can 
include you into the study. You will be asked questions about psychiatric, 
neurological and medical symptoms, treatments, learning problems and whether 
such symptoms occurred in your family. I will also ask about substance or alcohol 
abuse. Things which are an obstacle to participate in MRI studies such as 
possible pregnancy or metallic objects will also be asked. Results of these 
questions will not be stored, but we ask your permission to store your contact 
information and whether you passed the screening for the study group in an 
electronic database which is protected by a password and can only be accessed 
by the investigators.' 
 
I) General questions for all participants 
Question Response Comments 
Do you agree to this interview? yes no If no => Exclusion 
 
If participant’s details have not been recorded prior to the phone screening, get full name 
& email address (do NOT note down here) 
 
Do you live in the Greater London 
Area? 
yes no If no => where? How long 
does it take them to get to 
London?  
How did you hear about our study?  
How many years of education have you 
had? 
 
At what age did you start and leave 
school? 
 Towards the end of the 
study, controls will be 
selected to be age- and 
education- matched to the 
patient population 
What is your age?  If < 18 => Exclusion 
 
 
Ask for participant’s DOB  record on separate piece of paper, not on this document! 
 
Are you right-handed? yes no If no => Exclusion 
Is English your first language? yes no If no => Exclusion 
If any other early 
languages 






detected -  
Is English your parents’ 
first language?  
At what age did you first 
speak English / did you 
learn English? 
Which language did you 
speak at home/school? 
Have you ever been diagnosed with or 
treated for any psychiatric or 
psychological problem (e.g. 
Depression, Bipolar or manic-
depressive, Anxiety, Panic Disorder, 
Posttraumatic Stress, Eating, 
Borderline Personality, Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, Psychotic or 
schizophrenic disorders, Attention-
Deficit-Disorder)? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion as HC 
If yes => Who 
diagnosed? 
If more than 1 => Did 
they occur 
independently?  
Anxiety allowed in MDD if 
not prominent. If PD => 
screen for study2 
Have you ever, at any time, taken anti-
depressant or anti-psychotic 
medications (such as Prozac, Zoloft, 
Zyprexa, Haldol)? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion as HC 
 
Are you currently taking any 
medication? 
yes no MDD/PD group: 
antidepressant 
medication allowed if on 
stable dosage for at least 
6 weeks prior study 
participation. If other 
centrally active 
medications than 
antidepressants that will 
not be stopped anyway 
before participation for 
other reasons than study 
participation => Exclusion 
If yes => What medications? Dosage? 
Since when this medication/dosage? 
(must be on stable dose for at least 
6weeks) 
 
Have you been treated with counselling 
/ CBT / psychotherapy in the past? 
yes no If yes => When? How 
many sessions? 
Are you currently treated with 
counselling / CBT / psychotherapy? 
yes no If yes => Since When? 
How many sessions 
remaining? 
 
=> Exclusion in case of 
CBT/psychotherapy; 
irregular sessions of 
counselling = ok / maybe 
inclusion after last session 
Have you ever attempted suicide in the 
past? 
yes no If yes => When? Para-







Have you ever been diagnosed with or 
treated for any neurological problem 
(weakness, gaze problems, walking 
problems, motor coordination, epilepsy, 
stroke, Parkinson’s Disease)? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion  
In case of concussions: for 
how long unconscious? 
Any signs on MRI? 
Have you ever had a drug or alcohol 
problem? 
yes no If questionable => Ask 
about any treatment for 
the problem.  
If yes => Exclusion  
Have you ever had 3 or more alcoholic 
drinks within a 3 hour period on 3 or more 
occasions? 
yes no If yes => Explore further 
with question below  
Have you ever taken any drugs more than 
once: for example stimulants, 
amphetamines, diet pills, cocaine, 
morphine, LSD, ‘mushrooms’, ecstasy, 
cannabis (‘hash’), tranquilizers, steroids, 
sleeping pills or pain killers? 
yes no If yes => Explore further: 
e.g. when drugs were last 
taken, how often; 
check if participant is 
likely to be drug free for 
study 
In the past have you been intoxicated, 
high, or hungover from alcohol or drugs 
when you had other responsibilities (work, 
school, home) or did you have legal 
problems, problems with other people or 
accidents because of this? 
yes no If yes or questionable => 
explore further; Ask for 
examples of behaviour, 
how frequently this 
occurred, any significant 
consequences? If 
significant => Exclusion 
Have any of your first degree relatives 
(parents, siblings or children) ever been 
treated for/diagnosed with 
psychosis/schizophrenia/depression/bipolar 
disorder or manic depression? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion as HC 
 
If yes => who treated for 
what? 
Have you ever had  any significant 
physical health problems, for example 
heart, lung problems, diabetes, 
hypertension, arterial diseases, thyroid 
function problems, liver, kidney disorders, 
rheumatoid disorders, infectious diseases 
or anything else? 
Do you still have your appendix? 
Have you ever had any surgeries in your 
life? 
yes no If yes => check with Dr 








Have you ever had any learning 
disabilities? 
yes no If yes => Who diagnosed? 
Was your educational 
performance affected by 
this? 
Did you attend a specialist 
school? (If reading 
difficulty, check if able to 
read stimulus words at Visit 
1) 
Do you have hearing problems or problems 
with vision? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion if 







II) Screening questions for all participants (Adapted MINI
1
) 
Have you ever had a phase of at least 2 
weeks in your life where you needed only 
a few hours (for example 3h) of sleep and 
were still totally alert and very active the 
whole day, where you were very 
enthusiastic and did things you usually 
wouldn’t do?  
 
Have you ever had a period of time when 
you were feeling so good, “high”, excited, 
or “on top of the world” that other people 
thought you were not your normal self? 
 
IF NO: Have you ever had a period of 
time when you were feeling irritable, 
angry, or short-tempered for most of the 
day, every day, for at least several days? 
What was this like?  (Was that different 
from the way you usually are?) Was this 
outside of depression? 
 IF YES: Did you also feel like you 
were “hyper” or “wired” and had an 
unusual amount of energy? Where 
you so much more active than is 
typical for you? (Did other people 




































If yes => Exclusion 
For the next question, please just say “yes” 
or “no”, no details will be asked nor 
recorded: 
Have you ever been traumatized in a way, 
that you feared your life was in danger or 
were you sexually assaulted?  
yes no If yes => Are you still 
bothered by it? 




If currently significantly 
distressed => Exclusion 
Do you experience frequent states of 
tension and use self-injuries such as 
cutting or burning to reduce tension? 
yes no If currently yes => 
Exclusion 
If yes in the past: When 
the last time? Did this 
only occur during 
depressive phases?  
If occurred outside 
depressive phases => 
Exclusion 
 
Do you get very tense or anxious, when 






If yes => Did this only 
occur during depressive 
Do you wear glasses or contact lenses? yes no If yes => What 
prescription / strength? 
(Up to 7 diopters can be 





not symmetrically arranged, when you 
can’t wash your hands, after you have 
touched a door knob, when you can’t 
perform certain daily activities according 
to a fixed and detailed routine (e.g. 
washing, certain professional or household 
activities)?  
phases?  
Does this interfere with 
your professional or 
personal life? 
Have you ever heard voices with no person 
or audio-device as a source? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion 
Have you ever lost control of your body 
movements or your thoughts and felt 
controlled by an external power? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion 
Have you experienced unusual signs 
referring specifically to you and indicating 
great danger, for example by a group or 
person threatening your life?      
yes no If yes => Exclusion 
 
III) MDD group only  





Exclusion: Duration of current MDE > 1 
year 
When did you start to feel better again?  Does not need to report 
improvement over the 
course of the current 
episode,  
 
but no significant change 
over 6 weeks before 
randomisation! 
Do you now feel as well as before your 
first depressive phase and do you feel 
back to your normal self? 





Ask =>Do you 
experience symptoms 
that are distressing or 
interfering with your 
life? 
In your most severe depressive phase, 
have you been consistently depressed or 
yes no Only included if yes 
Have you ever been consistently depressed 
or down, most of the day, nearly every day, 
for at least 2 weeks? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion as 
HC 
 
Check eligibility for 
MDD group:  
Ask when participant 
experienced those 
feelings & continue with 






down, most of the day, nearly every 
day, for at least 2 months? 
During the most severe period of that 
depressive episode, did you have a 
general loss of drive and energy, where 
your activities were either slowed down 
or only possible against a huge inner 
resistance? 
yes no Only included if yes 
During the most severe period of that 
depressive episode, did you lose your 
ability to respond to things that 
previously gave you pleasure, or 
cheered you up? 
yes no Only included if yes 
 
 
DSM-V criteria for MDD 
Over the last month, has there been a 
period of time when you were feeling 
depressed, down, empty or hopeless? 
Was this most of the day, nearly 
every day? 
yes no If yes: 
How long has this period 
lasted? As long as 2 
weeks? 
Over the last month, has there been a 
period of time 
when you lost interest or pleasure in 
things you usually 
enjoyed? Was this most of the day, 
nearly every 
day? 
yes no If yes: 
How long has this period 
lasted? As long as 2 
weeks? 
During the same 2 week period: has 
your appetite 
decreased or increased nearly every 
day? 
yes no  
During the same 2 week period: have 
you been sleeping too much or too less 
nearly every day? 
yes no If yes: How many hours 
more/less? 
During the same 2 week period: have 
you been so fidgety or restless that you 
were unable to sit still? 
 
What about the opposite – talking more 
slowly than is normal for you? Has it 









If yes: Has it been so bad 
that other people noticed?  




feelings(due to anxiety)  
During the same 2 week period: have 
you felt tired or low in energy most of 
the day nearly every day? 
yes no If yes: how bothering has 
it been? 
During the same 2 week period: have 
you had feelings of worthlessness or 
excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly 
every day? 
yes no  
Not merely self-reproach 
or guilt about being sick! 
During the same 2 week period: have 
you had problems to think or 
concentrate or to make decisions? Has 
it been nearly every day? 







IV) Study 1 only: Eligibility for MRI 
For women: Are you absolutely sure 
that you are not pregnant? 
 









Exclusion for MRI if no 
 
If yes: Ask about 
brand/type 
Check MRI safety with 
CNS 




yes no Potential exclusion for 
MRI if yes; tattoos can 
warm up, permanent 
make-up = definite 
exclusion! (=> also, 
tattoos may reduce MR 
image quality) 
Do you have loose dental implants such 
as fillings or crowns which cannot be 
removed before scanning? 
 










Absolute exclusion for 
MRI if yes 
 
Could cause MRI signal 
distortions 
Do you have any implanted electrical 
devices? (pacemaker, brain stimulator, 
ear implants, implanted delivery pumps) 
yes no Exclusion for MRI if 
yes 
Could you have any metal in your body? 
(metal clips on the wall of a large artery, 
metallic prostheses including metal pins 
and rods, heart valves, shrapnel 
fragments) 
yes no Exclusion for MRI if 
yes 
Have you ever worked as a welder or 
metal worker? (this can lead to small 
metal fragments in the eye which you 
may be unaware of) 
yes no Exclusion for MRI if 
yes 
 
Do you get anxious in confined spaces? yes no Exclusion for MRI if 
yes 
Do you require a hearing aid? yes no Exclusion for MRI if 
yes 
 
V) Study 2 only: Panic Disorder group  
Have you ever had an intense rush of 
anxiety, or what someone might call a 
‘panic attack’ when you suddenly felt 
very frightened, or anxious or 






If yes => Explore further with 
question below  
 
(=> and exclusion as HC) 
How many panic attacks did you 
have? 
 
When did the last bout of panic 
attacks start? 
 
When did you start to feel better 
again? 
 Does not need to report 
improvement over the course of 





significant change over 6 weeks 
before randomisation. 
Do you now feel as well as before 
your first panic attack and do you feel 





Only included if no and symptoms 
significantly distressing or 
interfering! 
If no: 
Ask =>Do you experience 
symptoms that are distressing or 
interfering with your life? 
Has at least one of the attacks been 
followed by 1 month (or more) of 
persistent concern or worry about 
additional attacks or their 
consequences (e.g., losing control, 
having a heart attack, “going crazy”) 
or significant maladaptive change in 
behaviour related to the attacks (e.g., 
behaviours designed to avoid having 
panic attacks, such as avoidance of 
exercise or unfamiliar situations)? 
yes no If no => Exclusion 
 
 
If yes => Ask if they felt that way 
most of the time in this month. 
Just before you began having panic 
attacks, were you taking any drugs, 
caffeine, diet pills, or other 
medicines? 
yes no If yes => Explore further: Ask 
what they took exactly and in what 
dosage. 
How much coffee, tea, or 
caffeinated beverages do you drink 
a day? 
Exclusion if aetiological. 
Just before the attacks, were you 
physically ill? 
 
yes no If yes => Explore further: What 
did the doctors say 
Exclusion if aetiological (e.g. 
hyperthyroidism/cardiopulmonary 
disorders). 
Do the panic attacks occur only in 
response to fearful situations, or only 
in response to phobic objects or 
situations, in response to obsessions, 
in response to reminders of traumatic 
events or in response to separation 
from attached figures? 
yes no If yes => Exclusion (The 
disturbance may be better explained 
by another mental disorder, e.g. 
social anxiety disorder, OCD, PTSD 
or separation anxiety disorder) 
 
Interview is stopped as soon as exclusion criterion is detected, the interviewer apologises for not being 
able to include the person and thanks again for the willingness to participate.  
If necessary, one can explain that it is important for research studies to focus on specific types of 
depression (study 1) / panic disorder (study 2) because it is difficult to find significant results if patients 
with different types of depression or other problems are mixed together. 
If person meets all inclusion/exclusion criteria for one of the study groups (MDD/Panic Disorder (PD)/ 
Healthy Control (HC)), contact information and study group are stored in password protected excel 
sheet. 
The PIS and Consent Form for the respective study is sent to the person after screening and an 
appointment for Visit 1 is scheduled with at least 24h time after the person has received the PIS. The 
consent form is signed at Visit 1. 
This sheet is reviewed after the phone interview, exclusion reasons are coded in separate sheet not 
linked with screening-ID, and the questionnaire is then shredded.  
Comment:  
The screening questions for major psychiatric disorders are based on clinical experience as providing high 
sensitivity and specificity for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, OCD, PTSD and Borderline Personality 
Disorder. The screening questions for inclusion into MDD groups were taken from the melancholic subtype 
questions of the MINI/SCID for DSM-IV. This is because melancholic subtypes are most likely to fulfil ICD-
10 severe depressive episode criteria and score high enough on the MADRS. Screening questions to exclude 
current MDD were taken from SCID for DSM-V, neglecting the DSM-V criterion of suicidal thoughts. 
Remitted MDD is defined as meeting no more than 3 diagnostic criteria for current MDD. Screening 
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Imagine the following scenario: 
 
1. You drive your best friend’s car, 
cause an accident and damage it. 
Your best friend drives your car, 
causes an accident and damages it. 
2. At your best friend’s party, you 
spill wine on their carpet. 
At your party, your best friend spills 
wine on your carpet. 
3. You speak negatively about your 
best friend to their boss. 
Your best friend speaks negatively 
about you to your boss. 
4. After your best friend wins a 
competition, you spread nasty 
rumours about them. 
After you win a competition, your 
best friend spreads nasty rumours 
about you. 
5. At a game’s evening at your best 
friend’s house, you cheat during a 
poker game. 
At a game’s evening at your house, 
your best friend cheats during a 
poker game. 
6. When babysitting for your best 
friend, you slap their child. 
When babysitting for you, your best 
friend slaps your child. 
7. Your best friend lends you money, 
and you do not pay them back. 
You lend your best friend money, 
and they do not pay you back. 
8. In front of strangers, you bring up 
one of your best friend’s private 
memories. 
In front of strangers, your best friend 
brings up one of your private 
memories. 
9. When talking about politics, you 
mock your best friend’s opinions. 
When talking about politics, your 
best friend mocks your opinions. 
10. In a meeting, you take all the 
credit for your best friend’s effort. 
In a meeting, your best friend takes 
all the credit for your effort. 
11. During an important exam, you 
copy from your best friend. 
During an important exam, your best 
friend copies from you. 
12. You steal money from your best 
friend’s wallet. 
Your best friend steals money from 
your wallet. 
13. Whilst your best friend is on 
holiday, you kiss their partner. 
Whilst you are away on holiday, 
your best friend kisses your partner. 
14. When with other friends, you tell 
one of your best friend’s secrets. 
When with other friends, your best 
friend tells one of your secrets. 
15. At a dinner party, you take your 
best friend’s dessert. 
At a dinner party, your best friend 
takes your dessert. 
16. After a double date, you criticise 
your best friend’s choice of 
partner. 
After a double date, your best friend 
criticises your choice of partner. 
17. On your best friend’s birthday, 
you pretend to be ill to avoid 
attending their party. 
On your birthday, your best friend 






18. To avoid seeing your best friend, 
you lie about your plans. 
To avoid seeing you, your best 
friend lies about their plans. 
19. After too much alcohol, you shout 
at your best friend. 
After too much alcohol, your best 
friend shouts at you. 
20. After noticing your phone is 
missing, you wrongly accuse your 
best friend of stealing it. 
After noticing their phone is 
missing, your best friend wrongly 
accuses you of stealing it. 
21. At a party, you get food at the 
buffet for yourself, but not for 
your best friend. 
At a party, your best friend gets food 
at the buffet for themselves, but not 
for you. 
22. You win the lottery and do not 
share any of the money with you 
him/her. 
Your best friend wins the lottery and 
does not share any of the money 
with you. 
23. During a verbal fight, you push 
your best friend. 
During a verbal fight, your best 
friend pushes you. 
24. During a disagreement, you swear 
at your best friend. 
During a disagreement, your best 
friend swears at you. 
25. Behind your best friend’s back, 
you tell their boss about their 
mistakes. 
Behind your back, your best friend 
tells your boss about your mistakes. 
26. When your best friend rings the 
doorbell, you pretend not to be at 
home. 
When you ring the doorbell, your 
best friend pretends not to be at 
home. 
27. You refuse to help your best 
friend move to their new house. 
Your best friend refuses to help you 
move to your new house. 
28. When your best friend needs some 
help, you do not lend a hand. 
When you need some help, your best 
friend does not lend a hand. 
29. After receiving a birthday present 
from your best friend, you do not 
thank them. 
After receiving a birthday present 
from you, your best friend does not 
thank you. 
30. On the day of your best friend’s 
birthday, you forget to say happy 
birthday. 
On the day of your birthday, your 

















Imagine the following scenario: 
 
1. Someone spreads a rumour about 
your best friend, and you defend 
you her/him. 
Someone spreads a rumour about 
you, and your best friend defends 
you. 
2. When your best friend is ill, you 
leave a party early to look after 
them. 
You are ill, and your best friend 
leaves a party early to look after 
you. 





homeless, and you offer them a 
spare bed. 
your best friend offers you a spare 
bed. 
4. Your best friend finds themselves 
unemployed, and you pay their 
debts. 
You find yourself unemployed, and 
your best friend pays your debts. 
5. Your best friend needs a kidney 
transplant, and you donate yours 
to them. 
You need a kidney transplant, and 
your best friend donates theirs to 
you. 
6. In a meeting, you let your best 
friend take credit for your work. 
In a meeting, your best friend lets 
you take credit for their work. 
7. On a cold day, you give your best 
friend your coat. 
On a cold day, your best friend gives 
you their coat. 
8. After the loss of a loved one, you 
comfort your best friend. 
After the loss of a loved one, your 
best friend comforts you. 
9. In an accident your best friend 
falls into a lake, and you jump in 
to save them. 
In an accident you fall into a lake, 
and your best friend jumps in to save 
you. 
10. After a long flight home, you pick 
your best friend up from the 
airport. 
After a long flight home, your best 
friend picks you up from the airport. 
11. While your best friend is attending 
a funeral, you do all their 
housework for them. 
While you are attending a funeral, 
your best friend does all your 
housework for you. 
12. When your best friend gets 
arrested, you pay their bail. 
When you get arrested, your best 
friend pays your bail. 
13. You share your lunch with your 
best friend. 
Your best friend shares their lunch 
with you. 
14. Your best friend is in a rush, and 
you offer them a lift. 
You are in a rush, and your best 
friend offers you a lift. 
15. So that your best friend can visit 
their parents, you look after their 
pet dog. 
So that you can visit your parents, 
your best friend looks after your pet 
dog. 
16. After your best friend gets their 
hair cut, you compliment their 
appearance. 
After you get your hair cut, your 
best friend compliments your 
appearance. 
17. Your best friend falls over, and 
you help them to get up. 
You fall over, and your best friend 
helps you to get up. 
18. Your best friend is worried, and 
you give them advice. 
You are worried, and your best 
friend gives you advice. 
19. After your best friend is fired, you 
take them for dinner. 
After you are fired, your best friend 
takes you for dinner. 
20. Your best friend loses their wallet 
on holiday, and you lend them 
some money. 
You lose your wallet on holiday, and 
your best friend lends you some 
money. 
21. To give your best friend a night 
off, you look after their children. 
To give you a night off, your best 
friend looks after your children. 
22. After your best friend breaks up 
with their partner, you 
commiserate with them. 
After you break up with your 
partner, your best friend 





23. Your best friend loses their job, 
and you listen as long as needed. 
You lose your job, and your best 
friend listens as long as needed. 
24. After the death of your best 
friend’s relative, you send a 
sympathy card. 
After the death of your relative, your 
best friend sends a sympathy card. 
25. Your best friend is sad, and you 
console them. 
You are sad, and your best friend 
consoles you. 
26. Your best friend is ill, and you go 
food shopping for them. 
You are ill, and your best friend 
goes food shopping for you. 
27. Your best friend insults you, and 
you forgive them. 
You insult your best friend, and they 
forgive you. 
28. You are crying, and your best 
friend gives you a tissue. 
Your best friend is crying, and you 
give them a tissue. 
29. During your best friend’s move to 
a new house, you offer to help. 
During your move to a new house, 
your best friend offers to help. 
30. While your best friend is on 
holiday, you mow their lawn. 
While you are on holiday, your best 
friend mows your lawn. 
 
 
